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Summary 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the British Mandate in Palestine with a view 
to developing a new understanding of the interconnections and dissonances between 
the principal agencies.  Through a critical examination of British government papers 
the thesis argues that the moment of the British Mandate in Palestine signalled a new 
phase in the development of British imperialism constituting a rupture with the 
colonialist past and the advent of a new type of imperialist relationship.  The 
encounter between this new-imperialism which developed from the end of the 
nineteenth century and a Palestinian society which was in the process of 
transformation between a predominantly pre-capitalist agricultural society into a 
commodity producing capitalist one engendered a conflictual environment dislocating 
the economic, social and political structures that existed.  
 
The Balfour Declaration constituted an agreement between British imperialism 
and organised Zionism which was the establishment of a symbiotic relationship 
emerging from the coalescence of two interdependent political goals.  The British, 
intent on preserving their position as an imperial hegemon perceived the occupation of 
Palestine as a critical component of their strategy and a vital adjunct of their objective 
of remaining the dominant force in the region of the Near East.  The combined aspects 
of this strategy cannot be reduced to but may be expressed as: a desire to retain 
untrammelled communications through the Suez Canal with the Empire at large; a pre-
occupation with seeking to establish a dominant position in respect of the exploitation 
and marketisation of oil and the implantation of a colonising surrogate to act as the 
agency through which its objectives might be mediated.   
 
The Zionist objective, to create a National Home for the Jews, constituted a 
nationalist endeavour premised on the acquisition of an imperialist sponsor.   
The British course of action through the implementation of the Mandate constituted an 
intervention which distorted and gravely damaged the evolution of the economic, 
social and political life of the indigenous Palestinians. 
 
The thesis in analysing these events in a new way argues for a fresh 
appreciation of the origin and character of the British Mandate in Palestine.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis offers an innovative explanation and evaluation of the nature of the British 
occupation and Mandate in Palestine from 1917 to 1936.   Examining the process by 
which British imperialism was implemented in Palestine through a policy of settler-
colonialism I argue that this form of colonial intervention constituted a new phase in 
the development of British imperialism.  The war for plunder and the looting of goods 
characteristic of earlier forms of imperialism was, from the end of the nineteenth 
century, increasingly augmented, and to some degree supplanted, by competition for 
raw materials and control over markets.  This led to a continuous predatory activity by 
imperial powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and others, seeking 
to acquire lands and their raw materials coupled with the subjugation of rivals and the 
brutal repression of the rights of peoples of the lands conquered.1   
 
The thesis makes the case that the British occupation of Palestine and the 
implementation of the Mandate constituted a break in the nature and practice of British 
imperialism with that of the nineteenth century.  I argue that the method of 
colonisation employed by the British in respect of the Zionist project differed from 
that of the preceding period.  Furthermore the thesis contends that the Balfour 
Declaration which was innately contradictory was an expression of the coalescence of 
the strategic objectives of British imperialism with the aspirations of the Zionist 
movement.  Lastly, I argue that the British implementation of the Balfour Declaration 
and the Mandate in Palestine had a fundamentally disruptive impact on the ability of 
Palestinian society to achieve sovereignty.  By utilising the methodological approach 
outlined in Chapter One I demonstrate how the attempts by the indigenous Palestinian 
people to respond politically to the intervention of British imperialism and Zionist 
colonisation were continuously thwarted, disrupting what might otherwise have been a 
relatively untrammelled progress towards self-determination.  Whilst addressing the 
contradictions, dissonances and convergences produced by the interplay of global and 
local factors the chapters of the thesis seek to remain within an overall chronological 
framework.     
                                                
1 See for example Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Oxford: MacMillan, 1999), for a graphic 
description of the role of Belgium imperialism in the Congo region. 
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The originality of the thesis lies in the approach which has been adopted which 
emphasises the importance of analysing the global, regional and local context within 
which British imperialism implemented the Mandate.  Palestinian society which had 
already experienced challenges as a result of longer-term developments within the 
Ottoman Empire was confronted by the seismic disruption caused by the First World 
War and the British occupation of the country to which were added the challenges 
created by Zionist settlement.  The characteristics of Palestinian society were 
compromised, adversely affecting the development of the endeavour for self-
determination.  From a methodological perspective therefore the thesis will examine 
how the asymmetrical pressures exerted on Palestinian society by changes in the 
character of the Ottoman Empire coupled with the immediacy of the British 
occupation and the imposition of the Zionist project affected the growth and 
development of Palestinian society and its political response.   
 
The thesis interrogates the specificities of the new-imperialism emerging in 
Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, which was defined by four key features: 
the move towards control over sources of raw materials; the emergence of finance 
capital producing a new unity of industrial and commercial enterprises; the desire to 
hegemonise global markets and the abandonment of more traditional colonialist 
practice to be replaced by the development of a neo-colonialist strategy.  The British 
occupation of Palestine constituted the first major encounter of this new-imperialism 
with a country and a people it sought to dominate.  I argue that re-examining British 
imperialism from within a framework that foregrounds these four elements provides 
an original insight into the operations of the Mandate and the policies adopted by the 
British.  
 
British disdain for the aspirations of the indigenous peoples of lands they 
colonised was a constant.  The history of colonisation was one which cannot be 
written without due recognition of the consequences of occupation, military 
subjugation, displacement and genocide of indigenous peoples.  A superiority, at 
times articulated in quite explicitly racial terms placed all those whom the British 
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ruled into subordinate categories of human beings.2   From the outset the project of 
the creation of a homeland for the Jews was based on the denial of the rights of the 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Unlike past scholarship on this subject which has tended to concentrate on a 
chronological account of the period this thesis presents a multi-faceted interpretive 
model that engages with four critical areas.  The thesis contends that by utilising an 
awareness of these elements it is possible to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the nature of the British occupation and its consequences on the development of 
Palestinian nationalism. The first is a recognition of the specific character of British 
imperialism and the changes which it had undergone since the end of the nineteenth 
century. The second is an acknowledgment of the impact on the Ottoman Empire, and 
specifically Palestine, from its encounter with western European imperialism.  The 
third is an awareness of the economic, political and military context that Britain found 
itself in at the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of global pressures 
and structural economic and political changes. The fourth element is an appreciation of 
the context in which Palestinian society found itself as a result of both longer and 
shorter term processes maturing within the Ottoman Empire, the convulsions of the 
war, occupation and subsequently Zionist colonisation. 
 
Whilst attention will be paid to the uniqueness of each of these elements it is 
the recognition of the complex interaction between them and their social, political and 
economic dimensions which constitutes the distinctive nature of the approach that I 
have taken. I will argue that it is only through an appreciation of the asymmetrical and 
differential rhythm of development of these components that it is possible to develop 
an understanding of the conditions under which Palestinian society sought to address 
the problems it faced.  I will explain further below the approach I have used in order to 
explore how these components interacted and the degree to which they shaped British 
imperialism in Palestine and consequently Palestinian society.   
 
                                                
2  See for example Winston Churchill’s statement to the 1937 Palestine Royal Commission (Peel 
Commission) that: “I do not admit … that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians [sic] of 
America, or the black people of Australia.  I do not admit that a wrong has been done to those people 
by the fact that a stronger race [sic], a higher grade race, or, at any rate, a more worldly-wise race, to 
put it that way, has come and taken their place.”  Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Churchill and the Jews 
(London: Simon and Shuster, 2007), 120. 
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British imperialism was radically challenged by rival imperialisms and its 
occupation and colonisation of Palestine took place in a unique context prescribed by a 
global conflict.  The rivalry displayed by the contending imperialist world powers in 
the war from 1914–1918 was the manifestation of the inter-imperial competition 
which had been evident across the globe over a period of decades.  On a number of 
occasions there had been attempts by the dominant imperial powers to achieve an 
agreed division of spoils, most notably at the 1884 West Africa Conference held in 
Berlin.3  Despite attempts by diplomatic means to resolve these rivalries, localised 
skirmishes appeared periodically which were redolent of the greater contest which 
followed.4  Responding to this context the British occupation and Mandate constituted 
a break with previous imperialist practices and embodied both the apotheosis and the 
nadir of British imperialism.  During the period of the First World War the British 
sought to assert their hegemony over the Near East, as they had done over other parts 
of the world.5  They did so because, for economic, political and military reasons, they 
regarded the region as essential to the maintenance of their Empire.  
 
The thesis will analyse the development of Palestinian society consequent on 
the interaction of processes which were initiated during the course of the Ottoman 
Empire and the huge convulsions evident in the First World War.  The changes 
wrought on British perspectives by the advent of the new-imperialism shaped the 
conduct of the Mandate and the intervention of British imperialism in a neo-
colonialism of a special type.  As a consequence of British intervention, Palestinian 
society was prevented from developing in an organic manner, transitioning from a 
predominantly pre-capitalist agricultural society producing principally for 
consumption into a capitalist market-oriented and commodity producing economy.  
                                                
3 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (London: Abacus, 1991, Reprinted 2003), 239.  Prince 
Otto von Bismarck opened the Conference by declaring that its objectives were to advance the goals of 
commerce, Christianity and civilisation.  
4 Ibid., 456.  
5 Nomenclature is an important consideration when writing about this subject.  Whilst recognising that 
these are disputed questions I have sought to use terms which reflect the most common usage.  In the 
main the Arab peoples of the Palestine Mandate area considered themselves at this time to be part of 
Greater Syria.  I will use the term “Palestine” to refer to what became the occupied Mandate territory 
and “Arab Palestinian” to refer to both the Muslim and Christian people who lived in it.   
Although the term “Near East” has been used throughout this text, the United Nations and bodies such 
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development use the term “West Asia”.  The terms 
“Western Asia”, “Southwest Asia” and “Southwestern Asia” are also used by other authors to describe 
the same geographical area.  The use of “Near East” should not therefore be read as an indicator of any 
form of perspective or predisposition from which my work should be read. 
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Critical to the functioning of British imperialism in Palestine was its 
relationship with Zionism.  At the end of the nineteenth century political Zionism 
emerged as a nationalist movement largely as a response to the growing anti-Semitism 
that had developed into pogroms across Eastern Europe and Russia in particular.  
Beginning in 1881, these attacks took place mainly in cities in southern Russia 
spreading in 1883 and 1884 to Rostov, Yekaterinoslav and Odessa.6  Twenty years 
later a new wave of pogroms occurred and led to increased attempts by Jews in these 
areas to leave for Western Europe and the United States of America.  As a secular 
organisation influenced by the nationalist movements of the period Zionist leaders 
recognised that in order to achieve the objective of establishing a homeland for the 
Jews in Palestine it required an imperialist sponsor.  The aspirations of Zionism 
coalesced with the goals of British imperialist policy and were co-opted by them. I 
will argue that this constituted a different form of colonial enterprise from those which 
had preceded it.  
 
In this thesis I have concentrated on 1917–1936 as the period prior to the 
proposal for the partition of Palestine and before the eruption of the armed uprising 
against the Mandate authority.   I have done so because I would contend that it was 
during this period that the major fault lines of Palestinian politics were formed which 
shaped the way in which the events of 1948 unfolded.  Both economically and 
politically British imperialism simultaneously prevented the Palestinian peoples 
progression to nationhood whilst at the same time empowering the Zionist settler 
colonialists.  
 
A further originality of the approach that I have used in this thesis lies in the 
consideration that there is an interrelationship between the political, economic and 
social characteristics of society which constitute the framework within which the 
British Mandate operated in Palestine.  Society is the product of multi-faceted 
relationships and the nature and contradictions of these relationships are manifested 
through many forms including for example the political, social, philosophical, 
religious, cultural and ideological.   The forms of expression and contestation however 
                                                
6 Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003 [Third Edition]), 58. 
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are themselves constrained in the last analysis by the material nature of the economic 
character of the society in which they function.  This is a tradition of analysis which 
has been summarised as one which argues that “the ultimately determining element in 
history is the production and reproduction of real life”.7  Palestinian society under the 
Mandate was confronted by specific challenges in the social, economic and political 
fields which were not only the consequence of developments within that society itself 
but were the product of developments in British and Ottoman societies. The approach 
adopted will acknowledge and examine the complex dialectics created by the 
combinations and the disjunctures of economic, social and political energies on 
Palestinian society. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the role and importance played by social agents, 
individuals and political organisations, I argue that these agencies were themselves the 
products of and to a certain extent the casualties of a process which was not of their 
making and over which they had limited control.  The methodology adopted however 
rejects any notion of inevitability or economic determinism. It situates itself within an 
approach which argues for a recognition that the more local combination of elements 
already mentioned above were interrelated with and influenced by developments on 
the wider regional and global scale such as the permeation of capitalist economic 
relations into non-capitalist societies. The division of the world into imperialist 
spheres of influence following the First World War and the immediacy of changes 
locally evident through the emergence of new social and political forces critically 
affected the circumstances within which the attainment of Palestinian self-
determination was sought. 
 
The theoretical and conceptual framework I have used in this thesis is 
influenced by the writings of Karl Marx, Ellen Meiksins Wood, David Harvey, E. H. 
Carr, Christopher Hill and others in analysing afresh the way in which British policies 
were influenced by the characteristics of the new-imperialism.8  This thesis has argued 
                                                
7 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 692. 
See also in the same work Karl Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, 182. 
8 Inter alia: Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Allen Kane, 1973); Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of 
Capitalism (London: Verso, 2002); David Harvey, Limits to Capital (London: Verso, New Edition 
2006), The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); E.H. Carr, What is History? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 1961); Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical 
Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 
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that the period within which the British government established the Mandate in 
Palestine constituted a moment in which the nature of imperialism was undergoing 
profound changes moving from a time in which it was typified by the use of 
colonisation as its defining characteristic to one in which the expansion of overseas 
investment was beginning to become the dominant form of its operation.  The last 
quarter of the nineteenth century had seen the rapid escalation of inter-imperialist 
rivalry resulting from the aggressive competition for dominance over increasingly 
important raw materials.  The attempts by the rival imperial powers through initiatives 
such as the Berlin Conference of 1884 to reach accommodations about existing points 
of contention and to anticipate future areas of disagreement failed to resolve the 
underlying problem at the centre of the changes taking place within the economies of 
the contestants. 
 
The approach that I have adopted in this thesis differs from that of other 
historians on the subject of the British Mandate in Palestine.  Whilst I acknowledge 
the contribution of historians on this topic such as Bernard Wasserstein, Jonathan 
Schneer and Tom Segev for their capacity to integrate a breadth of information 
welding together a chronological account, the political decision-making process and 
illuminating their work by reference to the contributions of individuals I have 
reservations about their overall approach to the subject.9  Wasserstein argues that  
Palestinian nationalism first appeared just prior to World War One and was 
characterised “more than anything else by [its] opposition to Zionism”.  He ascribes to 
it a determined anti-Semitism especially fuelled by Arab Christians, Ottoman officials 
and conservative Muslims.  He conflates Zionism and Judaism and asserts that it was 
through the schools that Arab Christians acted as the principal conduit for the anti-
Semitism on which the Palestinian nationalism was based. His somewhat partisan 
position in relation to Zionism is coupled with a seeming acceptance of the role of the 
British in Palestine as a neutral entity arguing that under the Mandate the 
“Government of Palestine became little more than an umpire: real authority 
increasingly resided in the Arab and Jewish institutions which commanded the 
                                                
9 Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine:  The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish 
Conflict 1917–1929 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 16.  Jonathan Schneer, The Balfour 
Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); Tom Segev, One 
Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (London: Abacus, 2000). 
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primary loyalty of their respective communities”.10 I regard this position as in part an 
inversion of the relationships that existed and to be based on a presumption of the 
irreconcilability of those he labels Arabs and Jews and crediting the British 
government with a seeming impartiality.  Wasserstein largely regards the 
developments within Palestine as taking place within an hermetically sealed society, 
the product of a subjectivist dynamic, and that even the responses from the British 
were a product of countervailing perspectives within its political strata.  I would argue 
that it is necessary to insist upon an appreciation of global developments which 
contributed to shaping the political responses of the British, the Arab Palestinians and 
the Zionist settlers.  This is not in the interests of “painting some broader picture” but 
rather an insistence on the interconnectedness of the dynamics operating in the 
general sphere and the specific.  I argue that the focus I have adopted seeks to situate 
the political process in the context of developments which lay beyond Britain and 
Palestine which impacted on both in an asymmetrical fashion in which the role of 
British imperialism was dominant.   
 
Whilst much more tightly focused on the political processes and the role of 
individuals that led to the production of the Balfour Declaration, Jonathan Schneer 
adopts a methodological approach which has similarities to that of Wasserstein. 
Although providing important insights into the method of the formulation of the 
Declaration he views the process as the product of individual interventions the results 
of which were governed by the personal attributes of those concerned rather than 
being the product of political choices related to the specific situation facing Britain 
during the war and international developments such as the transitions taking place 
within imperialism which recalibrated the priorities for the British.  Furthermore his 
definition of imperialism focuses on territorial acquisition and makes no significant 
recognition of the changes that were taking place on a global scale that contributed to 
redefining the nature of the Zionist project. In contrast I argue that the new-
imperialism which had evolved especially at the end of the nineteenth century was a 
break with the earlier territorially-based imperialism bringing a new impetus which 
oriented towards hegemonising markets and raw materials rather than control over 
land surfaces. 
                                                
10 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 16. 
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In a similar vein to both Wasserstein and Schneer, Segev develops a more 
personalised narrative-based account of the British Mandate interweaving anecdotes 
and stories of those he deems the main characters. Whilst this is interesting from a 
biographical perspective his approach however reinforces the concept of the history of 
the British Mandate being the aggregation of the personal narratives of individuals 
emanating from the different groupings, the British, the Arab Palestinians and the 
Zionists.  It is an account based on the assemblage of connections but it fails to 
develop the nature of the connectedness between these groupings nor the dynamic 
produced with which they inter-reacted.  In none of the three authors mentioned do 
we find an appreciation of the multi-layered nature of the British occupation and 
Mandate administration rooted in imperialist practices, encountering an evolving 
society in transition from essentially pre-capitalist social relations and confronting the 
shock therapy of the new-imperialism     
 
I have drawn attention to these more global phenomena in order to argue the 
case that an appreciation of the context of the British Mandate in Palestine requires an 
understanding of the connections between different components and an appreciation of 
the ways in which these connections are articulated.  I remain acutely aware that an 
understanding of the processes which combined to shape social, historical and political 
developments has to be based on an acknowledgment of the diverse forms in which 
contestations took place including the roles played by individuals. Whilst Karl Marx 
and Frederick Engels have frequently been accused of an economic determinist 
interpretation of history they repudiated this accusation.  Engels explained in a letter to 
J. Bloch (21st September 1890), that:   
 
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the 
superstructure – political forms of the class struggle and its results, to 
wit: constitutions, established by the victorious class after a successful 
battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual 
struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical 
theories, religious views and their further development into systems of 
dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical 
struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.  
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There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amidst all the 
endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner 
interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard 
it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts 
itself as necessary.11  
 
I argue in this thesis that those “actual struggles” which shaped the 
development of the Balfour Declaration and the British administration during the 
Mandate period have to be situated within an appreciation of internationally 
significant transformative processes which had appeared before World War One and 
continued to mature throughout the period I am analysing. 
 
The brief summary of my theoretical approach should not be taken as an 
adoption or endorsement of a crude economic determinism to explain historical 
developments and the course of events during the period I am addressing. The struggle 
in Palestine between British imperialism, the Palestinian people and the Zionist 
colonisers took place in a number of different spheres and was expressed in a variety 
of forms of contestation including political, legal, philosophical, ideological and 
religious.   There was no direct correspondence between the dominant forms in which 
the discourse was conducted, in what Engels has referred to as the “superstructure”, 
and the economic process or “basis” but there were points at which they intersected 
and the determinant influence of the economic factors asserted themselves.12  I will 
argue that this manifested itself for example in the manner in which Palestinian social 
layers, which were already in the process of evolution during the time of the Ottoman 
empire were further affected in the period of the Mandate under the pressures of 
British imperialism and the actions of Zionism.  The consequence of this 
concatenation was likewise to impact on the political development of Palestinian 
nationalism disadvantageously distorting the process of self-determination.  This thesis 
recognises the interconnection and interaction of the social, economic and political 
agencies without succumbing to a crude economic reductionism.  I will deal in greater 
detail with the question of the methodological approach I have adopted and the 
                                                
11 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, 692. Letter to J. Bloch (21st September 1890). 
[Emphasis in original]. 
12 Ibid. 
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manner in which the components of social, political and economic phenomena respond 
to and impact on each other in chapter one.  Together with the sources I have used, it 
is the employment of this methodological approach, in providing an account of the 
British Mandate in Palestine that makes this thesis original and contributes 
significantly to our understanding of British imperialism in the twentieth century.  
 
Sources 
In focussing on the policy decisions of the British Cabinet I have paid 
particular attention to sources which demonstrate the considerations that pre-occupied 
the political leadership and reveal the increasing influence of the changing nature of its 
imperialism on its decision-making.  In order to demonstrate that British imperialism 
made a series of choices at the governmental level in respect of their policies 
concerning Palestine, particular attention has been paid to government papers and 
records.  The aim of using these sources is to demonstrate that the decisions taken by 
the British government and that alternative options available were considered in the 
most important decision-making bodies of the government.  These papers reveal that 
the British decisions about Palestine and the implementation of the Mandate took into 
consideration the wider interests of British imperialism from both a strategic 
perspective and short-term expediency.  Particular attention has been paid to the 
discussions within the British Cabinets of the period because these bodies were 
ultimately responsible for the policy decisions of their respective governments.  The 
High Commissioners charged with administering the Mandate were responsible to the 
ministers who were in turn answerable to the Cabinet.  I have for these reasons 
examined Cabinet Minutes, White Papers, government correspondence, reports, 
debates and discussions of the British government on both the development of policies 
and actions relating to Palestine and tracking the development of the debate and 
implementation of the project for the creation of a homeland for the Jews.  Sources 
from contemporary newspaper reports and the papers of prominent figures of the day 
have also been examined and used when appropriate.  
 
A central consideration in utilising government Cabinet papers has been to 
illustrate the context within which decisions were made by the government and the 
mandatory authority.  Successive British governments faced different scenarios as a 
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result of changing international and domestic challenges, such as those presented by 
World War One, which affected their decision-making.  These papers reveal that 
despite the absence of significant resources or raw materials to be exploited by the 
British in Palestine, nevertheless the country was perceived as playing a strategic role 
in the maintenance of the Empire.  However because of Palestine’s relationship to the 
strategic defence of Britain’s empire, especially India, and the increasing significance 
of oil, which was in the process of becoming an essential commodity I argue that, in 
order to understand the context of British government policies, it is necessary to 
conduct a wider reading of Cabinet papers beyond those related to Palestine.  By so 
doing it is possible to gain a broader understanding of British policies and demonstrate 
that the Balfour Declaration was a fundamentally contradictory document which had a 
defining influence on their conduct as the Mandatory authority resulting in an 
asymmetrical relationship with the Arab Palestinian population.  
 
Reading chronologically and thematically through the Cabinet papers covering 
the period under consideration held by the National Archives has also enabled me to 
evaluate the British decision-making in its wider context examining the critical 
domestic and international influences on governments.  The discussions around 
Palestine went through a series of stages from the debates around the text of the 
Balfour Declaration, through the period of the British occupation of Jerusalem, the 
discussions leading up to and at the Paris Peace Conference.  Following through these 
discussions facilitates an appreciation of the relationship between the wider imperial 
concerns, the changing situation inside Palestine and how the development of policies 
relating to the country itself developed.  This provides a unique and new approach to 
the understanding of the operation of the Mandate and the challenges facing the 
Palestinian people.   
 
The thesis has drawn on the public records of the British government including 
Gazettes, commission and inquiry committee reports and the Hansard record of 
discussions in the British parliament. I have examined additional primary sources 
including correspondence and personal diaries held in archive collections at the 
Middle East Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford; the Liddell Hart Military Archives 
and the Private Letters and Diaries of Sir Ronald Storrs, held at Pembroke College, 
Cambridge.  These have helped by contributing to an appreciation of the approach of 
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those implementing the Mandate for example.  I have drawn on the online archives of 
bodies such as the King–Crane Commission (Oberlin College Archives) paying 
attention to the submissions by the indigenous peoples to that body.  The views 
expressed to the Commission include those which emanate from a wide variety of 
contemporary local Arab sources and reveal the character of the understanding of the 
political situation by wider sections of the Arab population than those whose views 
have been formally recorded.  
 
In this thesis there is a significant lacuna in the primary sources utilised: 
although I have used and do include Arabic language primary sources on occasion, 
there is no sustained discussion of such sources. Whilst I have benefitted from the help 
of a number of academic colleagues in translating material from the Arabic it is 
difficult without a competence in the language I do not possess to identify possible 
relevant sources.  In light of my lack of the Arabic language, I have taken several 
measures to compensate for this placing particular emphasis on utilising Arabic 
material that is already available in translation into English drawing on material for 
example from sources such as the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs and online archives of Mohamed Ali Eltaher now held at the 
Library of Congress.13  In addition I have extensively used secondary source work by 
Arab and Palestinian authors in order to draw on the knowledge and experience of 
historians who have access to a wider range of Arabic primary and secondary sources. 
In my opinion the works of Arab and Palestinian historians such as W.F.Abboushi, 
George Antonius, Abdul Wahhab Al-Kayyali, Rachid Khalidi, Walid Khalidi, Philip S. 
Khoury, Nur Masalha, Muhammad Y. Muslih and Salim Tamari, to name but a few, 
are essential sources alongside historians such as Simha Flapan, Ilan Pappe, Benny 
Morris and Avi Shlaim for example, whose work has received special attention in 
Britain in recent years.14  
                                                
13 PASSIA. http://www.passia.org/index.htm (accessed 18/01/2016), Mohamed Ali Eltaher Archives 
http://eltaher.org/index_en.html (accessed 18/01/2016).  PASSIA (Palestine Academic Society for the 
Study of International Affairs). 
14 Inter alia: W. F. Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine (Vermont: Amana Books, 1990); George 
Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Phoenix: Simon 
Publications, originally published 1939, 2001); A. W. Kayyali, Palestine a Modern History (London: 
Croom Helm Ltd., Undated); Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The struggle for Palestinian Statehood,  
(Oxford: One World Publications, 2007); Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in 
Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948 (Washington: The Institute for Palestine Studies, Third 
Printing 2005); Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The politics of Damascus 
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The history of the British Empire, the Mandate Period, the struggle for 
Palestinian self-determination and the desire to create a national home for the Jews is 
historiographically a challenging period because in essence the evidence upon which 
to formulate an analysis is contested and the interpretation of that evidence is open to 
dispute.15  All histories are authored and of necessity involve interpretation and the 
selection and organisation of evidence and sources.  It is impossible for any history to 
be comprehensive or complete, there is an inevitable partiality in all history.  The task 
must be to attempt to retain a sense of integrity with regard to the evidence, an 
assiduous commitment to acknowledge the absences in evidence and a consciousness 
of one’s own dispositions in respect of the evidence and the subject matter.  The 
second consideration is an acknowledgement of the purpose for which a text may have 
been produced and the recognition that all texts are edited.  The third is an 
acknowledgement that the very identification and use of sources is a process of 
editorship.  I would argue that whilst I strongly believe in the importance of drawing 
on sources in Arabic there nevertheless remains the important question of the analysis 
and interpretation of the significances of sources which has to be addressed. There are, 
for example, authors who do have access to primary material in Hebrew and Arabic 
whose selectivity and analysis of material may nevertheless produce a narrative of 
events from a particular political perspective.  In the works of Yehoshua Porath which 
are an invaluable resource there appears to be no acknowledgement of the potential 
problems arising from an extensive use of Hebrew and Arabic archival sources from 
the Jewish Agency’s Joint (later Arab) Bureau.16  There is no obvious qualification by 
the author that texts produced by “bureau recruited well-placed Arabs to supply it with 
very rich information about the internal political discussions and decisions of the 
                                                                                                                                       
1860–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the 
Palestinians: The Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948 (Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Salim Tamari,  Mountains against the Sea: Essays on 
Palestinian Society and Culture (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009); 
Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Ilan Pappe, The 
Making of the Arab Israeli Conflict 1947–51 (London: I.B. Taurus, 1994); Benny Morris, The Birth of 
the Palestine Refugee Problem (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The 
Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921–1951 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
15 Hillel Cohen, Year Zero of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1929 (Massachusetts: Brandeis University 
Press, 2015).   
16 Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian–Arab National Movement: 1918–1929 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1974), The Palestinian Arab National Movement, From Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two 
1929–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1977). xi.  
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various Arab bodies” is at all problematic.  There is no detailed account of who the 
sources were produced by and for what purpose although it should be acknowledged 
that there is an effort to produce corroborative evidence to substantiate the arguments 
developed in his various works.  However these too are not analysed and evaluated 
sufficiently in my opinion. 
 
Chapter Overview 
The aim of the first chapter is to establish the conceptual framework of the 
thesis. I will argue that the term imperialism covered very different economic and 
political practices in different periods.  I distinguish between the pre-capitalist or 
traditional imperialism exemplified by the Roman Empire and to a degree the 
Ottoman Empire in which agricultural production dominated; the capitalist 
imperialism of the Dutch and English Empires commencing in the sixteenth century 
which saw the expansion of trading, industrialisation and the opening of markets for 
the purchase of commodities and the new-imperialism which arose at the end of the 
nineteenth century based on the emergence of finance capital as a consequence of the 
fusion of banking and manufacturing capital.  From the end of the nineteenth and into 
the twentieth century, this new-imperialism, which constituted a break with the earlier 
imperialism, underwent further significant changes leading to the emergence of sharp 
inter-imperialist rivalry.   These developments had repercussions on the establishment 
and operation of the British Mandate in Palestine.  The chapter considers the nature of 
the ideological discourse on imperialism and draws attention to the overlap between 
the forms of secular political and religious apologetics invoked to legitimise the 
colonialism of both the capitalist era imperialism and the new-imperialism.   
 
Furthermore the chapter explains the distinction between colonisation, based 
on the creation of settler colonies generally composed of migrants from the imperial 
power, and colonialism, in which conquered territories were not colonised but were 
subordinated to the political and economic imperatives of the mother-country.  The 
British-sponsored Zionist project in Palestine further differed from previous forms of 
colonisation in that the settlers, who overwhelmingly came from the countries of 
eastern Europe, did not consider themselves beholden to any mother-country 
politically nor were they dependent on Britain as an exclusive source of capital for 
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investment.  The chapter concludes by demonstrating that British support for the 
Zionist project of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine constituted a further shift 
towards a new form of neo-colonialism which sought to establish its hegemony 
without employing settler colonialisation based on migrants from the imperial power 
nor continuous occupation by the imperial power itself.  In what was a relatively 
unique initiative the British, asserting their own strategic aims, were able to co-opt the 
aspiration of Zionism for a homeland for the Jews into their overarching imperialist 
goals.  
 
In the second chapter of the thesis, a close reading of Cabinet papers 
demonstrates how the British preoccupation with Palestine was heightened as a 
consequence of World War One.  I argue that the British focus on Palestine and the 
Near East was a direct product of new-imperialism and was a break with previous 
practice.  Surveying the domestic and international challenges confronting the British 
government, the chapter explores the priorities attached by the British to the region as 
a whole.  Whilst the British were in military conflict with imperialist rivals, the pre-
war diplomatic manoeuvring and the post-war settlement negotiations relating to the 
conquered provinces of the Ottoman Empire were also shaped by inter-ally rivalry.  
Drawing on the theoretical framework that I have argued for the chapter analyses the 
importance to Britain of the Suez Canal for the preservation of the empire and their 
focus on access to and control over oil as an increasingly essential raw material.  
Against this backdrop the chapter briefly looks at the way in which Germany sought to 
orientate to the Near East, and briefly reflect on the impact of the Russian Revolution 
on developments in the Near East.  The chapter concludes with a review of the 
emergence of the Arab revolt and an examination of the nature of the British 
relationship to the Arab leaders of the anti-Ottoman forces.     
 
Against the context outlined in the preceding chapter, Chapter Three narrows 
the focus and investigates the origins and nature of the British government’s 
commitment to the Zionist project of the creation of a homeland for the Jews in 
Palestine in the context of its imperialist ambitions in the region. The chapter will 
analyse how the ambitions of Zionism were contested both by Jews and non-Jews. The 
chapter demonstrates how the Balfour Declaration was an inherently contradictory 
statement appearing to make a commitment to the Zionist settlers whilst notionally 
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expressing a parallel responsibility to the indigenous Palestinian people.  The 
ambiguity of the Declaration was utilised by the British to justify the objectives they 
wished to pursue in the region twinned inevitably with its corollary, the denial of the 
right to self-determination of the Arab Palestinian people.  The chapter further 
demonstrates how the imperial powers, including the United States of America were 
complicit in supporting the British opposition to the increasing demand for self-
determination despite the evidence gathered by the King-Crane Commission.  The 
chapter concludes with an exploration of the relationship between the growing support 
for self-determination and the responses of the Arab opposition to the League of 
Nations’ Mandate which, authored by the British government, replicated the ambiguity 
of the Balfour Declaration.  
 
 From the last half of the nineteenth century onwards the Ottoman Empire’s 
changes to laws governing land ownership and their implementation had begun to 
change traditional relationships within Palestinian society between the landowners and 
the fellahin (peasants) who worked the land.  In Chapter Four I will analyse how these 
laws laid the basis for the dislocation of the existing feudal land relations in Palestine 
by which the fellahin were obliged to work for the landowner and provide a share of 
the surplus produce.17  Acknowledging how these changes facilitated the expansion of 
Zionist colonial settlement the chapter will analyse the growing contest between the 
Arab Palestinian society and the imperial rulers’ methods which coincided with a 
moment of social transformation and the emergence of new social forces onto the 
political stage.  At the same time British imperialism continued to face challenges 
consequent upon the attempts by Arab peoples in other regions of the Near East to 
assert their rights to national sovereignty.   
                                                
17 Alexander Schölch, Palestine in Transformation: 1856–1882: Studies in Social, Economic and 
Political Development (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, Reprinted 2006). See especially 
Chapter 5 for a discussion of the use of the term “feudal” in the context of Palestine and the Ottoman 
Empire.  I recognise that there is a debate about the appropriateness of the use of the term “feudal” but 
would argue that it is legitimate in the specific context of Palestine at the time of the Mandate to use it 
as a description of the forms of land tenure and the obligations of the fellahin to the landowners.  
Schölch provides the following definition in “abbreviated form”:  “Agrarian production and the 
“peasant economy” form the economic basis of feudalism.  The means of production are effectively in 
the possession of the peasants who, on their own, organize the working of the land.  The “feudal lord” 
on whom they depend, appropriates the surplus of their labor in the form of rents – labor, in-kind, and 
money – by means of “extra-economic coercion” (relations of coercion and dependence being based 
not just on economic but on politico-legal factors).  This rent tends to be used for consumption 
purposes.  As for the rest of the land over which he exercises control, he either cultivates it himself or 
has it worked directly for his own account”. 174.  
I would also wish to clarify that I do not use the term “feudal” in any judgmental sense.    
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The social changes that were happening resulted in the engagement of new 
social groups in opposition to the Zionist project and the actions of the British being 
manifested through large scale and increasingly militant expressions of resentment 
against the trajectory of the Mandate. This struggle was further exacerbated by the 
steps taken by the British in the political and economic sphere whilst seeking to lay the 
foundations for a homeland for the Jews through the displacement and dispossession 
of the Palestinian people.  The strength of the Arab Palestinian response to the British 
Mandate was reflected in the growing breadth and depth of those who engaged in 
articulating opposition to the steps that were being taken to implement the logic of the 
Balfour Declaration.  The chapter will incorporate an analysis of the developing 
formal politics of the Arab Palestinian society from forms more associative of pre-
capitalist social relations to party structures and organisations of capitalist social 
formations. 
 
The fifth chapter will investigate how the British utilised the Mandate to 
forward the aim of fulfilling the ambitions of the Zionist Organisation and the 
developing opposition by the Arab Palestinian community to this process.  Whilst 
narrowly prescribing the political rights of the indigenous community the British 
protected and gave succour to the developing proto-state structures of the Zionists 
whilst simultaneously denying the Arab Palestinians the right to any degree of 
autonomy.  The British intervention in favour of economic enterprises promoted by 
the Zionists within Palestine dramatically shaped the social and political formation of 
the Arab Palestinian society. In quick succession the Arab Palestinian peoples 
convened a number of Congresses which defined a political perspective leading 
toward self-determination which was consistently ignored or suppressed by the British 
in contrast to their general tolerance towards the Zionist Organisation’s demands.  
 
Further in Chapter Five I will analyse how the British Mandate 
administration’s embrace and utilisation of the Ottoman Land Laws shaped social 
developments within Palestinian society and influenced the politics of the emerging of 
nationalist endeavour for self-determination.  During this period the a‘yan (notables), 
as the dominant traditional hereditary leaderships within society, were incapable of 
asserting their demands for self-determination confronted as they were in 1917 by a 
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determined imperial power with overwhelming military superiority. The Palestinian 
bourgeoisie and the working class were relatively new entities whose organic growth 
was hampered by the twin interventions of imperialism and Zionism. I analyse how 
these developments involving new social forces, the growth of the media, new 
political parties and new organisations were in turn affected.  The first decade of the 
Mandate saw the emergence and re-emergence of younger generations, the growth of 
the Palestinian trade union movement and the increasing involvement of women as a 
political force.   This chapter identifies the discriminatory practices by the British 
authorities against Arab Palestinian capitalists and in favour of Zionist entrepreneurs 
as a significant factor disadvantageously prescribing and distorting the growth of the 
Palestinian economy and its attendant features. 
 
In the final chapter I argue that the evidence supports the proposition that 
British imperialism as implemented in Palestine was of a specific neo-colonial 
character influenced by the outcome of the war, the growth of the new-imperialism 
and the relationship with the Zionist movement.  To fully understand the impact of the 
British occupation on the capacity of the Palestinian people to assert their right to self-
determination, it is necessary to appreciate that Palestinian efforts to achieve this goal 
were affected by the specific character of British imperialism at the time, the 
distinctive context within which it sought to maintain its imperial influence and the 
special circumstances within which the Palestinian people were confronted by this 
global power. The imperialism confronting Palestinian society at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was one which had changed significantly from that of the first half 
of the nineteenth century.  The combined consequences of imperialist occupation 
coupled with Zionist settler-colonisation impacted on the economic and demographic 
development of Palestine in a unique manner dislocating a pre-existing social entity 
and rupturing its organic development.  It was in this context of on-going contestation 
with both British imperialism and an increasingly confident Zionist settler colonisation 
that the Palestinian people faced the challenge of establishing and advancing their 
goals of self-determination whilst being shackled by the constraints imposed by 
British imperialism.   
 
Given the particularly charged nature of the British occupation of Palestine in 
the context of current Palestinian-Israeli relations it seems pertinent to reflect on my 
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own interest in the subject.   My own interest was probably first stimulated around 
1969 through a meeting with two critics of the Six-Day War of 1967 who had left 
Israel and were living in London.  One was of Jewish heritage, the other an Arab 
Palestinian.  Both were of Israeli nationality and were socialists.  Their insightful 
views stimulated an interest in me which has continued ever since then and led me to 
reading and studying the whole question although it is only now since retiring that I 
have had the time to try to write about it.  Needless to say in writing about Mandate 
Palestine more questions have been raised than I started with.  I intend to try to follow 
those up in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Imperialism, Colonialism and Settlers: The Problem Reconsidered 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the theoretical framework for the thesis, 
identifying the key concepts that I will use to analyse the nature of the British Mandate 
in Palestine.  The objective will be to substantiate the argument that the constitution of 
British imperialism encountered by the Palestinians differed significantly from the 
form of imperialism which existed prior to the last decade of the nineteenth century 
and the changes which had taken place in turn impacted on the character of the British 
administration of the Mandate.   
 
I am conscious of the wide variety of literature to be found on the subject of 
imperialism, the contentious nature of the term and that this debate is on-going.1 There 
are features common to all imperialisms but I will argue that there are significant 
differences between the imperialisms of distinct historical era and indeed between the 
imperialisms of the same period.  These differences I will argue had a bearing on the 
way in which British imperialism acted in Palestine and it is necessary to have an 
understanding of its specific character prior to and during the period of the Mandate.  
It is also essential to recognise that Palestinian society itself existed prior to British 
intervention with its own unique characteristics and life that were in part shaped by the 
imperialism of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Underpinning the concept of imperialism that I employ is the viewpoint that it 
was the economic aspects of British imperialism and the asymmetrical relations 
                                                
1 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2011, First published 1902); Rudolf Hilferding, 
Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development. ed. Tom Bottomore (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, first published 1910); V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, Twentieth Printing 1986, First published 1917); Hannah 
Arendt, Imperialism, Part Two of “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1967); P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-
1914 (London: Longman, 1993), Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–1990 (New York: Longman 
Publishing, 1993); Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994); Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003); David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World 
(London: Penguin Books, 2004); Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Richard Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt 
(London: Verso, 2011). 
 27 
imposed by the imperial power on the subaltern country which ultimately determined 
the character and evolution of the relationships between them.  This relationship 
additionally affected the development of Palestinian society.  However, in this thesis I 
argue that the political process itself, encompassing the totality of these 
interconnections, was not simply the product of economic factors.2   The concept of 
imperialism that I make use of is not limited to exclusively economic relationships 
between countries but is intended to recognise the multi-faceted nature of imperial rule 
affecting diverse areas of social, cultural and political life.3  The British occupation of 
Palestine and the implementation of the Mandate administration impacted on the 
indigenous society in multiple ways beyond the confines of the economic.  The contest 
between the occupier and the occupied took place on diverse terrain including at least 
the social, cultural, legal, educational, religious and political, in addition to the 
economic.4    
 
As I will outline below the term imperialism has been used to describe 
phenomena in vastly different epochs, in different parts of the world operating under 
radically different conditions.  The imperialism of Rome in the first three to four 
centuries of the Common Era differed significantly from that of the British, Dutch, 
French or Spanish imperialisms which developed after the sixteenth century.  In turn 
the imperialism of these nations differed from each other and went through phases of 
development, which produced further divergences.5   These differences were not just 
spatio-temporal but differences created, influenced and determined by the specific 
                                                
2 Hobson Imperialism. 99. J. A. Hobson, writing in Imperialism in 1902 identified the driving force 
behind Rome’s imperialist expansionism as economic.  When turning to the nineteenth century, he 
explains how the “new imperialism” of the United States of America is not “a mere wild freak of 
spread-eaglism, a burst of political ambition on the part of a nation coming to a sudden realisation of its 
destiny…Not at all.  The Spirit of adventure, the American ‘mission of civilisation’, were, as forces 
…subordinate to the driving force of the economic factor”. 
3 There is a wide range of literature on the impact of imperialism on the wider social, cultural and 
political aspects of society including for example: Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: 
Vintage Edition, 1994); Rumina Sethi, The Politics of Postcolonialism: Empire, Nation and Resistance 
(London: Pluto Press, 2011); Jean-Paul Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism (London: Routledge, 
Reprinted 2010); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, Reprinted 2001). 
4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works. 692. 
5 Wood, Empire of Capital, 91.  Wood explains that the imperial powers of the capitalist era had 
different attitudes towards the indigenous peoples of the conquered lands dependent on their primary 
objectives and the degree of dependence of the imperial power on those they conquered to achieve their 
goals.  French reliance on the indigenous people in Canada to trap animals for the fur trade differed 
from the British who wished to remove the indigenous peoples from the lands they wished to occupy 
and cultivate. Spanish imperialism which encountered sedentary populations with well-organised 
societies utilised their skills to mine gold and silver. 
 28 
relationships within each of these states, their rivalry during the process of imperial 
expansion and the effect on them of the existing social relations within the societies 
they conquered.  I argue that the forms of imperialism differed in the first instance as a 
consequence of the distinct domestic political and economic character of the imperial 
power itself. In order to analyse the specific nature of British imperialism during the 
period of the Mandate in Palestine in the first section of this chapter I will briefly 
examine preceding imperialist regimes in order to clarify what was distinctive about it.  
Using predominantly the example of western European imperialisms I will explain 
how the imperialism of Ancient Rome in the pre-capitalist period differed from that of 
England/Britain in the capitalist era and from the new-imperialism that emerged at the 
end of the nineteenth century in Britain.6 
 
Having established the distinctions between the imperialisms of different 
historical eras I will analyse the nature of the historical moment in which the British 
Mandate in Palestine was established.  World War One, as it is most commonly 
referred to, was the first war in history which had a direct or indirect effect on every 
continent and, arguably, almost every area of the world.  It was perhaps the most 
significant war that had taken place in the world to date in terms of its consequences 
for millions of people.  It constituted the culmination of a period of expansionism 
generated by the new-imperialism and heralded a sea change in the development of 
many aspects of social, economic and political life.  From the end of the war onwards 
the economic and political influence of British imperial power began to decline even at 
the very moment when it appeared, militarily, to be at its most successful. Driven 
primarily by its colossal economic capacities the United States of America began to 
overtake Britain, becoming a world power.  Simultaneously the British, and indeed 
other powers, were faced with developing anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles.7   
These seismic events directly shaped the nature of the British Mandate in Palestine.  
 
                                                
6 I use the term the “British Empire” for the period after the Treaty of Union in 1706 and the Acts of 
Union in 1707.  The unification took place following the collapse of the 1690 Darién Scheme by which 
the ruling class in Scotland intended to make the country an imperial power in its own right but failed. 
For an account see Niall Ferguson, Empire, 40. 
7 Indicative of this process was the founding of the Indian National Congress (1885) and the African 
National Congress in 1912. Anti-imperialist struggles erupted onto the global stage such as the Cuban 
War of Independence against the Spanish (1895–98). During and after World War One anti-imperialist 
struggles emerged, for example, in Egypt and Iraq. 
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Unlike earlier pre-capitalist and capitalist era imperialisms, new-imperialism 
generated an intense rivalry between nation states which, amongst western European 
countries, assumed profound dimensions.8  A central feature of the new-imperialism 
was the emergence within countries of finance capital melding together industrial and 
commercial interests which sought to establish monopolies in the domestic and 
international markets. The nation states were critical to the protection of the interests 
of the expansionist finance capitalism seeking to gain and retain control over valuable 
raw materials in order to hegemonise international markets.9  As I will demonstrate 
further in Chapter Four this resulted in specific repercussions for the Near East region 
and for Palestine.10  I argue that the establishment and maintenance of the Mandate by 
the British was influenced by political and economic factors the product of Britain’s 
broader imperial interests.  This thesis will situate the colonisation of Palestine in that 
context of imperial and capitalist developments.  Specifically I want to investigate 
those components which were the product of new-imperialism that contributed to 
shaping the development of Palestine and to explore their articulation and the dialectic 
of their relationships. 
 
Furthermore this chapter will demonstrate that the form of colonisation 
employed during the British occupation of Palestine and the implementation of the 
Mandate constituted a break in the nature and practice with that prior to the 1890s.  
The process of migration which was a highly significant phenomenon in the nineteenth 
century was conducted within an imperialist framework driven by economic and 
political factors, pragmatism, racist perspectives and notions associated with the 
                                                
8 David Harvey, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Robert Brenner, use the term “new” imperialism to refer to 
the United States of America from the end of World War Two onwards.  I use the term “new” 
imperialism here to refer to the period after 1890. David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble (London: Verso, 2002); 
Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Democracy as Ideology of Empire” in The New Imperialists: Ideologies of 
Empire, ed. Colin Mooers, (Oxford: One World, 2006). 
9 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon and Shuster, 
1991). 
10 Nomenclature is an important consideration when writing about this subject.  Whilst recognising that 
these are disputed questions I have sought to use terms which reflect the most common usage.  In the 
main the Arab peoples of the Palestine Mandate area considered themselves at this time to be part of 
Greater Syria.  I will use the terms “Palestine” and  “Arab Palestinian” to refer to what became the 
occupied Mandate territory and to the people who lived in it.   
Although the term “Near East” has been used throughout this text, the United Nations and bodies such 
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development use the term “West Asia”.  The terms 
“Western Asia”, “Southwest Asia” and “Southwestern Asia” are also used by other authors to describe 
the same geographical area.  The use of “Near East” should not therefore be read as an indicator of any 
form of perspective or predisposition from which my work should be read. 
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concept of promoting a civilising mission.  Whilst previous justifications for 
emigration were often couched in Malthusian terms the project of the Zionists was 
from the outset aimed at achieving a nationalist objective.  This chapter will also 
illustrate that the nature of the settlement by Zionism differed from that of previous 
practices.  The alliance between British imperialism and Zionism represented a new 
form of colonisation and colonial rule, the product of a convergence of interests 
between the two parties.  This break in the form of colonisation constituted a radically 
different form of obstacle for any Palestinian endeavour to establish national 
sovereignty. The second section of this chapter will analyse the different forms of 
colonial settlement to distinguish the Zionist project from that of other colonising 
enterprises.   
 
The chapter will conclude by examining the roots of the justifications used by 
the British to legitimise their actions in pursuing the aim of establishing a homeland 
for the Jews on the territory of the Palestinian people.  Imperialism has always sought 
to legitimate its actions by invoking ideological justifications seeking to represent 
single national interests as the application of universalist goals. Typically this has been 
presented as the imperial power bestowing benefits on the subaltern whether they be 
religious beliefs promising reward through conversion or the bringing of “civilisation”.  
In the case of Palestine this chapter will argue that in addition to the use by both 
British politicians and Zionist political leaders of religious notions of “choseness” 
originating from Christian and Jewish exegesis, the ideological roots of Zionism were 
interwoven with more secular justifications for conquest.   In turn the secular 
apologetics of Thomas More, Hugo Grotius, John Locke and others were augmented 
by the pseudo-scientific concepts of racial superiority and hierarchised civilisations. I 
will demonstrate how the forms of justifications used to support the actions of British 
imperialism originated from both religious and secular traditions which had their roots 
in the apologetics utilised to defend capitalist imperialism from its inception.11   
 
                                                
11 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962).  Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century 
Revolution (London: Allen Lane, 1993). 
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Imperialism  
The term imperialism has been used to describe phenomena which occurred 
centuries apart which although having some common features were in reality 
significantly different.   Those features which can be viewed as evident, to varying 
degrees, in all or most imperial regimes, whatever the historical period are: the 
invasion and conquest of other lands, the subjugation of the peoples of those territories, 
the extraction and extortion of wealth, the imposition of exogenous rule, the 
colonisation of the conquered lands, the generation of an ideological justification for 
the conquests and an attempt, through coercion or persuasion, to gain the collaboration 
of all or some of the indigenous peoples to maintain the imperial project.   
 
Whilst the overwhelming majority of the literature on the subject of 
imperialism recognises that there are significant distinctions between, for example, the 
Greek and Roman Empires, the empire of China in the third century BCE and empires 
which emerged in later centuries, it is important to try to identify what those 
distinctions are.  In the first place I will differentiate between three types of 
imperialism.  Those imperialisms which existed prior to the advent of capitalism, such 
as the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire I have called the pre-capitalist empires.  I 
use this term to cover not only those empires such as the Roman Empire but also those 
which existed in the feudal era.12  The second type of imperialism is that formed 
during the capitalist period after the sixteenth century in countries such as Holland and 
England and for which I will use the term capitalist imperialism. Those powers which 
emerged at end of the nineteenth century, like Germany and Britain, I will describe as 
indicative of the new-imperialism.   
 
These terms, which I will explain further below, are not intended to be 
judgemental but are used to distinguish between different historical periods with their 
own discrete features.13  These different forms of imperialism did not develop 
simultaneously across the world and neither did all the features associated for example 
                                                
12 I have used the term pre-capitalist to refer to societies both in the ancient world as well as those of 
the feudal era although I am aware that there were significant differences between the two. There were 
also differences between pre-capitalist feudal and capitalist empires which impacted on the 
development of those societies however an investigation of those differentiations is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.   
13 I am conscious that I have not dealt with the concept of imperialism as it relates to feudal societies. 
See Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: Verso, 1996 Edition). 
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with pre-capitalist imperialism disappear at the advent of capitalist imperialism.  The 
totality of relationships present in one form of imperialism was not replaced with a 
completely pristine set of relationships.  This has a direct bearing on the durability of 
social and political relationships even when the economic character of a society has 
changed.  Social groups which are influential in one period may retain their influence 
even when their real economic status in society is in decline. 
Pre-capitalist Imperialism 
The society of pre-capitalist imperialism was agricultural in character. The 
city-state of Rome was based on an agricultural economy, governed by a hereditary 
landowning class increasingly dependent on slave labour to produce the surplus 
products necessary to ensure its survival.  The slaves themselves were the property of 
the landowner.  The labour required to farm the land might be provided by slaves or 
sometimes by a workforce tied to the land who were also compelled to transfer the 
whole or a portion of their crops to the landowner in addition to that which they 
produced for their own survival. The amount transferred was fixed by the landowner 
only varying marginally on the basis of crop yield.  This taxation in kind, not varying 
irrespective of crop yields, had the potential to generate indebtedness. To ensure the 
provision of an adequate surplus the city-state expanded territorially, utilising military 
force to achieve its objective.14  The goods which the pre-capitalist imperial powers 
seized or traded in the conquered territories were predominantly, if not exclusively, for 
the privileged members of society and were not for sale in any market place. They 
were not commodities as such but booty which were consumed or hoarded by the 
conquerors.   
 
In pre-capitalist societies land was inalienable in almost all instances and its 
transformation into a commodity, as distinct from war-booty, was to be a seminal 
component differentiating the economies of earlier societies from those of capitalist 
ones.  Those who worked on the land, in both ancient and feudal societies, were 
permanently attached to it and required to produce a surplus, which was expropriated 
by the landowner, in addition to sufficient crops for their own survival. The form of 
ownership and control of the land was the major defining characteristic of these 
                                                
14 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (London: Verso, 2003).  J. A. Hobson in his book 
Imperialism makes a similar analysis, describing Rome as the “capital of an agricultural State”, 
utilising slave labour which led to the ousting of sections of the peasantry. Hobson Imperialism, 227 
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societies shaping their economic, social and political relationships.   The change 
brought about by capitalism, rendering land a commodity turned the peasantry into 
landless labourers and constituted the most significant transformation between the pre-
capitalist and the capitalist imperial era.  As I will explore in further detail in Chapters 
Four and Five, the sale of land which began during the pre-capitalist Ottoman Empire 
created landless workers and was to have an increasingly important impact on the lives 
of Palestinians.  It affected both the landowning strata of society as well as the fellahin 
or peasantry who worked the land.  This hugely disruptive process was to be a major 
point of conflict in Palestine both with the British Mandate authorities and the Zionist 
settlers.  These later chapters will also explain how this affected the development of 
social forces in the country and had consequences for the political development of 
Palestinian society. 
 
In the conquered territories the pre-capitalist imperial power might seek to 
build a system of alliances with an existing hereditary landowning social layer or in 
the event of their refusal to co-operate, through the creation of a surrogate through 
colonisation.15  Where co-operation or at least acquiescence could not be obtained then 
the imperial power resorted to the use of military means which was invariably 
necessary since the relationship between the city-state and the colony was based on a 
system of direct extraction and extortion carried out through an exploitative in-kind 
tax system.  The nature of this relationship, based on direct in-kind levying, required 
the imperial power to have large standing armies in order to enforce their system.16  As 
a consequence the political, social and economic relationships between the imperial 
power and the conquered peoples were transparent.17  There was no distinction 
between the economic, the political and the military roles employed by the imperial 
power.  These roles were fused into a whole.  As this chapter will demonstrate this was 
to change with later forms of imperialism. 
                                                
15 Wood, Empire of Capital, 28. 
16 Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, 28.  “Classical civilization was in consequence 
inherently colonial in character: the cellular city-state invariably reproduced itself, in phases of ascent, 
by settlement and war.  Plunder, tribute and slaves were the central objects of aggrandizement, both 
means and ends to colonial expansion.  Military power was more closely locked to economic growth 
than in perhaps any other mode of production, before or since, because the main origin of slave-labour 
was normally captured prisoners of war, while the raising of free urban troops depended on the 
maintenance of production at home by slaves; battle-fields provided the manpower for corn-fields and 
vice versa, captive labourers permitted the creation of citizen armies”. [Emphasis in original]. 
17 It is important to note that this does not imply a value judgment on Wood’s part. 
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In the area of economic activity in pre-capitalist societies the transactions that 
were made were based on the physical separation of markets: one in which the 
imperial power acquired goods cheaply and the other in which it traded for gain.  The 
value of an item transacted in one market did not have a direct influence on its cost in 
another.  Under capitalism this separation was replaced by the establishment of an 
integrated expanding market which imposed “certain common conditions of 
competitive production” thus reducing the need for overt forms of domination.18   The 
ability of purchasers of goods to seek out their desired commodities from other 
competing less-expensive markets affected the economic development of societies.  
The Palestinian soap industry, for example, was severely damaged by the production 
of less expensive alternatives by Zionist owned industries.  The growth of industry in 
one part of the capitalist world directly impacted on its potential for development in 
another.  As we shall see in Chapter Five this had both economic and political 
implications for Palestinian society and demonstrates the value of situating the 
Mandate within a wider framework of economic developments. 
 
Capitalist Imperialism 
On a global scale the change from pre-capitalist to capitalist imperialism, 
which accelerated from the sixteenth century onwards, was the result of tectonic shifts 
in land ownership, the expansions of trade and commerce which led to a growing 
rivalry between the states involved and technological developments.  The following 
economic facets can be said to be characteristic of capitalist imperialism: the 
alienation of land; the commodification of labour; the growth of generalised 
commodity production; the subjugation by the imperial power of the existing 
economic relations and priorities of conquered countries; the emergence of a world 
market for commodities; the growth and expansion of social classes and new means of 
production and the transference of the costs and responsibility for ensuring the 
operation of the enterprises created under this process to the indigenous peoples 
conquered or to a colonial peoples settled for this purpose.19  Not all of these aspects 
                                                
18 Wood, Empire of Capital, 54. 
19 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006).  See especially Chapter 11, “The 
Theory of Rent”. Robert Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
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came into operation at the same time nor did they always follow the same pattern.  
Each encounter between the imperial power and the non-imperial countries followed 
its own particular path.  As I will argue these changes, severally and collectively, had 
severe effects on the Palestinian economy, buttressed as they were by an 
administration which implemented economic and political policies asymmetrically 
discriminating against the indigenous population.   
 
There is a further important distinction to be made between pre-capitalist 
imperialism and capitalist imperialism.  “The economic power of non-capitalist 
classes could extend only as far as their extra-economic force, only as far as their 
political, military, or judicial powers; and, no matter how much surplus was actually 
produced, accumulation by exploiting classes was limited by what their extra-
economic power was able to extract from direct producers”.20  In contrast from the 
sixteenth century onwards, the very beginning of capitalist imperialism, the English 
Empire’s exercise of domination combined physical intervention with political and 
economic coercion.21  It was equally true of other imperial powers such as Holland, 
Spain, Germany, France and Belgium.22   In the capitalist era, imperialism’s use of 
“extra-economic force” was augmented by “manipulating the forces of the market, 
including the weapon of debt”.23   
 
Of course the conquered people might enter into some form of alliance or 
accept a compliant relationship with the imperial power but, in any case, such an 
accommodation was more than likely to be disrupted at some stage in the association.  
From the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards the establishment in conquered 
lands of totally subservient pseudo-governmental structures came to the fore tying the 
metropolis and the colonies together.   The hegemony of consent seeming to change 
into the hegemony of coercion when the indigenous peoples, refusing to be compliant, 
were physically subjugated or as happened in a number of instances became the 
                                                                                                                                       
Industrial Europe”, in The Brenner Debate, ed. T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
20 Wood, Empire of Capital, 12. 
21 Gott, Britain’s Empire. This is evident from the histories of British involvement in India, Africa and 
Australasia, not to mention Ireland, Egypt and of course Palestine. 
22 David Olugosa and Casper W. Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide 
and the Colonial Roots of Nazism (London: Faber and Faber, 2010). Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. 
23 Wood, Empire of Capital, 12. 
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victims of genocidal policies and were supplanted by settler colonists. Of course 
periodically privileged sections of the indigenous communities might enter into 
compliant associations with the imperial power. Whatever path was followed extra-
economic force remained as an option to be employed at any time the rule of the 
imperial power came under challenge.24  
 
Stimulated by the desire to acquire commodities for domestic consumption, 
gain control over raw materials and expand the potential for markets in which to sell 
goods, the English empire’s physical expansion coincided with and contributed to the 
growth of capitalism through its differing phases from the mercantilism of the 
sixteenth century onwards.  The English empire’s accumulation of wealth and the 
acquisition of raw materials was based on maritime power, the control of the seas, the 
establishment of garrisons and the securing of a chain of fortified harbours for the 
provision of fuel, foods and stores.25   The acquisition of overseas colonies was 
accompanied domestically by the growth and strengthening of state institutions. The 
1653 Instrument of Government called for the establishment of a standing army of 
30,000 and by 1688 James II could mobilise 40,000 men.26  Systematic colonisation in 
Ireland originated with the establishment during the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
of plantations of settlers loyal to the crown, to suppress political opposition to the 
English rule emanating especially from Gaelic–speaking Ulster and was the forerunner 
of colonialism more generally.27   
 
Though the initiative may have been driven by military and political 
considerations, particularly that of suppressing a rebellious people, the scheme was 
also promoted as an opportunity for the new settlers who supplanted the displaced 
communities to live profitably and their sponsors to profit likewise.28  The creation of 
the plantations, forcibly removing and dispossessing the indigenous Irish, transporting 
some to North American plantations and the Caribbean as slaves, significantly 
                                                
24 In the cases of Ireland and India the use of “extra-economic force” was a constant through the history 
of both countries.   
25 Michael J. Braddick, “The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688”, in The 
Origins of Empire: An Introduction in The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume I, ed. 
Nicholas Canny, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 296 
26 Ibid, 287. 
27 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).  
28 Nicolas Canny, “The Origins of Empire: An Introduction,” in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire. Volume I, ed. Nicholas Canny, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9. 
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contributed to the destruction of existing social and economic relationships.  This 
pattern was of course repeated in the colonies established in North America where the 
lives of the indigenous first Americans were transformed as successive waves of 
settlers occupied the lands from which they had drawn the means to live. 
 
The colonisation initiated in both Ireland and North America, involved the 
creation of settler colonialism, subjugating and subsequently displacing existing 
inhabitants.  Although pre-capitalist empires, such as Rome, also displaced indigenous 
peoples, invariably they sought to retain them as cheap labour or slaves to produce the 
crops and goods which the imperium wished to garner.  In pre-capitalist empires there 
was, with qualification, a necessity, if not a desire to maintain the indigenous peoples 
on their lands, albeit in a subservient role, to meet the demands of the imperial power 
not least in the example of Rome in order to provide a supply of slaves.29  This 
contrasts sharply with the pattern of settlement witnessed in the north of America, 
Australia and New Zealand.  The objective in these cases was the expulsion of the 
indigenous peoples.  As we shall see later the earliest Zionist colonists did employ 
some Palestinians in their settlements but this diminished considerably as the numbers 
of settlers going to Palestine increased. 
 
  
New-Imperialism  
Whilst the nature of the new-imperialism of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century differed from that of pre-capitalist and capitalist imperialism, it faced 
challenges in attempting to impose its will on the development of the societies which it 
encountered.  Frequently these peoples whose lands were invaded had developed 
societies with long-established social, political and economic relations predating the 
arrival of the imperial power.  In almost all cases their social structures and economic 
relations were totally different from that which the imperialist powers themselves 
operated under and they could not be changed swiftly or easily.  The new-imperialism 
had to contend with the reality that in certain areas of social and economic relations 
the already existing associations continued to survive.  In many instances this was 
manifest, for example, in the differences between the kind of relationships, both 
                                                
29 Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, 22. 
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economic and political, established in coastal regions from those with peoples living in 
the hinterlands of those countries. In this next section I will look at some examples of 
such occurrences and how this is relevant to the subject of this thesis. 
 
Whilst each example of imperialism cited from the earliest recorded periods to 
the modern day may have a number of features in common the focus on an individual 
state’s powers to expand into other territories with the objective of gaining military, 
political and economic advantage is not an adequate taxonomy with which to classify 
phenomena with radically divergent characteristics.  The new-imperialism from the 
end of the nineteenth century through to the twentieth constitutes a new phase of 
political and economic development representing the beginning of a process which 
impacted increasingly on the development of all countries.  
 
In identifying this time frame I am drawing on the approach of a number of 
authors, who whilst differing in their methodological perspectives agree that the latter 
quarter of the nineteenth century through to the end of World War One witnessed a 
significant change in the nature of imperialism.  Hannah Arendt in Imperialism: Part 
Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism identifies the period between 1884–1914, whilst 
J.A. Hobson in Imperialism cites 1870 as “the beginning of a conscious policy of 
Imperialism” although he qualifies this by adding that “the movement did not attain its 
full impetus until the middle of the eighties”.30  Lenin, in his work Imperialism: the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism, placed the significant point of change as taking place 
from the second half of the 1890s onwards.31  Drawing radically different conclusions 
to the other authors cited about the consequences of imperialism, Niall Ferguson in his 
work Empire: How Britain made the Modern World nevertheless also singles out the 
end of the nineteenth century as signalling a departure from earlier times. Alongside 
Lenin, he pinpoints the vast expansion of overseas investment from Britain as being 
the distinguishing feature of the changes that were taking place.32  These variations in 
dating the moment at which the transformation commenced can be attributed to the 
differing focal points of each of the authors but the relative coincidence of their dates 
is indicative of agreement on the historical significance of the changes taking place 
                                                
30 Hannah Arendt: Imperialism: Part Two of the Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harvest Book, 
1948) 3; Hobson Imperialism, 57.  
31 Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 16. 
32 Ferguson, Empire, 244. 
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during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  I will outline below some of the 
critical components of these changes. 
 
A major factor of the reshaping of imperialism that was taking place was the 
rapid territorial expansion by a number of state powers which led to a real division of 
the world economically and politically into areas over which they held sway.33  The 
West Africa Conference, held in Berlin in November 1884, was an expression of an 
already advanced struggle for control of the whole continent of Africa and its 
peoples.34  This expansionary process was accompanied by the subjugation of millions 
of people throughout the whole continent transforming and frequently destroying their 
existing patterns of life.  As I shall point out later in this chapter this impacted not only 
on those countries which were directly occupied by the imperial powers but also on 
those which encountered it initially through trade.  As we will observe later the impact 
of imperialist expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean obliged those countries 
encountered to make changes to their existing economic and commercial structures 
challenging for example patterns of land ownership with their attendant social 
relationships.  
 
In addition to this rapid expansion in territorial control and influence the period 
saw an acceleration in economic expansion driven by the changes which were taking 
place as a result of the fusion between finance and industry.  In Germany for example 
there was a rapid growth of companies fuelled by the fusion between the banking and 
industrial sectors.  “From 1871 to 1913 capital investment in industry grew from just 
under 10 billion Marks to over 85 billion”.35  It was this swift economic development 
which made Germany the “world’s second strongest industrial power, rivalling 
Britain”.36  This process paralleled developments in a number of other countries during 
the same period.  In France and the United Kingdom the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) doubled in size, in Germany it tripled, whilst in the United States of America in 
quintupled.37   
 
                                                
33 Packenham, The Scramble for Africa. 
34 Packenham, The Scramble for Africa, 239. 
35 James Retallack, Imperial Germany 1871–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 74. 
36 Ibid., 73. 
37 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003), 49 and 84-85. 
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When examined in a world context these increases in GDP were not mirrored 
by a corresponding proportionate increase in their respective share of world GDP.  
France and the United Kingdom’s GDP declined as a proportion of the world GDP by 
approximately one percentage point each whilst Germany’s increased by around 2% 
and that of the United States of America by around 9%.38  The cumulative impact of 
this expansionism and especially the economic growth was to redefine what was 
meant by imperialism and how it functioned moving away from imperialism as 
conquest and occupation to a less overt, more pervasive form of economic and 
political domination.  
 
A driving factor behind these rapidly developing economic phenomena was the 
expansion of new forms of financial organisation which brought together two 
important components whose impact was more than the sum of its parts.  Finance 
capital was an original combination which helped drive the technological changes 
which contributed to the expansion of the new-imperialism. 
Finance Capital  
A central feature of the emergence of the new-imperialism was the growth of 
finance capital which was an entirely new phenomenon.  The term “finance capital” 
has been used to describe the coalescence of finance and industry, two hitherto 
relatively distinct components of the economy, which when fused produced an 
oligarchy whose control extended over the large parts of the economy laying the basis 
for the growth of monopolies and imperialist expansion.  This led to the global 
articulation of the whole capitalist economic process on a qualitatively different 
level.39   
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a huge industrial and 
technological expansion which contributed domestically to an accelerating growth of 
the economy and pressure to seek new markets.  Industrial and financial institutions 
which united in commercial enterprises became powerful bodies seeking to exercise 
monopoly control over their respective markets driving them to gain access to and 
                                                
38 Ibid., 261. 
39 Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 45. 
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control over sources of raw materials abroad.40  British companies sought to gain a 
monopoly of the control of oil in Persia but their efforts went beyond that.  “As the 
industrialised world scrambled for oil, Britain hastened to secure exclusive rights to 
approve concessionaries in other Gulf sheikhdoms, where oil might be found – notably 
in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Nejd, where a preferential treaty had been signed with 
Abdul Azziz ibn Saud in 1915”.41  The growth of oil companies seeking to gain control 
over the exploitation of sources of the product in countries like Persia is perhaps the 
most vivid demonstration of this new-imperialism.  The government of Britain sought 
to establish political relations with those countries in which the raw materials were 
situated or, in the absence of accommodative partners, the establishment or 
maintenance of regimes which would ensure their untrammelled access to them.   
 
As a result of the emergence of finance capital, huge companies with 
international interests began to appear in Germany and Britain and in other imperialist 
countries.  The creation of international divisions of spheres of interest was driven by 
monopolies and marks out this phase of imperialism.  This process led to each of the 
respective imperial state powers championing the endeavours of the companies within 
their respective nation states.  Governments directly intervened against their rivals to 
ensure the most favourable conditions for their own companies.  In the case of Britain, 
monopolisation was encouraged by the government which took the view that the 
“economic resources were intertwined with strategic priorities, and … the Foreign 
Office … accepted the need to reinforce private firms in areas of political sensitivity. 
… the government supported the creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909 
and acquired a controlling interest in it in 1914”.42  This pattern of development 
ineluctably led to intense rivalry between companies and therefore between their 
respective national patrons.  
 
Banks played a critical role influencing the development of finance and trade 
across the Near East.  “Some 500 different London institutions were involved in 
British foreign investment, with long term ventures and securities handled by such 
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powerful issuing houses as Barings, Rothschilds, Brown Shipley, Glyn Mills and 
Currie, and short-term financing being underwritten by smaller banks and investment 
companies”.43  Lloyds, Barclays and the Rothschilds were linked to the expansion of 
British economic interests across world.  Barclays Bank, through its Jerusalem Branch, 
was the issuing centre of the currency established by the British during the Mandate 
occupation.44  Similarly the Palestine Currency Board, whose headquarters were in 
London “were appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and included a 
representative of the Crown Agents as chairman, an official from the Colonial Office, 
the general manager of the Bank of British West Africa, and an honorary member 
from the Treasury”.45  By establishing the Board the British maintained a degree of 
control over the currency and the flow of capital governing the nature and the levels of 
investment.46  This acted as a dominating influence on the development of the 
Palestinian economy which was also a matter of contention with the Zionists in 
Palestine who complained that it restricted their capacity to invest and develop.47  The 
composition of the Currency Board graphically illustrates the different constituencies 
that constituted the leadership of just such a finance capital oligarchy.  The whole 
institutional oversight of the currency in Mandate Palestine was within the framework 
of a monetary system tied to Britain. The discussions about which currency to use and 
what to peg that currency to, were critical discussions which had a bearing on the way 
the economy of Palestine was to develop.48  Following World War One the British 
replaced the Turkish pound which had lost 90% of its pre-war value with the Egyptian 
pound which was directly tied to Sterling.   
 
 In order to gain advantage in their economic competition, imperial powers 
have occasionally sacrificed immediate profitability in order to gain control over a 
specific market. Competition involved not simply gaining advantage but also 
disadvantaging the competitor. Imperialism sought “to reach out for every kind of 
territory … the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much 
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directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his [sic] 
hegemony”.49   The gains to imperialism cannot be assessed by an analysis of the 
balance sheets of trade relations between an imperial power and one of its colonies, 
but rather they have to be appreciated within the overarching context of the pursuit by 
the imperial power of its own specific goals within the development of capitalism as a 
whole.  This was the case in respect of the British concern for Palestine which did not 
itself constitute a particularly profitable endeavour.  “It is generally accepted that one 
of the foremost reasons for the adoption of the Jewish National Home policy was 
strategic because Palestine formed a buffer state to protect Egypt, helped provide 
secure air routes to the East, and became important as the terminal of the 
Mesopotamian oil pipeline”.50  Although Palestine did possess valuable raw materials 
this was not, at this time, the dominant reason for British interest in the country. 
 
Whilst imperialist governments were capable of maintaining a strategic view of 
their goals this did not prevent individual countries, like Britain, also assessing the 
specific balance sheet of trade relations between them and any of their colonies.  The 
notion that a colony should “pay its own way” was a frequent theme in the discussions 
on the costs of maintaining the British occupation of Palestine.  “The colonial 
requirement that a self-supporting colony have recourse to the home economy as 
seldom as possible was applied to mandated territories as well and in the case of 
Palestine rigidly enforced by the Colonial Office”.51  The objective always was to 
make the occupied pay for the occupation and control of the currency offered one 
means by which this might be achieved.    
 
In the British economy, the characteristics of the new-imperialism developed 
rapidly through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century prior to the Mandate 
occupation.  The economies of the imperial powers expanded exponentially, especially 
in the latter period of the nineteenth century.  Between 1840 and 1870 British GDP 
grew by 88% whilst between 1870 and 1913 it expanded by 124%.52  The comparable 
figures for France are 45% and 100% whilst that for Germany between 1870 and 1913 
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was 229%.53  Although the population of Germany was 32% larger than the United 
Kingdom, the GDP of both countries was roughly equivalent to each other in size in 
1913 but the per capita GDP, which generally is accepted as an indicator of standard 
of living, was 35% higher in the United Kingdom.54  This rapid economic expansion, 
concentration of capital, creation of monopolies and trusts gave rise to international 
rivalry and competition for territory, markets and raw materials.   
 
This expansion was both an expression of and a catalyst for the growth of 
overseas investment.  The export of capital accelerated rapidly through the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth.  “By 1914 the gross nominal 
value of Britain’s stock of capital invested abroad was £3.8 billion, between two-fifths 
and a half of all foreign owned assets.  That was more than double French overseas 
investment and more than three times the German figure”.55  Investment in the 
colonies and the neo-colonies offered, in general, a higher rate of return on capital than 
could be achieved in the mother country itself.  Capital investment in Palestine was 
largely directed towards companies whose owners supported the Zionist project thus 
having a major impact on the formation and growth of social classes.  In Chapter Five 
I will return to the issue of the impact of the inflow of capital into Palestine and how it 
affected the social formation of Palestinian society and the political consequences that 
brought about.   
 
The British focus on Palestine was a consequence of a variety of factors 
intrinsic to new-imperialism including the simple insistence on denying its acquisition 
to anyone else.56  The strengthening of British imperialism would be a blow to the 
ambitions of German imperialism but also place it in an advantageous position in the 
region in respect of all other imperialisms, including the French.  Although Palestine 
itself may not have been as important a source of raw materials, in comparison to the 
gold of the Witwatersrand mines in the Cape Colony for example, nevertheless the 
production of oil in the north of Mesopotamia was important to the British and a 
                                                
53 Calculations based on statistics in Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, 47-48 
54 GDP for the United States in 1913 was more than twice the size of the United Kingdom.  Angus 
Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, 85.  
55 Ferguson, Empire, 244. 
56 Exports from Palestine, especially agricultural produce, expanded in the period 1880–1913. See 
Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800–1914, (London: I. B. Taurus, Reprinted 
2009), 264. 
 45 
Mediterranean outlet for it was essential.57  The cost of British imports of oil products 
increased eleven fold between 1900 and 1920.58  Furthermore it is worth noting that 
although Palestine was not a major trading partner for Britain, throughout the first 
decade of the Mandate the British had an increasing monopoly of imports and exports 
and used this to their economic advantage.59 
 
Building a British controlled terminal at Haifa would cut the length of the 
supply line from Mosul and provide a place to refuel their Mediterranean fleet.   
Palestine also provided a convenient refuelling stop for aircraft flying from India and 
other parts of the British Empire to the East.  When the Lloyd George Cabinet were 
attempting to draft the map of Palestine the expert invited to assist them was the 
managing director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.60  Economic, political and 
military interests were interwoven.  It is unsurprising that the negotiations between the 
French, the British and later the USA over access to and control over the extraction, 
exploitation and use of the oil in the whole area were conducted between the 
representatives of major petroleum companies, governments and banks. The way in 
which this question was dealt with epitomised the functioning of finance capital and 
demonstrates how the advent of the new-imperialism influenced British policies in 
regard to Palestine.  
 
This view was expressed very forcefully by the Petroleum Executive, under the 
chairmanship of Sir John Cadman, in December 1918. Cadman was concerned that 
Britain should retain an independent oil supply and not become reliant on supplies 
from the United States.  The Executive body he chaired concluded that, “any territorial 
adjustments in Syria or elsewhere wayleaves for pipelines etc. from Mesopotamia and 
from Persia to the Mediterranean should be secured for British interests”.61  The 
British wanted a port outlet for the oil from Mosul.  This concern for Britain’s oil 
independence from the United States involved Cadman in extensive negotiations both 
with them and with the French over the exploitation of potential resources in the north 
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of Mesopotamia and the creation of a terminal point at the Mediterranean Sea.  These 
negotiations ran on for at least two decades before they were finally concluded and the 
pipeline built.  Time magazine, of 21st April 1941, concluded that the importance of 
the pipeline merited calling it the “carotid artery of the British Empire”.62  
Implementing New-Imperialism 
The nature and mode of the displacement of existing structures of social and 
economic relationships as a consequence of occupation by an invading power with a 
different set of relationships is a complex one.  All imperialist interventions including 
the British Mandate-occupation of Palestine are multi-faceted.63  The changes imposed 
by the British on Mandate Palestine did not remove every vestige of pre-existing 
social and economic relationships which had developed during the Ottoman Empire 
over many years.  In Palestine the British encountered Ottoman laws and practices 
governing the ownership and control of the land as well as traditions and customs 
shaping social and political bonds that had been in place for many centuries.  These 
pre-existing practices relating to land ownership could not be terminated immediately 
by the occupying power and were in fact one of the central questions at the heart of the 
conduct of the occupation and the colonisation of Palestine.  In Chapter Four we will 
look at how these contradictions impacted on social and political developments. 
 
In a number of instances exogenous economic factors had a significant impact 
on the domestic economies of sovereign countries as well as colonised societies.  In 
the nineteenth century the development of the economy of the Ottoman Empire, for 
example, was influenced by those with whom it was trading even though no 
occupation occurred.64  The Civil War in the United States of America reduced the 
production and export of cotton to Europe as a result of which Mediterranean 
agriculturalists switched their production to take advantage of the potential profits to 
be made thereby reducing the amount of land available to produce the staple crops for 
domestic consumption.  The pre-capitalist forms of landholding which had prevailed 
until that time then came under pressure from those who wished to exploit the 
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advantages presented by expanding the area of land that they could cultivate to grow 
the cotton. This switch to take advantage of the greater profitability of cotton impacted 
upon ownership structures.65  This profit-driven approach to production contrasted with 
what had happened previously when the goal was domestic consumption by those who 
worked the land and the production of a surplus for those who owned it.  Prior to this 
change the surplus, as I have explained above, had not been transformed into 
commodities to be sold in competition with other producers on a world market.     
 
Social, economic and political relations seldom if ever change at the same rate.  
There is no mechanical correspondence between developments in one sphere with 
those of the other.  It is arguable that social relations and social customs are slower to 
change than the formalised economic and political changes which might be imposed 
by the use of “extra-economic force”.  Imperialism, whether pre-capitalist or capitalist, 
does not immediately eradicate pre-existing relations and replace them with pristine 
alternatives.66  The nature of the new social, economic and political relationships will 
be an expression and a consequence of a variety of contestations including in this case 
most noticeably between the capacity of the occupier to impose and the occupied to 
resist.  Whilst this may result, for example in one sphere, in a variety of 
accommodations, in another it may well be a very destructive experience.  The 
ramifications of the alterations occurring in one area however reverberate in others.  
Marx explained how British rule in India had major consequences for the development 
of the latter’s economy not simply by having reverberations on specific individual 
commodities but in terms of the consequences for all the associated and subsidiary 
processes and their relations of production.    
 
It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian handloom and destroyed 
the spinning wheel.  England began with depriving the Indian cottons from the 
European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan [sic] and in the end 
inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons.  From 1818 to 1836 
the export of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 
                                                
65 See Resat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: the nineteenth century (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1988).  It is also worthwhile comparing these comments to those of Irfan Habib in Indian 
Economy 1858–1914 (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2007) on the impact of British colonialism on the 
development of industry and agriculture in India.  
66 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Allen Kane, 1973), 105-106. Marx made a similar point that 
capitalist society did not eradicate overnight pre-existing social and economic relationships.  
 48 
5,200.  In 1824 the export of British muslins to India hardly amounted to 
1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 of yards.  But at the 
same time the population of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 
20,000.  This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no 
means the worst consequence.  British steam and science uprooted, over the 
whole surface of Hindostan [sic], the union between agriculture and 
manufacturing industry.67 
 
Although aspects of the new-imperialism were present in the interstices of the 
existing empires it was the truly worldwide expansion of capitalism incorporating the 
economies of all countries into the capitalist system which signalled the most dramatic 
change.   Between 1860 and 1909 the British Empire expanded from an area covering 
9.5 million square miles to one of 12.7 million square miles representing around 25% 
of the surface of the world.68  This process came about largely as a result of the 
expansion of finance capital coupled with the export of capital to create new 
companies and new markets.  Even where pre-capitalist relations existed they became 
subservient to the imperatives of the market economy.  The direct interventionist 
imperialism typical of the pre-capitalist and the capitalist period was supplanted by a 
new-imperialism which, as a global system, reached every corner of the world 
compelling changes to the existing social formations.  The products of Palestine were 
in competition with those elsewhere and as we shall see later with new methods of 
production which were brought to the country by those who were colonists.  Later in 
this chapter we will examine the notion of finance capital more closely and offer some 
examples of its operation in the area of the Near East. 
 
As an example of the nature of the new-imperialism the intervention by the 
British in Palestine was multi-layered.  The transformations which it wrought, in a 
certain sense created and in another sense accelerated, the process of displacing 
existing social relations which contributed to the undermining of the capacity of the 
indigenous people to resist.  The accelerating impact of the imperial economies on 
land ownership in the Ottoman Empire through the nineteenth century resulting in the 
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alienation and then the commodification of land led to a dislocation and then 
progressively a break with the already existing relations.69  In drawing attention to this 
process my intention is not to adduce that changes in the forms of landownership 
determined the capacity of the Zionists to acquire land nor that it defined the character 
of British rule but to suggest that global economic changes contributed in part to the 
destabilisation of well established social, economic and political set of relations.  In an 
overwhelmingly agricultural economy alterations to the existing forms of 
landownership have consequences for the social and political relationships.  In later 
chapters we will examine this process more closely. 
 
Uneven Development 
From an economic perspective the rise of England as a leading imperial power 
can be ascribed to a variety of factors. The initial process has been described as 
“organised crime” conducted by buccaneers or pirates.  Witnessing their successes the 
government of the day authorised privateers whose actions were legalised  “in return 
for a share of the proceeds”.70  The establishment of the English Empire was based on 
theft, from the Spanish in particular.71  The economist John Maynard Keynes summed 
up the process as one in which “the booty brought back by Drake in the Golden Hind 
may fairly be considered the fountain and origin of British Foreign Investment”.72  
This phase of transition from a pre-capitalist imperialism to an imperialism based on 
capitalist economic and social relations was stimulated not only by the systematic 
robbery of contending powers but additionally by plundering lands which had not 
previously been under the dominion of any of the emerging empires.  In order to 
become a capitalist power England had to accumulate capital and it achieved this in 
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large measure by taking the capital of others.  In Chapter Two I will explain how 
British policy in respect of Palestine was underpinned by imperial preoccupations of 
expansionism, the protection of gains already made and the desire to protect markets 
and acquire control over essential raw materials simultaneously denying others access 
to them.  The occupation of Palestine was the epitome of the new-imperialism.   
 
 As has been argued above, in all forms of imperialism there is a connectedness 
between the social, economic and political development of the imperial nation itself 
with the manner in which it seeks to establish and then to operate its power 
internationally. Whilst there is a debate about the factors which led to increase in 
population and the demographic changes produced by technological advances and 
developments in industrial production which most notably resulted in the population 
moving away from the land, it is not my intention to enter into this debate here.73 
Population displacement took place which coincided with social and economic 
changes that had an impact on the capacity of Britain to begin its imperialist 
expansionism.  I will however return to the issue of the association of colonialism with 
population growth below and will specifically comment on the availability of human 
resources available to undertake colonisation as a factor influencing the choice of 
Zionist settlers as candidates to undertake this role in Palestine.  As I argue in this 
thesis the nature of the Zionist project constituted a distinct form of colonisation. 
 
There exists, in my judgement, a substantial body of empirical evidence which 
has been analysed in academic literature sufficient to justify the view that 
imperialism’s imposition of its own priorities negatively distorted the economic, social 
and political relations of those dominated.74   In its most extreme form there are many 
instances where imperialist intervention led to the development of monoculture and 
monoproduction with the economy of the colony being dominated by agriculture, 
frequently based on a single crop, and the production of raw materials.75  Perhaps one 
of the most graphic cases to illustrate the effect of the imperial domination on the 
economic development of a conquered people is India, geographically the largest and 
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most populated country of the British Empire. It was first subjugated not by the forces 
of the British state but by the Honourable East India Company, a joint stock company.  
Under the rule of the British East India Company, “from 1757 to 1857, Indian per 
capita income fell, but British gains were substantial”.76  It was, to some extent, as a 
result of the desire to hold onto these gains and to India the source of that wealth that 
the British Empire was concerned about guaranteeing safe passage for its goods 
through the Suez Canal.  India as we shall see in later chapters was a significant factor 
influencing not only the future of Palestine but also that of the whole region 
surrounding it.     
 
It is important to note too that the British pre-occupation with Palestine was 
not just a matter of economics but was connected to questions of political control and 
management of the Empire, and to the religious significances of Jerusalem for 
example to the Muslim population of India.  The profound interest shown by 
successive holders of senior posts in the British India Office in the developments in 
Palestine and the Near East generally are testament to that.  This further demonstrates 
the value of situating the British policy towards Palestine in this wider context of 
imperial concern.    
 
Colonialism, Colonisation and Neo-colonialism 
Imperialism and Migration 
The shift from pre-capitalist to capitalist imperialism is best exemplified by 
the emergence of the Dutch and English Empires.  A key transitional component of the 
change to capitalist imperialism was, in the case of the Dutch Republic, the 
commercialisation of trade. In England this process of transformation in the domestic 
economy, it has been argued, emerged from the changing forms of landownership 
which produced a “surplus” population in the rural areas.77  The numbers evicted from 
their lands and the changes in the nature of the use of land amongst other things 
contributed over many years to a reduction in the need for agricultural labour 
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producing a consequential growth in the urban population.78  According to one 
authority, more than 22 million people left the British Isles between 1815 and 1914. 
Motivation for emigration in part stemmed from coercion in the form of penal 
transportation and famine, and in part, resulted from voluntary encouragement through 
a variety of means including subsidised transportation.79  Agents and societies, who 
received payments for each individual successfully processed, were employed to seek 
out potential emigrants with employable skills for the colonies.80   Children were sent 
from orphanages; famines in Ireland impelled others; both male and female convicts 
were transported; displaced Highlanders; paupers sent by aristocrats from landed 
estates and many more made up the numbers.81  In 1845 the population of Ireland was 
more than 8 million but by 1914 it had fallen to just over 4 million.82  There appeared 
in society numbers of people for whom emigration became, if not a desirable option, 
then at least a plausible route for survival, notwithstanding the horrendous 
consequences for large numbers of them.   
 
Anxiety about the impact of an ever increasing population was perhaps most 
typified by the writing of Thomas Malthus in his work, An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, printed in 1798 which, amongst other arguments, advanced the thesis that 
whilst population expansion was exponential the means of subsistence on the other 
hand was growing arithmetically.83  His ideas continued to have an influence 
throughout the rest of nineteenth century.   Emigration allied to the expansion of the 
empire and the building of colonial settlements albeit under a variety of circumstances, 
was a significant contributing component to colonialism.  In the view of some 
politicians it was a matter of exporting a problem which if left unattended might have 
severe domestic social consequences.  As an example Lenin recounted the alleged 
comment of the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes: 
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I was in the East End of London (a working class quarter) yesterday and 
attended a meeting of the unemployed.  I listened to the wild speeches, which 
were just a cry for ‘bread! bread!’ and on my way home I pondered over the 
scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism 
… My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save 
the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we 
colonial statesmen, must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to 
provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines.  The 
Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question.  If you want to 
avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.84  
 
The idea in Britain of turning “surplus” populations into settlers ran throughout 
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Organisations were established to recruit 
large numbers of settlers taking account of their age and gender and to ensure that 
people were recruited with skills relevant to the work that the colonists were to be 
engaged in.  A variety of organisations were established, for example, specifically 
aimed at recruiting women emigrants including, the London Female Emigration 
Society (1850), the Female Middle Class Emigration Society (1862–1892) and many 
others subsequently organised under the British Women’s Emigration Association.85  
This pattern of the selective processing of potential settlers can also be found in the 
records of papers of PICA, the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association, whose roots 
go back to the end of the nineteenth century and echo the methodology employed by 
these other agencies.86 
 
Although stimulated by quite divergent reasons, within Britain the idea of 
emigration and settlement to other parts of the Empire was widespread within society.   
However emigration and colonisation within the Empire were not confined to settler 
colonists drawn from the British Isles. Large numbers of emigrants were drawn, by the 
British, from other parts of the Empire and especially from India to settle colonies in 
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other parts of the world.  Many of those who migrated, voluntarily or under 
compulsion, did so to undertake specific work within the countries to which they went. 
Between the years 1834 to 1920 more than 1,258,861 or 85% of indentured 
immigrants were from India.87  The net outflow of migrants from India has been 
estimated at over 5 million travelling to a variety of countries including Burma, 
Malaya, Sri Lanka and the continent of Africa and to the Caribbean.88  
 
However it has been noted that “differences in economic circumstances, 
geography, and imperial policies were responsible for directing most European 
immigrants to ... temperate destinations, while African, Asian, and Pacific Islanders 
went largely to tropical ones”.89  Government travel subsidies and racist policies added 
to the discriminatory distribution of immigrants diverting white settlers to temperate 
climates.90  The prospect of a Jewish homeland settled by predominantly non-British 
colonists played into this racialised pattern of emigration.  I will return to this subject 
later in this chapter differentiating between colonialism and colonisation in order to 
analyse how the Zionist project constituted a break with previous patterns of 
colonialism and colonisation.  The substantial point that I wish to underline here is that 
colonisation was an integral part of imperialism facilitated by the availability of a 
population “surplus” albeit the consequence of different factors.  The colonisation 
undertaken by Zionism was distinct but reflected a common pattern of migration that 
was evident in the nineteenth century.    Colonisation was part and parcel of the 
capitalist imperial project but its significance diminished with the arrival of the new-
imperialism. 
 
Forms of Imperial Rule 
The British used diverse forms of rule in different parts of their Empire at 
different times but in general these could be divided into the two broad categories of 
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direct and indirect rule.91  The form of regime adopted at any particular moment was 
based on a pragmatic response to each specific situation and ranged from direct rule, at 
the outset of a colonial enterprise, through to a relatively high degree of autonomy, 
invariably granted only after the indigenous peoples had been subjugated or 
incorporated into the imperialist project.  The nature of the rule imposed might change 
from the direct to the indirect as the balance of power between the indigenous peoples 
and the colonists shifted.  The nature of the rule applied might also be dependent on 
the outcome of inter-imperialist rivalries. 
 
The judgement about the degree of autonomy to be granted was based on a 
variety of economic, military and political considerations.  The greater the degree of 
compliance with the imperialist power and the less the need for military intervention 
then the greater the degree of independence bestowed. A more substantial level of 
independence and even self-government was granted when the colonists themselves, 
or in alliance with compliant sections of the indigenous peoples, were able to take on 
the role previously played by the imperial power.92  When self-government was 
granted it was generally confined to control over domestic issues operating within a 
free trade system which privileged the British over the notionally independent 
country.93  In Chapter Five I will analyse the contradictions which confronted the 
British in Palestine as a consequence of the Balfour Declaration which acted as an 
obstacle to the creation of any affiliations between the British and the indigenous Arab 
Palestinian people.  
 
Even in the stage of direct control exercised from London the forms of rule 
might vary.  In nineteenth century India for example, the British imperialist 
domination was initially exercised by the private East India Company, a joint stock 
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company and only later did the British government take over responsibility.94  The cost 
of administration born by the entrepreneurial capitalists of the East India Company 
was, at least in part, relocated to the British state.  This was a consequence of the fact 
that this single commercial enterprise no matter how large was unable to maintain 
domination over the country and state intervention was necessary. Furthermore, it was 
an indication of the competitive economic forces within Britain which opposed the 
company establishing a monopoly of the Indian market and potentially excluding them 
from the marketplace.  Irfan Habib, in his Essays in Indian History, has described the 
period between 1800 and 1850, when this process of transformation in the form of 
imperial rule was taking place, as corresponding to a change “from seizing Indian 
commodities to seizing the Indian market”.95  The form of rule had a correspondence 
to the changes taking place which foreshadowed the monopoly economics of the new-
imperialist era. 
 
The intention behind the British endeavour to impose their political and 
military rule in India was in order to achieve an economic hegemony giving exclusive 
advantages to companies from Britain.  Even under any devolved government, the 
British insisted on freedom of trade for its merchants whilst simultaneously imposing 
tariffs and constraints on goods and raw materials imported from those colonies.96  
This process was accompanied by the introduction of taxation systems on the 
indigenous peoples and the colonists to make them pay the cost of the administration 
of the imperial rule under which they lived.97  The break by the thirteen American 
colonies from the Empire was led by colonists precisely opposing the excessive 
taxation imposed on them.98  This process of making the peoples in the British 
colonies pay for the presence of British troops and administrators was replicated in 
respect of Palestine to the disadvantage of the indigenous community.  
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India had a degree of devolved government resulting from the Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 but control ultimately lay with the Viceroy and the India 
Office in London.99  Other parts of the Empire were ruled directly through a variety of 
mechanisms involving High Commissioners who had a power of veto over any local 
decision-making agency. In southern Palestine the British in December 1917 
established military rule run by the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South).  
In October 1918 this administration was extended to the whole of Palestine and lasted 
until July 1920 when it was replaced by the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel to run 
a civil administration which was legitimised by the League of Nations through the 
Mandate.  Whilst the appearance of the two administrations might have seemed 
different they were both backed by the military capacities of the occupying force. 
 
The decision to rule Palestine through the mechanism of a Mandate was the 
consequence of a number of factors.  Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United 
States of America, had insisted that there should be no colonial acquisitions as a result 
of the outcome of the war but that a system of Mandates should be set up which would 
place the former colonies in the hands of the victors, with the express intent of those 
territories becoming independent self-governing countries.100  British acquiescence to 
this formula reflected the changing balance of power internationally and was an 
indication that they recognised that their actions needed a form of international 
legitimation.   
 
Article 22 of the League of Nations which defined the role and function of the 
Mandate process expressed the superiority of the powerful nations against the defeated 
nations and the peoples over whom they had previously ruled.  Those who had been 
subject peoples of the defeated nations were viewed as “peoples not yet able to stand 
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”.101  As a 
consequence the League proposed that “the tutelage of such peoples should be 
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101 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. January 1920 quoted in Charles D Smith, 
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entrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience or 
their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing 
to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on 
behalf of the League”.102  The League of Nations Covenant codified imperial rule.  It 
differentiated between “advanced nations” and those not yet ready to take on the 
responsibilities of government.  Of course the arbiter as to which category a country 
might belong was determined by the British and the victorious allies.  As I will explain 
in Chapter Three, Woodrow Wilson initially saw his Fourteen Points as applying only 
to the European countries which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman 
Empire. However this notion of transition was itself a form of redefining of imperialist 
relationships concomitant with the expansion of a form of covert imperialism or neo-
colonialism. It might be argued that this represented a shift from the “formal” empires 
of past centuries to a twentieth century legitimation of the “informal” imperialism.   
 
Colonialism and Colonisation 
Imperialism has generally incorporated within it forms of colonial rule 
although their character have varied between the imperialisms of differing eras and 
even within empires.  Lorenzo Veracini in Israel and Settler Society has drawn 
attention to the work of David Fieldhouse who distinguished between “colonisation” 
and “colonialism”, differentiating between a process which sought the “successful 
reproduction of a European society in a colonial context” with the process of 
colonialism which seeks “the successful imposition of political and economic control 
over a colonial domain”.103  A distinction can therefore be made between colonisation 
which entails the physical presence of settlers and colonialism which is the 
establishment of political, economic and cultural forms of hegemony based on 
imposed norms albeit presided over by agencies of the imperial power.104  
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Colonisation in the sense that Fieldhouse has used it requires the physical act 
of settlement to reproduce the “European society” and is inseparable from a process 
which simultaneously involves the subordination if not the destruction of pre-existing 
social formations.  The colonies of North America and Australia were premised on the 
wholesale transplantation of a “European society” to the colonised lands.105  
Displacement, dispossession and genocide were inflicted on the indigenous peoples of 
Australia in the process of the establishment of this “European society”.106  
Colonialism, as defined by Fieldhouse, requires a degree of consent in order to 
function but what is lacking in Veracini’s approach is any exploration of the nexus 
around which this process develops.  The categories used by the latter are descriptive 
of identity, “consciousness”, “narrative” and although referencing the imperial power 
as a component in these relationships, it does not, in my view, explain what propelled 
this process nor evaluate what roles the differing constituencies of imperial rule played 
within this process. 
 
Colonisation involves the transfer of people to settle permanently in a 
conquered land in order to ensure that the economic spoils resulting from conquest 
continue to flow to the imperial power.  This has been described as a means to 
guarantee “accumulation through dispossession” and a process by which essentially 
European capitalism acquired its wealth in a dual act of exclusion and expropriation.107   
Not all settlers were driven by the idea of gaining materially nor were they necessarily 
motivated by the idea of carrying out an imperial mission.  I would distinguish 
between the pressures which resulted in migrants leaving their homeland, the 
ideologies which were used to justify that action of settling in a new land and the 
objective role that they came to play in those circumstances.   
 
The famines which took place in Ireland in the nineteenth century, whatever 
their specific cause, crop failure or the economic policies of those who could redirect 
exports to domestic markets, constituted a pressure on the population to emigrate.  The 
emigration which occurred did not result in every case in those who left becoming 
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colonists: for example those who went to the United States of America.108  Those who 
were transported to Australia in the nineteenth century as a result of criminalisation 
under the operative legal system did not go voluntarily.   A quarter of those sent were 
from Ireland and a quarter of these were women with around one fifth of the total of 
Irish transported for political reasons.109  Those who emigrated to colonies of the 
British Empire whether from within the Empire or from other countries in Africa, Asia 
or the South Pacific frequently did so under coercion and with long-term debt bondage 
obligations.110  Nevertheless the net consequence of their being in Australia or 
elsewhere, was, in the longer run, to place them objectively in the same relationship to 
the indigenous peoples as those who had travelled voluntarily.111  They became, in 
time, incorporated into the colonial-settler project and themselves de facto colonists.112   
 
In contrast to colonisation, colonialism was based on minimal if not negligible 
transfer of people to the conquered territories and often involved the co-option of a 
layer of the indigenous population in an occupied territory to collaborate with the 
imperial power or even manage the territory on its behalf.  When the East India 
Company went to India and established itself it lacked the capacity to provide the 
numbers of troops essential to rule so vast a land with so many people.  In the first 
instance it was engaged in a series of confrontations with other imperial powers, often 
in the coastal regions, but its eventual success was the result of making alliances with 
hereditary rulers who, relative to the vast majority of indigenous people, became 
beneficiaries of the relationships they entered into with the Company.  This social 
layer acted as allies and agents of the British in India.  Whilst they may have gained 
personally, the economic development of India was itself set back by their actions as 
we have already noted. 
 
                                                
108 There are of course a number of questions unanswered here.  The colonisation of the whole country 
continued throughout the nineteenth century even though the United States of America was 
independent and not itself a colony.  The spread of imperialism was not simply a matter of overseas 
expansion but as with Russia included contiguous territorial expansion.  I am aware that this indeed 
raises further questions but there is not space here to explore this fully. 
109 Marjory Harper, “British Migration and the Peopling of the Empire”, 78. 
110 David Northrup, “Migration from Africa, Asia and the South Pacific” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume III ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
88 
111 Marjory Harper, “British Migration and the Peopling of the Empire”, 78.  A similar pattern was 
present in New Caledonia which the French used as a penal colony. 
112 See Wolfe, Settler Colonialism.   
 61 
This issue of the interplay between the economic, social and political 
relationships imposed upon a pre-existing set of relationships has been touched on 
above.  Colonist-settlers went for personal gain and to play a role to the benefit of the 
empire.  They found themselves in lands already populated by peoples with their own 
social, economic and political structures.   This encounter impacted on both groups but 
in a much more unequal and disadvantageous way on those of the occupied lands.113   
The imperial ruler was capable of imposing an asymmetrical relationship of power 
which they maintained even when sections of the indigenous community had been co-
opted through treaties, privileged treatment or bribery.114  In China, this resulted in the 
emergence of a comprador class willing to act to the benefit of the imperial rulers 
whilst able to gain advantage for themselves in the process.115   From the outset this 
was not presented as a serious option in Palestine.  Some of those who might have 
played this role were of course to sell their lands to the Zionist settlers thus eliminating 
that choice for themselves.116 
 
Settler Colonisation 
The process of colonisation invariably commences with an act of force 
subjugating and frequently physically displacing the indigenous peoples or 
maintaining them in a subservient position excluded from the political administration 
of the territory and the economic and social structures created by the imperial power.  
In its extreme shape this exclusion takes the form of physical separation accompanied 
by genocidal policies.  This pattern is evidenced in the examples of the north of 
Ireland, in North America, Australia and New Zealand.117  The colonists, who 
undertook the role of surrogates for the imperial power, broke with the protection of 
the imperial power only after the indigenous peoples had been displaced or militarily 
defeated by their sponsors and most often of course both. Whilst the imperial power 
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might have sought to rule through consent, it resorted to coercion especially where no 
significant social layer of the indigenous peoples was willing to be co-opted into the 
imperial project. 
 
In the British Empire diverse forms of political control were exercised which 
included colonies, dominions, protectorates and mandate territories and those 
countries under imperial control have been referred to as constituting the “formal” 
empire.  However the influence of the imperial powers was not limited to those 
countries over which they held direct control.  Even before the advent of the new-
imperialism there were counties whose economies were dominated by their economic 
relationships with an imperial power. The term “informal” empire has been used to 
describe those countries over which imperialist dominance was exercised by less direct 
means but especially through economic influence.118   This became increasingly the 
case with the development of the new-imperialism when finance capital in particular 
sought to dominate control of the raw materials and the markets without becoming 
encumbered by any obligation to take on political responsibility for the management 
of the peoples of the lands over which they sought hegemony.   
 
In the twentieth century Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, 
defined this practice as neo-colonialism.  “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the 
State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings 
of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy 
is directed from outside”.119  There are numerous cases of neo-colonial rule and 
intervention by Britain for example in Latin America in countries which formally were 
sovereign entities but which were under obligations to British economic imperatives.120 
“The immense amounts of capital sunk into Latin America, for example, gave Britain 
so much leverage – especially in Argentina and Brazil – that it seems quite legitimate 
to speak of ‘informal imperialism’ in these countries”.121  The imperatives which 
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created this relationship were the consequence of the economic relations controlling 
the availability of credit, the convertibility of currency, investment and financial 
relations generally binding together the political and economic development of these 
countries with the imperial power.   
 
With the advent of new-imperialism, colonialism and especially neo-
colonialism was to replace the use of colonisation as the preferred option of the new-
imperialist powers.  The British clearly aspired to create a neo-colonialist relationship 
with the newly created Arab countries by having them incorporate in their treaties 
clauses which committed the new countries to have their primary external trade 
relationships with the British.  In Chapter Three I will demonstrate this through a 
discussion of the negotiations which took place between the Arab leaders and the 
British.  However although a neo-colonialist option was available to the British, in 
respect of Palestine, the government decided on a different course of action.  They 
chose the option of Zionist settler colonialism thus diverting from neo-colonialism by 
endorsing a surrogate and thereby fulfilling the USA’s criteria that the post-war peace 
should exclude further imperialist expansion. 
 
Ideology, Politics and Religion 
Political actions are always underpinned by an ideological justification none 
more so than Balfour’s promise to create a homeland for the Jews.  Here I will 
examine the connections between the new-imperialism and its ideological justification.  
Perhaps more than any other imperialist venture the British undertaking to establish a 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine was always infused with a profound ideological 
character. 
 
In seeking to establish a framework for examining the imperialist experience I 
am conscious that the role of ideology as a component of conquest and colonisation is 
itself a complex question. Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism has drawn 
particular attention to the wider question of the cultural aspects of imperialism going 
beyond even the officially constructed ideologised narratives of the imperial powers.122  
For Said, imperialism was all-pervading but its struggle for power was not one simply 
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conducted around questions of economics or even politics.  “The main battle of 
imperialism is over land, of course, but when it came to who owned the land, who had 
the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now 
plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in 
narrative”.123  Each state aspiring to become an imperial power developed a self-
justifying rationale for its actions, a metanarrative which sought to explain and justify 
its actions in terms of continuity with its own national aspirations and history.  
 
The development of imperialist ideologies legitimating the expansionist 
policies of British imperialism can be traced through a skein of justifying arguments 
from Thomas More through Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.124  Their 
opinions were frequently substantiated by reference to religious authority. The views 
expressed by these authors influenced the development of the language and concepts 
used to express the terms of the relationships between the imperial power and the 
conquered people.  The development of universalist ideologies became an important 
trait of imperialists seeking, in the first instance to hegemonise the domestic political 
discourse, but then looking to impose or implant a belief system on the diverse 
conquered peoples to justify the imperialist process.   
 
Throughout most periods, but perhaps more evidently from the commencement 
of modern imperialism, powers have sought, through the imposition of common legal 
frameworks especially in respect of trade, land ownership and political governance to 
create the structural underpinning by which their control, whether by coercion or 
consent, might be legitimated.  These entirely secular actions have frequently been 
justified in terms of particular belief systems often, though not exclusively religious, to 
coax the indigenous peoples through their adoption of a notionally common narrative 
to enmesh themselves in their own subjugation.125  Amongst the most crude examples 
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of such a process was that of the Inquisition in Spain, which under the direct control of 
King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, sought ruthlessly to impose religious conformity 
on Jews, Muslims and other Catholics both within the country and in the furthest 
reaches of the Spanish Empire.126   Belief in the same gods induced the conquered 
peoples to adhere to the strictures laid down by those deemed who were (or are) there 
spokespersons on earth. 
 
Whilst in all epochs imperial powers have sought to impose their belief 
systems on those they subjugated, this was never a simple or undifferentiated 
process.127  Conversion to Christianity, using both coercion and consent, was a feature 
of European imperialism particularly that of the Spanish, Portuguese and the English.  
However proselytisation was certainly never a feature of the alliance between British 
imperialism and Zionism.   The religio-ideological message of the Zionists and pro-
Zionist Christian imperialists alike was, on the contrary, one of exclusion of the 
indigenous peoples. There was little or no attempt or indeed intention, by any of the 
pro-Zionist supporters, to win the indigenous Muslim and Christian Palestinians to an 
ideological acceptance of the Zionist narrative let alone to Judaism.128  Although there 
were Christian missions in Palestine and surrounding areas, prior to the emergence of 
Zionism, during the late nineteenth century and through to the twentieth, there was no 
generalised attempt by the British to utilise them to achieve their acceptance of either a 
Jewish or Christian Zionism by the majority of the indigenous Palestinian people.  
 
Whilst there may have been attempts to co-opt some sections of the population 
into an accommodation to British imperialism there was no systematised attempt to 
engage the Palestinians as a whole.  Conversely there were attempts to engage 
members of the leading families to co-operate with the British administration but this 
was largely presented as a question of pragmatism and there was no success in 
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winning even a significant layer to play the role of surrogates for the colonisers.  This 
was in contrast to other instances of occupation and colonisation such as in India 
where hereditary ruling layers were co-opted into or allied themselves with the 
imperialist framework of the Raj without converting to Christianity.129  In a later 
chapter I will examine those attempts which did take place to co-opt sections of the 
Palestinian society and leading families into the British-Zionist agenda for the creation 
of a homeland for the Jews. 
Secular and Religious Apologetics 
At different periods and in different parts of the world debates about economic, 
political and social relations have been expressed in the form of religious disputes or 
through the development of argument reinforced by reference to religious codes or 
extrapolated from religious texts or practices.  As I noted above the break between 
pre-capitalist imperialism and the imperialism of the capitalist era was a consequence 
of the break between the social relations which existed in the agriculturally-based 
economies ruled by landed aristocracies extracting tax and tribute in kind and the 
emergence of economies in which commercial trade began to play a more dominant 
role and, goods became commodities.   
 
During the course of the English Civil War political and economic debate was 
often couched in terms of religious disputation with disagreements about property 
relations and the right to the appropriation of territory conducted as doctrinal 
debates.130   As C.B. Macpherson explains in The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, Hobbes to Locke, the debate which took place about ownership of lands 
and property rights amongst different factions of the contending forces were couched 
in terms of the interpretation of religious injunctions.131  The use of religious authority 
to justify political practice has occurred throughout history and Zionism was not the 
first ideology to elaborate a political perspective drawn from a faith-based tradition 
                                                
129 There is not the space here to go into other forms of co-option employed by imperialist powers such 
as corruption and bribery but these were clearly used extensively in conquered countries. See Irfan 
Habib, Essays in Indian History (London: Anthem Press, 2002). 
130 Wood, Empire of Capital. 68, 74. 
131 C.B.Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962).138. See also E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working 
Class (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970) especially Chapter 11. 
 67 
creating a secularised practice to legitimate the assertion of one group’s interests over 
those of another.   
 
What constituted the uniqueness of the situation of the alliance between 
Zionism and elements of Christianity however was the bringing together from two 
apparently divergent religious traditions a syncretic amalgam.  Nur Masalha 
summarises the way in which this occurred in respect of Zionism in the following 
way:  “Although many early Jewish Zionists were secular, socialists and atheists, they 
were quick to put the ‘promised land–chosen people’ ideology to use for its political 
value, both as a means of attracting believing Jews to their cause and as a way of 
justifying their colonial project in European Christian eyes”.132  Later in this chapter I 
will look in more detail at the ideas of those secular authors I have mentioned whose 
authority was invoked to justify both English and British imperial expansion and draw 
out the connections between them and the arguments favoured by the Zionists in 
justifying their political aspirations.  This ideological alliance was very evident in the 
argumentation justifying the Zionist project for the creation of homeland for the Jews 
in the land of Palestine. 
 
The Dutch author Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and the English writer John 
Locke (1632–1704) in particular developed arguments for imperial expansionism and 
colonisation.133  Grotius codified the just causes for war in De jure belli ac pacis and 
has been attributed with laying the basis for international law although this should not 
be misunderstood as meaning equity of treatment for conquerors and conquered.  His 
arguments equally provided an apologia for imperialist conquest and settlement.  Self-
preservation is the foremost rule of nature, he maintained, and arguing in support of 
free trade he contended that what cannot be occupied cannot be owned, thus asserting 
Dutch rights to sail unhindered by rival powers, to obtain new conquests.  He proposed 
that usable things left unused could be appropriated as property by others, that land 
left uncultivated, for example, could be acquired on the basis that the new “owners” 
would cultivate it thus adding value, a proposal present in the writings of Sir Thomas 
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More in his Utopia.134  Support for the notion of colonisation is also present in 
Leviathan, the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), though here it is a proposal 
which is promoted as a remedy for the problem of poverty and perceived 
overpopulation.135  These arguments provided a secular justification for all imperialism 
and for all expansionist developments.  It is possible to find these themes of 
uninhabited land or res nullius for people wishing to make it productive in the 
secularised biblical narrative voiced by Zionists about Palestine.136   
 
In the case of both the settlement in Ireland and in North America religious and 
ideological concerns were intrinsic to the groups who engaged in the process. Those 
who were encouraged by the English monarchy to settle in Ireland were required to be 
Scottish or English Protestants and not Catholics.  The objective of the plantation 
process was to disrupt and displace the indigenous community which resisted the rule 
of the Protestant English monarchy.137  John Winthrop, later Governor of 
Massachusetts, was one amongst many prominent English figures of the seventeenth 
century who saw the plantations as a means to supplant Irish Catholicism with English 
Protestantism.138  The rhetoric of religious salvation, rescuing the erring Catholics from 
their heretical disposition was an incessant accompaniment to the politico-military 
project of subjugation.  In America the settlement project was similarly swathed in 
redemptive discourse overseen in part by bodies like the Council of Trade and 
Plantations.139  
 
The idea that an occupying nation was bringing a redemptive religion to an 
unbelieving peoples was subsequently supplanted by alternative ideological narratives 
also based on the idea of bestowing superiority on the conqueror in respect of the 
conquered.  The exclusively religious narrative of superiority was replaced by the 
introduction of concepts of “civilisation” and “backwardness” and the beneficence of 
the European power in bringing enlightenment to a deprived society.  This concept of 
racial superiority became a generalised idea accepted across much of Europe in the 
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nineteenth century especially.  Hannah Arendt, in Imperialism: Part Two of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, argues that “Racism has been the powerful ideology of 
imperialistic policies since the turn of our (i.e. 19th) century”.140   
Conclusions 
The political, economic and social relations operating within Britain at the time 
when the colonisation of Palestine took place were the product of the emergence of a 
new stage of imperialism supplanting the form of capitalism dominated principally by 
mercantilism. The emergence and expansion of finance capital facilitated the 
expansion of overseas investment and laid the basis for intense international rivalry.  
This new-imperialism was manifested by the growth and expansion of monopolies, 
seeking to achieve pre-eminence in the international market, in part through control 
over important sources of raw materials such as oil. The Zionist project of creating a 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine was in many respects an anomaly reverting back to 
an earlier stage of colonialist imperialism. Palestinian society and the social groups 
which the settlers sought to displace was itself in the process of development towards 
capitalist forms of social and economic relations.  The British, in my view, had not 
encountered such a set of circumstances before.  
 
The ambition of the British imperial power on a world scale was not confined 
to profiteering from the acquisition of goods for sale at home or to third parties but 
incorporated a process of capital investment in those countries.  The objective of this 
relationship was to gain control over their economies, including their raw materials, 
and control over lines of communication such as the Suez Canal was vital.  This was 
especially important when the British imperial operation was not carried out in 
isolation from rival imperial powers.  Each imperial power sought to obtain and keep 
control of sources of goods or raw materials whilst denying their rivals access to any 
other potentially beneficial sources. British preoccupations with the Near East were 
influenced by the actions of allies such as the French and the Russians in the pre-
revolutionary period.  In addition British desire to control the access to oil was 
influenced by their desire to lessen their dependence on supplies from the United 
States of America. This inter-imperialist rivalry was at its most antagonistic when it 
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came to Germany and their ally the Ottoman Empire.  Palestine was situated at a 
critical junction between areas which each of the rivals wished to have control over. 
 
It is not possible to make an absolute distinction between rule by coercion or 
consent since both might be used at differing times in differing circumstances with 
different groups within a conquered people.  The extent to which the British were able 
to achieve the consent of an indigenous peoples was not a constant and underlying any 
apparently consensual relationships lay the ability to utilise force as the last resort to 
achieve their objectives.   Settlers were a component within their armoury of force in 
displacing the indigenous communities and the situation in Mandate Palestine 
replicated many of these features.  In almost all cases the settlers themselves went 
through a process of selection to determine their suitability.  Although the recruitment 
of potential colonists was driven by a desire to establish a population to act as 
surrogates, British imperialism was prepared to draw on peoples from different parts 
of the empire to undertake this role.  In addition whilst economic ambition might be 
one facet of their motivation it was true that many settlers, such as those in the north of 
Ireland and in North America, were also motivated by religio-ideological persuasions.  
The politics of Zionism welded together religious belief and a nationalist narrative 
complimenting the imperialist agenda of the British.  The Zionist project of creating a 
homeland for the Jews, whether in Palestine or as they had discussed, in east Africa or 
anywhere else, could not be achieved without the endorsement of British 
imperialism.141  In doing so British imperialism simultaneously sought to achieve goals 
of its own.   
 
 
 
  
                                                
141 HC Deb 11 April vol 144 c1263 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1905/apr/11/zionist-
expedition-against-the-nandi#S4V0144P0_19050411_HOC_89 (accessed 27th January 2016). It should 
be noted that even in respect of the proposal to establish a Jewish homeland in East Africa, concern 
was expressed in the House of Commons that it might require the displacement of the Nandi people.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
War, Empire And Palestine 
Introduction 
The war, which began in 1914, was fought between two opposing sets of allies: on the 
one hand the Entente Powers, consisting of Britain, France and Russia, and on the 
other, the Central Powers of Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. 
Although the United States of America declared war on Germany in April 1917 its 
main contribution until June was supplies and financial support.  During the course of 
the war the Entente alliance changed when, following the Revolution of 1917, Russia 
left the group. The war was a manifestation of deep-seated economic, political and 
ultimately military rivalries between the imperialist powers produced by the new-
imperialism. In Britain itself the war had tectonic economic, social and political 
consequences for the country.1   
 
 In this chapter I will analyse how the new-imperialism transformed Britain 
from a predominantly colonialist orientation to a focus on the finance capital driven 
concern to ensure control over raw materials and the hegemony of markets.  Military 
strategy was tailored to deliver economic objectives as was demonstrated by the 
increasing attention paid to the Near East and the Suez Canal driven by British 
concern to protect the links with India and the rest of the Empire.  Increasingly 
important was access to and control over oil resources to sustain the war effort, end 
their dependency on supplies from the USA and contribute to the further development 
of the British economy. 
 
The chapter will demonstrate the link between domestic and international 
policies by analysing the consequences of the war on Britain both from an imperial 
perspective and from the point of view of the domestic challenges arising from 
growing social problems and the struggle for Irish independence. I will argue that the 
scale of the war, a product of the expansion of the new-imperialism, placed increased 
material and financial demands on British imperialism.    
                                                
1 Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds, The Economics of World War 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 206. 
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A key priority for British politicians was to maintain the economic benefits of 
the Empire and to achieve this goal they had to defeat rival imperial powers and, when 
necessary, subjugate any would-be rebels in the colonies. The Near East was growing 
in importance because of the increasing importance of oil for British transport and 
production.  The Suez Canal was crucial to keeping open lines of communication to 
the Empire and the capacity to deploy forces to any part of it under attack.  In order to 
ensure it remained open to British shipping successive governments thought it 
necessary to have control over the lands surrounding the waterway.  In addition the 
land area between the Mediterranean Sea and India was becoming more important to 
the British because it offered an alternative land route to India and, increasingly, a 
source of the vital commodity, oil.  Ending Britain’s dependence for oil on the USA 
was a prize that leading politicians considered essential to help keep Britain in a 
dominant global position. 
 
Amongst the most momentous events during the war were the 1917 revolution 
in Russia and its withdrawal from the combat.  Although Russia was a less prosperous 
imperial power than Britain, it had until that year been considered a major ally against 
the Central Powers even though the British worried about its ambitions in Asia.2  A 
significant power within central Asia, Czarist Russia had sought to exercise its 
influence in Persia and Afghanistan, to access the Indian Ocean and obtain an outlet to 
the Mediterranean Sea.  After the Revolution, and no longer an ally of the Entente 
Powers, Russia became a political problem of a different kind, when it unilaterally 
exposed the pre-war secret negotiations and treaties between the British and the 
French over the Near East.  This action was based on its support for the right of 
nations to self-determination and its adoption of an explicitly anti-imperialist stance.  
 
In the war between the two groups the inter-imperialist rivalry between Britain 
and Germany was the epitome of the age of new-imperialism.  As we will see later in 
this chapter opinions differed inside Germany as to how best to gain ascendancy over 
their chief rival.  Calculating that it would be unable to overcome British maritime 
                                                
2 The 1913 per capita GDP in the United Kingdom was almost four times that of pre-revolutionary 
Russia.  Figures taken from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 
2003), 60 and 100.     
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superiority Germany expanded its Drang nach Osten policies focussing on eastern 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire, which moreover offered Berlin the potential to 
expand its Near East ambitions.  This included the creation of a rail link between 
Berlin and Baghdad facilitating trade and extending German influence over the lands 
of the Ottoman Empire.  In turn, through its ally the Ottoman Empire, the Suez Canal 
would become accessible to German control and thereby a threat to the functioning of 
the British Empire. Additionally Germany would secure its former east African 
colonies thus providing a base from which to dispute British dominance of the African 
continent and beyond to Asia.  For Germany as much as Britain the Canal was the 
gateway to Africa and Asia and therefore key to further new-imperialist expansion.   
 
To wage the war successfully Britain and Germany needed to mobilise support 
among their respective populations and allies.  This necessitated winning countries to 
their respective alliances and consolidating domestic support by assuaging popular 
concerns about the war.  Propaganda was a progressively significant weapon in the 
war in particular to convince the general public that it was worthwhile.3 The 
ideological battle was a part of the war and religious justifications and symbolism 
were frequently used as persuasive ways to win that support.4  As in many past 
conflicts religion was often invoked in response to actual and alleged atrocities by the 
opponent who was portrayed as both immoral and ungodly.  Christians on both sides 
invoked the support of god for their respective nations.  In this climate Zionism as a 
political ideology which influenced British politicians had its own uniqueness 
combining a nationalist revivalism with a religious narrative.  British and German 
politicians responded to the growth and influence of Zionism and sought to co-opt it to 
their war effort from an entirely pragmatic self-interest perspective.  Taking into 
account the economic, military and political developments, this chapter will reflect on 
the issue of ideology as a factor influencing British adoption of the Zionist cause and 
policies and the proposal to establish a homeland for the Jews.  
                                                
3 CAB 24/3 “British Propaganda in Allied and Neutral Countries”. (CAB – Cabinet Papers). 
4 There were ambiguities in respect of the role of Christianity and imperialism.  See for example: Shula 
Marks, “Southern Africa” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown 
and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 560.  “The missionary 
heritage however, was multi-faceted. If, in a general sense missionaries can be seen as the midwives of 
colonialism, encouraging individualism, wage labour, and commodity production, they also fostered 
the growth of a class of literate and educated Christian Africans who were paradoxically to become 
colonialism’s most effective critics”. 
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I will examine the British government’s changing attitude towards the Ottoman 
Empire and the proposals for the division of its territories including Palestine at the 
conclusion of the war. Even though they had been allies in the war against the Central 
Powers, Britain and France had contending aspirations in the Near East.  The solution 
was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement to partition the areas seized from the Ottoman 
Empire with the assistance of Arab forces who had fought alongside the British on the 
basis of promises of self-determination and the establishment of independent Arab 
states.  The British, however, treated the aspirations of the Arab leaders as entirely 
contingent to their own imperial objectives.  
 
The British and World War One  
The war was a concatenation of issues posed principally, though not 
exclusively, on the international level which threatened, in the eyes of the British 
governments of the day, to overthrow their world order.  Germany’s rapid economic 
expansion, coupled with its desire to gain access to markets for its products, expand its 
maritime and territorial influence inevitably led to confrontation with the most 
powerful obstacle to achieving those ends, the British Empire.  The German alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire in particular offered the prospect of disrupting if not 
completely destabilising British links to its Empire in Asia and access to a region of 
the world in which an increasingly significant commodity, oil, was being extracted.  In 
this endeavour, the German Government sought to develop its Drang nach Osten 
policy, in part by attempting to utilise the Ottoman Empire’s place in the Muslim 
world as a lever to gain their support and potentially to dislocate relationships between 
the British and a significant section of the Indian population. 
 
Between 1914 and 1918 Britain, the most powerful nation in the world with the 
largest empire was in the midst of a war involving the established and emerging great 
powers of the day which engulfed the whole of Europe and shape the politics of the 
twentieth century.5  As theatres of conflict developed in the Near East, parts of Africa 
and areas of the Far East, many British colonies and dominions were embroiled in the 
conflict which ultimately led to a re-division of political and economic spheres of 
                                                
5 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914. 
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influences with global and historical repercussions.6  By 1918 an estimated 70% of the 
world’s population lived in countries under the influence of the Entente powers and 
many of the remaining 30% lived in countries associated with the Central Powers.7 
 
From a population of 46 million, the British government sent around 5 million 
troops abroad, approximately 705,000 of whom were killed and 1,700,000 wounded.8  
Across the Empire, military personnel were mobilised from the British Dominions and 
colonies with nearly a million recruited from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa and a further one million soldiers and non-combatants from India. 9  No 
previous war had seen the mobilisation of human and material resources on this scale 
before and as I will demonstrate this war was a product of the changes resulting from 
the emergence of a new-imperialism.   
 
On the economic front the costs of the war did not affect all countries equally. 
Italy for example was one of those nations which needed financial backing from the 
Entente to play any part in the war and this economic dependency had structural 
implications for the country as it did for others in a similar situation.   Despite the £60 
million credit which the Italian government obtained from Britain following the 26th 
April 1915 Treaty of London, “(t)he demands of the war meant that the original credit 
had to be extended over and over again, and eventually Italy, like other Allied powers, 
entered the US market”.10  In Britain, during the course of the war Government 
spending rose from a pre-war figure of 8.1% in 1913, to 38.7% of GDP in 1917.11  
Britain, along with other members of the Entente, was obliged to purchase food and 
munitions from the USA and to take out loans to pay for the war which they financed 
in part by the sales of overseas assets.  Britain ended the war in debt to the USA and 
lost the commanding position which it had held prior to 1914.12 In the period 
immediately before the war, the USA economy was in recession and on the day the 
                                                
6 Robert Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War 1914–1918” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 114. 
7 Ibid., Table 1.1, 8. 
8 Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War 1914–1918”, 117. 
9 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 50. Ferguson, Empire, 303. 
Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War 1914–1918”, 117.  
10 Francesco Galassi and Mark Harrison, “Italy at War: 1915–1918”, 281. 
11 Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlitt, “The United Kingdom during World War 1: business as 
usual?” 210. 
12 Ibid. 220. 
 76 
war began the Wall Street Stock Exchange closed because of panic about the possible 
repercussions for the country.  However, by the end of the war, its economic position 
was transformed.   
 
Britain turned to the Empire to supply the personnel and to the USA to supply 
the material and financial resources.  The war had substantial repercussions 
domestically as a higher fatality rate than previous conflicts increased the demand for 
men to replace those killed and wounded.  Female employment rose by about 50% 
increasing the numbers of women employed in jobs from which they had been 
excluded. In Britain agricultural production declined in the first three years as the 
emphasis switched to manufacturing war material.   As average prices increased 
during the war, the value of real wages declined.13  Moreover, the price of a range of 
goods doubled in the four-year period.14  By the end of the war, British imperial power 
was diminished in comparison to the nineteenth century.15    
 
The war had repercussions in the political sphere.  A year after the declaration 
of war on 4th August 1914, the Liberal Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, was forced to 
restructure his government, creating a coalition with the Conservatives.  Then in 
December 1916 he was replaced by his fellow Liberal, David Lloyd George who, as 
the new Prime Minister, established a War Cabinet to conduct the war.16  Lloyd 
George also  convened an Imperial War Cabinet through which some of the countries 
of the Empire were consulted.17  “The Empire, in short, was to underwrite the extended 
belligerency on which the Lloyd George coalition was based”.18 
   
                                                
13 Mitchell, British Historical Statistics,168-169. 
14 Ibid.,726. 
See also Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlitt, “The United Kingdom during World War 1: business 
as usual?” in The Economics of World War 1, eds, Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 207. 
15 Angus Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 39.  
In the opinion of Maddison economic “leadership passed to the USA in 1890”. 
16 CAB 23/4, 13th December 1917.  As an example - the minutes list 19 additional people in attendance. 
17 CAB 23/44A.  In attendance on 31st July 1918 was the British Prime Minister and the Prime 
Ministers or representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland 
alongside Viscount Milner Secretary of State for War, General Sir H. H. Wilson Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff and Sir M.P.A. Hankey Secretary of the War Cabinet. 
18 Robert Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War 1914–1918” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 125. 
 77 
 The newly formed War Cabinet was chaired by the Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George. In December 1916 its members were Lord Curzon, President of the 
Council; Andrew Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Viscount Milner; and 
the Leader of the Labour Party Arthur Henderson MP.   The majority of members of 
the Cabinet had all played leading roles in the Empire and shared a common view of 
Britain’s role in the world.19 Curzon was a former Viceroy of India from 1895 to 1906. 
Bonar Law was a staunch supporter of Sir Edward Carson, the opponent of Home 
Rule for Ireland. Alfred, Lord Milner, was an administrator with experience of 
conducting colonial wars especially in South Africa.  The Labour Party member acted 
as an important conduit for government views and in turn kept the Cabinet informed of 
changing opinions in the trade union movement.    
The Home Front 
In its day-to-day business the War Cabinet dealt with a considerable number of 
domestic and international concerns analysing their significance, their implications for 
the conduct of the war and their consequences for British war aims.20  Having 
sufficient troops to fight the war was essential and the Cabinet frequently discussed 
recruitment and the number of men eligible by age and fitness for conscription as 
difficulties arose, for example, because of the necessity to exempt certain groups of 
employees such as those in armaments production. 21  A wide variety of domestic 
topics, such as the prices of staple commodities and levels of productivity, occupied 
the business of their meetings.22 Industrial disputes which might directly impact on the 
supply of materials for the war received particular attention and meeting after meeting 
recorded discussions about labour problems including strikes by sheet metal workers 
and plane makers in Coventry; the rates of bonuses to be paid to specific groups and 
the settlement of industrial disputes.23    
                                                
19 Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, Liberal Unionists, the Labour Party, military figures and 
administrators attended its meetings. The Labour Party members were Arthur Henderson and George 
Barnes 
20 CAB 23/4, 19th December 1917 item 1 “The Western Front”.  
See for example War Cabinet Minutes for 1916–17 which contained items ranging across a wide 
variety of issues - for example: Western Front; Arab Revolt; Ireland; industrial action by workers; 
Conscription; Russian revolution; influence of the Irish situation on Australia’s support for the war; 
financial relationship with the United States; German peace soundings; coal for Italy; rifles for 
Rumania.   
21 CAB 23/4, War Cabinet 288, 30th November 1917. 
22 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (London: Paladin, Reprinted 1988), 342.  
23 CAB 23/05, WC 310, 1st January 1918. A meeting at 6.30 pm dealt solely with a discussion on the 
“Labour Situation” making clear that events in Russia and Italy had caused the problems. 
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The War Cabinet paid close attention to the mood of workers and the level of 
backing for the war especially amongst those involved in industrial action scrutinising 
the levels of productivity as a barometer of that support.  They noted the reactions of 
workers to political developments elsewhere, especially following the 1917 Russian 
revolution with the establishment of the Bolshevik government and critically their 
decision to withdraw from the war.24 At one stage the influence of the Bolsheviks was 
considered so alarming that Sir Edward Carson was charged with preventing the press 
statements of  “Trotzki [sic] and Lenin” being published.25   
 
These domestic items were prominent on the War Cabinet’s agenda although 
the bulk of the items were concerned with details about the war itself, developments at 
the front, the availability of the means to continue fighting and crucially how to 
finance it.26  From time to time developments threw up new challenges or posed old 
ones in new ways, resulting in the business of meetings being rearranged as newer 
pressing items came to the fore.27  Discussion ranged from responsibilities on the 
disposition of the army at the fronts, problems of conscription, consequences of the 
actions of foes and allies on military developments, the availability of bread, meat and 
cheese, the price of milk and the provision of oats for horses racing in the winter.28   
 
Irish Independence and the United States of America 
Britain faced the sharpening struggle for Irish independence which had already 
wrought political damage on the fortunes of the Liberal Party and remained an almost 
unresolvable problem before, during and after the war. Troops could not be 
conscripted from Ireland, rebellion forced the deployment of soldiers to maintain order 
and the political ignominy of defeat threatened to dent British credibility as a world 
                                                                                                                                       
See also Albrecht Ritschl, “The pity of peace: Germany’s economy at war, 1914–1918”, in Stephen 
Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds, The Economics of World War 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 57.  Throughout 1918 nearly one million British workers were on strike 
compared to around 400,000 German workers. 
24 CAB 23 “Mr Barnes stated that when he had mentioned the name of Trotzki [sic]  at his meetings in 
Scotland during the past week, it had been received with cheers.” 
25 CAB 23/4 
26 CAB 23, 9th December, 1916 item 5.  The Minutes note that UK spending in the USA was running 
at $60 million a week and that a loan of $1,500 million would be needed by March 1917. 
27 CAB 24/38, “Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week ending 9th January, 1918.” 
28 CAB 23/4, War Cabinet 297, 13th December, 1917, 2-7 passim. 
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power.  If Ireland, then what of India, Egypt or other parts of the then imperial 
domain?29  Domestically, from the perspective of the British Government, the struggle 
for Irish independence had threatened a parliamentary and constitutional crisis, and 
had exposed fissures within the military.  The Easter 1916 Rising, at the outset 
emblematic perhaps rather than seismic in its impact, nevertheless was itself indicative 
of the emergence of struggles for self-determination which would develop in the 
aftermath of the war.  The struggle by the oldest of Britain’s colonies for 
independence was a mark of the times, the beginning of the ending of the colonialist 
period typical of the capitalist phase of imperialism. 
 
Even though the British government regarded the issue of Irish independence 
as a domestic concern those fighting for self-determination in Ireland regarded it as a 
struggle for national independence.  The gravity of its impact on Britain was 
evidenced by the fact that precipitated a constitutional crisis and caused an act of 
rebellion amongst pro-Unionists in the British Army in 1914.30  It was in essence a 
struggle for self-determination the outcome of which had national and international 
ramifications for the British government jeopardising its credibility as a power capable 
of retaining control over the Empire. The Irish diaspora, as I shall demonstrate, was a 
material factor in Cabinet decision making about the course of the war itself. 
 
The British government was antagonistic to Home Rule for Ireland and leading 
protagonists in the campaign against independence were members of the War Cabinet.  
Prominent in their ranks were figures like Sir Edward Carson, a Unionist leader of the 
parliamentary anti-Home Rule current, and one of the initiators of the paramilitary 
Ulster Volunteers pledged to oppose by arms attempts by any Government to grant 
Home Rule or to split the northern, predominantly Protestant, parts of Ireland from the 
rest of the United Kingdom.  Carson became a member of the Cabinet in December 
1916 as First Lord of the Admiralty and joined the War Cabinet in July 1917.    
 
Whilst the Home Rule Act had been passed on 18th September 1914, the 
government decided to postpone its implementation until the end of the “European 
                                                
29 Matthew E. Plowman,  “Irish Republicans and the Indo-German Conspiracy of World War 1,” New 
Hibernia Review 7/3, 2003. 
30 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (London: Paladin, Reprinted 1988).  
Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Allen Lane, 2005). 
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War”, a move that angered those seeking independence.31  Armed rebellion was a 
constant concern to the Cabinet as reports increased of people across Ireland openly 
conducting military drills in preparation for an armed revolt. According to some 
estimates “in August 1914, there were over a quarter of a million men enrolled in 
citizen militias in Ireland”. 32 Even industrial disputes in Ireland, such as a railway 
workers strike, were viewed as having the potential to become politicised and become 
a focus for the general sentiment for independence.33  In Dublin a banner hung over 
Liberty Hall the headquarters of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union and of 
the Irish Citizens Army, both led by James Connolly, proclaimed “Neither King nor 
Kaiser”. Its declaration refusing to align with either group of belligerents resonated 
with sentiments in Ireland which was reflected by the caution with which the British 
government approached the question of military conscription there.  Although the 
1916 Rising was suppressed the demands raised by the rebel forces resonated across 
Ireland and whilst a law was passed authorising conscription prompted by a crisis of 
manpower on the Western Front in early 1918, it was never implemented.  
 
The government’s handling of events in Ireland resonated well beyond 
Britain’s shores.  The War Cabinet was sensitive to reactions to any measures they 
took and were concerned about the potential influence of Irish émigré communities in 
the USA and Australia on those governments.34  In the USA a negative reaction to 
British policy on Ireland might influence the federal government’s assistance to the 
British war effort whilst in Australia it might hinder the recruitment of men to fight.  
An example of the way the Cabinet weighed these considerations could be seen at a 
meeting on 21st December 1916 just six months after the British suppression of the 
Rising when a debate took place on peace proposals to end the war in Europe drafted 
                                                
31 Deirdre McMahon “Ireland and the Empire Commonwealth, 1900–1948,” in The Oxford History of 
the British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 138. 
The Home Rule Act or the Government of Ireland Act 1914 granted a degree of autonomy to Ireland 
establishing a bicameral parliament with powers to deal with most national matters.  Passed in the 
House of Commons it was blocked on three occasions by the House of Lords. 
32 Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 28. The total 
population of Ireland was in the region of 4,500,000. 
33 CAB 23, 30th November 1916, 23, item 8 “Irish Railways General Strike”: “organised labour had 
joined hands with organised political force and it was evident that the Irish Nationalist party were ready 
to take charge of the railway trouble and use their political power to secure a settlement at their 
dictation”. 
34 See for example Townshend, Easter 1916, 32. Deirdre McMahon, “Ireland and the Empire 
Commonwealth, 1900–1948,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV, eds, Judith M. 
Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 141. 
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by President Woodrow Wilson.  Also on their agenda was the fate of some 350 Irish 
prisoners, of the 3,000 who had been arrested following the Easter Rising, who were 
still held in England.35  In the debate, Henry Duke, Chief Secretary for Ireland and a 
lawyer by profession, was more influenced in his judgement by political 
considerations than legal ones.  He put to the War Cabinet that it would be more 
beneficial to relationships with the USA if the men were released.  Indeed he stressed 
that it was “desirable ... to foster the impression in the United States ... that the new 
Government was approaching the Irish question in a generous but not timorous 
spirit”.36  The Cabinet was anxious to retain the material and financial backing of the 
USA Administration for its war efforts and adapted its policies on Ireland, as on other 
issues, to secure that support.37 
 
This eagerness to ensure that the USA administration was not alienated by 
Cabinet decisions was influenced by Britain’s growing economic dependency on that 
country and the British hope that at some point they would enter the war as 
combatants themselves. Politically and economically related judgements made by the 
British government during the course of the war were influenced by the attitudes 
adopted by the USA as an emerging world power.  Even if the USA did not intervene 
militarily until 1917 its economic weight was beginning to be felt across the world.38 
Beneath the surface tectonic shifts were taking place between the rival groups of 
powers and importantly within them.39  British concern for the potential economic 
aspects of the outcome of the war were paramount. 
Kitchener, De Bunsen and the Near East  
Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War in Asquith’s Cabinet and a former 
Vice Consul in Anatolia, had earlier in his career surveyed Palestine and adjacent 
                                                
35 CAB 23/1, War Cabinet 14, 21st December, 1916.  Of course it should be remembered that one of the 
leading figures arrested was Eamon De Valera, a citizen of the USA, for whom the Consulate made 
representations concerning his fate.  
36 CAB 23/1, War Cabinet 14, 21st December, 1916, 46. 
37 CAB 23/3, War Cabinet 190, 19th July, 1917, 7. Appendix 11 note by Mr. Duke, 11th July 1917. 
38 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 362. 
Having faced economic recession in 1914, the USA profited greatly from the war selling more than $2 
billion worth of goods to the allies. 
39 A. J. Stockwell, “Imperialism and Nationalism in South East Asia” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume IV eds, Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 466.   The reality of the changed relationship was reflected in the 
decision by Britain to agree the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty accepting parity with the USA on 
capital ships.  
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areas.  Premised on the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, his Memorandum Alexandretta 
and Mesopotamia, submitted to the Cabinet on 16th March 1915, proposed the 
development of a railway line connecting the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea as 
an alternative route to the colonies.40  Kitchener was convinced that in the years ahead, 
Russia would continue to pursue its ambitions to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea 
and to the Persian Gulf.  He viewed Russia as a threat because of its interest in 
Afghanistan potentially disrupting vital military and trade routes to India. He was, 
moreover, apprehensive about the ambitions towards Syria of a post-war revivified 
France.  For him France, “having established herself in Syria in close proximity to the 
Nile Delta” would become a threat to Egypt as well.41   
 
His paper focused on an analysis of the military significance of the area but 
went further showing an acute awareness of its economic importance. In countering 
the potential threat to the Suez Canal, he argued that the development of the 
Alexandretta-Mesopotamia link made good military and economic sense, because 
“(Alexandretta) … affords a natural Mediterranean terminus for the Baghdad Railway 
… an excellent anchorage for transports and for merchant shipping (and) it lends itself 
readily to defence by shore batteries”.42 These advantages provided an excellent centre 
he suggested, from which “to guard our interests in the Persian oil fields, and to 
control the land route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, which will 
eventually become our most direct and quickest line of communication with India”.43    
 
The Cabinet however dismissed Kitchener’s proposal that Alexandretta 
become the eastern Mediterranean terminus for British operations in favour of the 
more southerly port of Haifa in Palestine.  They made this choice to avoid any 
encroachment on those areas the French aspired to control whilst still enabling them to 
construct a “British-owned railway from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia (because 
it was both) strategically necessary and commercially viable”.44   The line which the 
committee suggested, would be to the south of what they assessed would and indeed 
did become the French sphere of interest after the war through the granting to them of 
                                                
40 CAB 24/1. See also CAB 24/1/0014. Note by the Secretary M.P.A. Hankey March 17th 1915. 
41 Ibid.,1 
42 CAB 24/1. 3 
43 Ibid., 3. 
44 Ibid. Para 30.  This was still under discussion in 1929. See CAB 24/205. 
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the Mandate for Syria.  The British Government had of course identified the countries 
lying further south, Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia, as important to focus on 
to guarantee a secure link from the Persian Gulf to Haifa.45 
 
In April 1915, a Committee chaired by Sir Maurice De Bunsen was appointed 
by the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, “to consider the nature of British desiderata in 
Turkey in Asia in the event of a successful conclusion of the war”.46  The proposals of 
the De Bunsen Committee, which reported on 30th June 1915, were based on a British 
victory over the Ottoman Empire.47  The composition of the Committee, which 
included representatives of the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty and the Board 
of Trade reflected the variety of interests that were involved.  Sir Mark Sykes 
presented the final report to the Committee of Imperial Defence in July 1915. The 
report illustrated by maps, included alternative scenarios and was presented on the 
basis that “any attempt to formulate (British desiderata) must as far as possible be 
made to fit in with the known or understood aspirations of those who are our Allies to-
day, but may be our competitors to-morrow”.48  The Committee summarised the 
wishes of the respective parties noting that the French Government, “demanded Cilicia 
and Syria, in which latter term they included Palestine and the Christian Holy 
Places”.49   Apart from this potential point of friction there was also worry about the 
danger of Britain overreaching itself since, “our Empire is wide enough already, and 
our task is to consolidate the possession we already hold, and pass on to those who 
come after an inheritance that stands four-square to the world”.50  These anxieties 
included of course disquiet about Russia’s ambitions and potential threats to 
Mesopotamia, Afghanistan and, as a consequence and most importantly, India. 
 
The clear focus in the report was the role of any agreement regarding “Asiatic 
Turkey” as it links to “one of the cardinal principles of our policy in the East, our 
special and supreme position in the Persian Gulf.”51  Pre-eminent amongst the 
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prerequisites that the Committee identified were economic goals which British 
governments repeatedly saw as central and these included “prevention of 
discrimination of all kinds against our trade throughout the territories now belonging 
to Turkey, and the maintenance of the existing important markets for British 
commerce” coupled to “security for the development of undertakings in which we are 
interested, such as oil production, river navigation, and (the) construction of irrigation 
works”.52 The purpose of the work on the irrigation systems was to develop the 
productivity of Mesopotamia which the Committee estimated could bring “back to 
cultivation 12,000,000 acres of fertile soil … (which) … would in time of emergency 
provide a British granary which should go far to relieve us of dependence on foreign 
harvests”.53   The document embodied the new-imperialist perspective to ensure 
British control over raw materials, the domination of markets and investment in 
agricultural production to benefit domestic consumption. 
 
The Suez Canal 
Whilst to some Palestine appeared to have little or no intrinsic economic 
significance, it did have a military, political and commercial importance because of its 
proximity to the Suez Canal, situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and 
as a terminal for a land link to the Persian Gulf.  This view was strengthened with the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 bringing increased trade between Europe, Asia, 
East Africa and Australia.  In November 1875, without Parliamentary or Cabinet 
approval, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, aided by Lord Rothschild, moved swiftly 
to buy a major shareholding in the canal at the cost of £4 million.54  His decision was 
additionally influenced by the fact that Britain was already involved in the economy of 
Egypt where following earlier investment, Britain had by 1876 become the main 
creditor for the bankrupt country.55  Beyond Egypt, trade with the British Empire to 
those countries which could be accessed through the Canal, had become a priority for 
Disraeli.56  In 1876, Lord Chancellor Hugh Cairns summed up the position when he 
wrote to the Disraeli, “It is now the Canal and India; there is no such thing now as 
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India alone. India is any number of ciphers; but the Canal is the unit that makes these 
ciphers valuable”.57  The Canal was to play a critical role in Britain securing a 
dominant trading role and thereby control over emerging markets. 
 
The Canal was especially important to the British because control of Palestine 
either by Germany or its Ottoman ally, would threaten both the Canal and any land 
route across the near East.58 Germany was ambitious to develop its influence in the 
region by building a railway link between Berlin and Baghdad and well understood the 
importance of the Canal to the British.59  Like the Liberal Prime Minister Lord 
Palmerston in the 1830s, the coalition government of Lloyd George initially opposed a 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire which they regarded as a block to Russian ambitions 
in the Near East, Afghanistan and India. In the event that Constantinople might no 
longer be capable of thwarting Russian schemes Lloyd George’s government 
considered ways in which London might maintain a secure route to India and the 
colonies of the East.60 A land connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Persian Gulf would save considerable time and therefore be a benefit to trade and the 
deployment of troops to India if it were called for.61 However a land link alone would 
not cope with the scale of trade between Britain and India. 
 
Before 1914 Britain had complete naval superiority in the world.  It was “the 
biggest ship builder … (and) … its ships carried 52% of the sea-borne trade of the 
world”.62 The scale of the exports from India can be assessed from the War Cabinet 
Report for 1918 which noted that “the annual value of Indian war exports is estimated 
to have reached £110,000,000”.63  In certain areas the imports were directly connected 
to the war effort.  “Sandbags and other jute goods are the largest individual item on the 
list of India’s material contributions to the war.   The total value of the jute goods 
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exported from India in 1918 was £38,000,000”.64  India was the source of a variety of 
other raw materials essential to the war including wheat and manganese used in the 
production of steel.65 In relation to the 1914–1918 war the Canal was a vital link to 
India.66  The traffic was not only one-way.  India was in turn a major importer 
purchasing more than 67% of its goods from Britain in 1909–1910, a relationship 
favouring the British which they were anxious to sustain.67  India provided much more 
than raw materials to the British war effort.  It has been estimated that between 1914 
and 1918 over 1.5 million men left India to serve with the British army including over 
700,000 troops who fought in the Near East and an estimated 140,000 who fought on 
the Western Front in France and Belgium.68  With a population in excess of 300 
million the imperial power looked on India as an almost limitless source of recruits for 
the war effort.  The seizure of the Canal by Germany or the Ottoman Empire would 
have been a major blow to Britain’s economy and to its capacity to wage the war 
isolating India and jeopardising their ambitions for the whole of the Near East. 
 
Palestine and Oil. 
Both the Kitchener and the De Bunsen reports paid close attention to the 
importance of economic issues in relation to the development of British strategy on the 
Near East and especially access to and control over oil resources.  Oil was becoming 
increasingly important as a commodity and although none had been discovered in 
Palestine, the country was well placed to act as a terminal for shipping in the eastern 
Mediterranean and a land link to the oilfields further east. Politicians had already 
begun to appreciate the much wider potential for the use of oil.69  New forms of 
warfare, like the tank, the use of airplanes, the need for more flexible forms of 
transportation generally and of course the conversion of warships from coal to oil, 
accelerated the demand for the fuel.  On 17th June 1914 Parliament had made the 
decision to purchase 51% of the stock of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in order to 
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avoid potential dependency on non-British companies, such as Royal Dutch/Shell or 
the USA based Standard Oil.  Access to oil reserves became even more important 
during the war, when guaranteeing adequate supplies of it had become a major worry 
for all belligerents.70  Bearing these concerns in mind and following the defeat of the 
Central Powers Britain began to define geographically its sphere of influence by 
securing Palestine as the base from which to oversee the region and move towards the 
creation of a Jewish homeland on its soil.71  
 
Whilst the British Government took the view that individual territories were of 
greater or lesser political or economic weight, the Empire itself was seen as an entity, 
ruled from London and linked by a chain of ports in which to refuel.  Palestine, the 
War Cabinet was advised by Amery, in the 20th May 1917 secret memorandum The 
Russian situation and its consequences, was a vital link, critical to Britain’s ability to 
retain the East African colonies in particular but with implications for the continued 
security of the entire Empire from the threat of the Central Powers.  Amery argued:   
 
Even if we retain East Africa the position will be extremely serious unless Palestine can 
be secured. For without the control of Palestine it will be impossible either to secure 
eventual railway communication between Egypt and Mesopotamia, or to prevent a 
Turkish reoccupation or reabsorption of Arabia, and the collapse of the whole Arab 
movement to which our prestige in the Moslem world is now committed.  With a 
reorganised German-Turkish Army, as a vanguard of the Armies of Central Europe, in a 
position to strike effectively either at Baghdad or the Suez Canal, and with submarine 
bases in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, our position both in Mesopotamia 
and in Egypt would he increasingly precarious, The collapse of Russia has, in fact, 
made Palestine, of the issues still left undecided by the war, one of the most vital for the 
whole future of the British Empire.72 
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A setback for the British in the Arab world might affect Britain’s prestige in the 
“Moslem world” more generally and might encourage Muslims to become more 
actively engaged in the developing anti-British alliance in India.73  Nevertheless 
Amery argued that the Western Allies would eventually be successful since “behind 
them are the almost inexhaustible reserves of America”.74  The reserves cited included 
both the numbers of prospective soldiers, but also the vast economic and productive 
resources of the USA.75  Russia’s withdrawal from the Allied Powers, it was reasoned, 
would make France more dependent on the “strength and security of the British 
Empire” than might have been the case before and as a consequence France would be 
obliged to back British ambitions for the region.76  “France has now a direct interest in 
our retention of East Africa and of Mesopotamia, and in our securing Palestine, which 
she would not have had if Germany had been crushed, or if the Central European 
block had been broken in the Balkans or at the Dardanelles”.77  The British viewpoint 
was that they clearly were gaining advantage over both their German foe and their 
French ally.  
 
Amery, the author of the memorandum, had Zionist sympathies and 
contributed to the composition of the Balfour Declaration as well as encouraging 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the Zionist politician, to form a Jewish Legion in the British army. 
In this document however there is no compelling evidence that his focus on Palestine 
was an attempt to insinuate a pretext for the creation of a Jewish homeland.  For him, 
Palestine had a significance beyond its geographical boundaries because its loss would 
have implications for the “very existence of the British Empire” and the independence 
of Britain itself.78  Palestine, he argued, was an integral part of the Empire’s 
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comprehensive geo-maritime plan and defending was therefore both a tactical and a 
strategic imperative. 
 
Like Amery, Ormsby-Gore outlined the possible implications of the changes 
taking place in Russia for the future of the war, explaining that, in his view, its 
withdrawal would benefit the Ottoman Empire.  He also reaffirmed the specific 
significance of British interests in the outcome of the war in the Near East not only for 
the Empire in general but building on Kitchener’s earlier memorandum, linked this 
quite explicitly to wider economic concerns.  The author argued that “control of this 
area gives the controller the essential strategic and economic mastery of the 
communications between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, between Asia 
and Africa, and of the natural outlet for more than half Russia’s agricultural produce 
besides the produce of her great undeveloped southern coalfield”.79  The British were 
concerned to secure their economic interests but were additionally intent on thwarting 
the ambitions of rival powers even when, notionally, they were allies.  Amery wanted 
to ensure British domination of the coal resources and thereby place Britain in a 
dominating position in the world market for the commodity.  Cheap coal from Russia 
could undercut the price of British coal and possibly stimulate an industrial revolution 
in the Near East and even India.  
 
New-imperialist interests were evolving from a focus on territorial acquisition 
and the retention of colonies to the control of natural resources, restricting access to 
trade routes or markets and generally inhibiting the economic development of others in 
the region. There were growing pressures to secure oil reserves since it was four times 
more efficient than coal and would greatly benefit British shipping.  British interests 
were already well established in this field. Winston Churchill MP, appointed First 
Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, had ensured that by 1912 the “British navy had gone 
over to oil and (that) the Iranian reserves were the source of its supply”.80  He was 
anxious to ensure British control over the oil and consequently secured a 51% stake 
for the government in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company the principal producer of fuel 
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from Persia.81 The British were heavily dependent on the USA for their oil.  Having 
supplies which they could directly control would give them greater independence from 
the USA.  
 
The importance of gaining access to and control over the supply of oil was 
equally reflected in the German attempt after the Russian Revolution to try to gain 
control of the Baku oilfields.  German geologists were well aware of the availability of 
oil around Mosul from before the war.82  The future of Baku was a central question 
during the protracted Brest-Litovsk negotiations at which Leon Trotsky for the 
Revolutionary government delayed signing any sort of treaty in an attempt to hold on 
to the region and its oil.  The onslaught faced by Germany on the Western Front in the 
last months of the war caused it to downplay the importance of the negotiations and 
abandon its interests in the Caucasus.  The Ottoman army briefly won a victory at 
Baku only to retreat following the Treaty of Mudros signed on 30th October 1918.  
Nevertheless the attention paid to the future of the Caucasus echoed British focus on 
the oil rich lands of Mesopotamia and Persia.83  Germany, like Britain, without any of 
its own sources of oil had seen Baku as a potential solution. 
 
Oil was to continue to be a priority, not only for Britain, but also for their ally 
France.  After the war discussions with the French on 22nd December 1919 had 
covered a wide range of topics arising from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.  These 
revolved, in part, around the precise direction that the border between the French and 
British Mandate territories should take.  Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs led the British side during the discussions.  The British were keen to ensure in 
accordance with De Bunsen’s suggestion that the border would be established in such 
a way so as to guarantee British control over any railway running from the 
“Mediterranean to Mesopotamia”.  In contrast the French sought to ensure that there 
would be “a satisfactory agreement regarding the oil in this area”.84  The Chief 
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Secretary for Political and Commercial Affairs at the French Foreign Office, M. 
Bethelot sought to ensure that French interests in respect of oil might be secured given 
that its availability from Baku and Batum might be jeopardised following the 
revolution in Russia. 85   
 
The building of railways was an equally important feature of the development 
of the new-imperialism requiring huge levels of investment, opening new markets and 
expediting trade.86   Britain, Germany and France each saw the possibilities that might 
arise from an expanded railway system in the region.  The future of Mosul was an 
important part of the considerations and the precise line that the railway from Acre to 
Mosul might follow also took their attention.  The French saw this as a major question 
given that the railway might be extended to India, Tehran and even extend into China 
duplicating the “Trans-Siberian Railway by a track from Constantinople to Peking” 
together with a Trans-Persian line running “from Moscow to Kurachi [sic] along the 
Indian Ocean through Vladikavkaz, Tiflis, Tabriz, Ispahan and Kerman”.87  The 
building and expansion of railway networks had been a material manifestation of the 
expansion of new-imperialist expansionism.  It tied in with the perspective of 
controlling the oil in the region. 
 
Imperialist economic rivalry of the new-imperialist age was not just about 
outperforming your competitor, it was about stopping your rival gaining any 
advantage and in fact as far as possible inflicting disadvantage on them. The War 
Cabinet were advised that: “The control of this area, gives the controller the essential 
strategic and economic mastery of the communications between the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, between Asia and Africa, and of the natural outlet for more 
than half Russia's agricultural produce besides the produce of her great undeveloped 
southern coalfield”.88  Denying Russia an opening for the agricultural products and 
preventing the development of the Russian coalfield would remove a rival to British 
production and that of its colonies.  In doing so Britain would strengthen its hand in 
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the market place in these commodities limiting the flow of goods from areas where the 
cost of production would be lower and therefore prices likely to be below those of 
products the British brought to sell.  Obviously the transport costs of goods from those 
Russian sources would also have an advantage over any which the British would bring 
to market.   
 
Germany, The Russian Revolution and Palestine 
In his secret war mentioned above, L.S. Amery presented an analysis of the 
developing situation in Russia.89  Amery a Conservative Party Member of Parliament 
born in Gorakhpur, India, assessed the impact of Russian internal developments on the 
war and their ramifications for the balance of power between the Central Powers and 
the Allied Powers.  He painted an even more alarming scenario than Kitchener’s, 
forecasting the expansion of German influence and identifying Palestine specifically 
as their target.  He argued that the global threat arising from an expansion of German 
interests would impact directly on the British colonies.   “The outstanding result of the 
change in Russia’s position,” he explained, “is that of Germany’s two main projects - 
the creation of a Middle-Europe extending from Hamburg to the Red Sea and Persian 
Gulf, and the displacement of the British Empire by German world domination - the 
former is practically made good, and, but for accidents, beyond our power to defeat”.90  
 
Amery argued that it was crucial to build an effective alliance to counter this 
offensive in the wake of any changed situation in Russia and the coming to power of a 
government less interested in continuing the war.  He suggested that the territorial 
ambitions of France, Italy and Greece had to be accommodated and somewhat 
exaggeratedly, compared the predicament of Britain with that of the smaller and less 
powerful countries of Europe which had been overpowered by Germany and its allies 
earlier in the war. He held the view that “it is not only Belgian or Serbian liberty, but 
British liberty and the very existence of the British Empire which are directly 
threatened by the great military Empire which Germany has built up for herself in the 
course of the war - a Power whose hand will be simultaneously at our throat in the 
English Channel and the Suez Canal, unless we can still drive her out of Belgium and 
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Palestine.”91   The future of Britain and the defence of the British Empire, he asserted, 
were indivisible and Palestine was essential to maintaining their well-being.    
 
The task, Amery concluded, was to reduce any advantage that Germany might 
obtain as a result of the Russian withdrawal from the war, through action by the Allied 
Powers to achieve “the liberation of Belgium or the conquest of Palestine and Syria”.92  
The Memorandum forecast the possibility of the formation by Germany of a huge 
Middle European block increasing “enormously the danger which would threaten the 
very existence of the British Empire if Germany should be able to recover any of her 
Colonies (except possibly those in West Africa), or if the Turk should retain his hold 
over Palestine”.93  He pointed out that the numbers of people living in countries under 
German control would then increase from 70 to 170 million, thereby vastly increasing 
the human resources at their disposal.  Furthermore he argued that “if East Africa 
should, by any chance, be restored to a Germany which, through Turkey, remains in 
control of, Palestine, our position in Egypt and British East Africa would become one 
of the utmost difficulty and danger”.94 
 
A few weeks after Amery’s document, “E. R. B” and “J. W. H.” produced the 
Memorandum on German War Aims for the War Cabinet in July 1917, examining the 
German views on the possible outcomes to the war and their alternative perspectives.95 
The Memorandum assessed the range of views being advanced by the major political 
parties in Germany and attempted to gauge support for them. The War Cabinet was 
advised that there were five main lines of thought about German strategy which 
included:  the advocacy of a strategy to increase German sea power and make 
annexations to “the West”; the consolidation of a “Central European bloc of Allied 
Powers” reinforcing “Mittel-Europa”; the strengthening of the Berlin-to-Bagdad axis 
through the control of the Ottoman Empire; the adoption of an extensive colonisation 
policy to create an African Empire and lastly the acquisition of new land to the East 
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through the annexation of Russian territory.  The document assessed the likely success 
of the contending views in winning German governmental support and the 
consequences of those alternatives for British interests in Mesopotamia and Palestine. 
 
 If the proposal to expand German interests in east Africa were to be adopted 
and be successful the authors argued that it would have implications for the fate of the 
Suez Canal opening it up to German shipping.  Such a development would have grave 
consequences for Britain cutting off vital trade routes and causing problems 
domestically for the London Government. Hans Delbrück, cited as “one of the most 
moderate of the ‘Moderates,’ one of the most emphatic opponents of annexation in the 
West”, a supporter of the German orientation towards Mittel-Europa and the Berlin-to-
Bagdad options, was reported as suggesting that, “if England loses the Canal, all the 
bands connecting its Empire are loosened” to the extent that even the “Central 
Government in London might grow insecure”.96  To Germany the winning of the Suez 
Canal would have a dual advantage allowing its fleet free access to the Indian Ocean 
whilst creating instability within Britain itself.97  
 
However, by the time that the War Cabinet came to look at the document, 
events had already overtaken it.  As the Postscript added on Thursday 19th July noted, 
the Reichstag had already resolved, that Germany was “not animated by lust of 
conquest” and that the “Reichstag stands for peace and understanding and for lasting 
conciliation of nations.  Annexations, political, economic and financial oppressions are 
contradictory to such peace”.98  The Reichstag resolution represented a decisive shift 
in Germany’s ambitions and accordingly the authors of the memorandum amended 
their own conclusions.   They now judged that the creation of a German Empire in 
Africa, a “German India”, had all but been abandoned.99  The Reichstag, it appeared, 
had conceded that British naval superiority could not be challenged. 
 
The subject was returned to in a further document, Review of the Near Eastern 
Situation written by another Conservative Member of Parliament, William Ormsby-
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Gore, presented just one month later, on 14th June 1917.100  Ormsby-Gore expressed 
apprehension about the consequences of Germany gaining a foothold in the region 
with its “vast colonisable and undeveloped lands of Asia Minor, Syria, and 
Mesopotamia”.  He feared that it would lead to “the absorption of the Ottoman Empire 
into German Mittel-Europa”.101  A development of such scope, he suggested, would 
result in Germany holding sway across the Near East constituting a dire threat to 
British imperial interests, menacing the Suez Canal and its defences and bringing 
German forces to shores of the Red Sea.  Until now this had been averted because of 
the intervention of the Sharif of Mecca but if that had not been the case then the 
Baghdad Railway, he concluded, “(would have been) a German arrow pointed directly 
at India”.102 
 
As the war continued, the loss of life, the privations suffered at home and the 
growth of industrial discontent took their toll. The Russian Revolution, albeit from a 
distance, challenged the very premises of the war and suggested alternatives which 
resonated with masses of people both in Britain, across Europe and even further 
afield.103  Confronted by this phenomenon the imperial powers were obliged to chart a 
new course to achieve their ambitions.  Colonial expansionism was politically 
discredited and became progressively a military and economic problem for the British.  
 
At the beginning of the war Russia, a less potent imperial power moving away 
from its predominantly pre-capitalist agrarian dominated economy towards a more 
industrialised capitalist one, was an established member of the Entente Alliance.  The 
Bolshevik led revolution of 1917 ended that union, changing the configuration of the 
war when it withdrew from the conflict ending the combat on the Eastern Front.  
However its departure raised other political challenges in the international field.  The 
Bolshevik Government exposed the secret negotiations which had taken place prior to 
the war between the new-imperialists especially relating to the lands of the former 
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Ottoman Empire laying bare their plans whilst simultaneously raising the standard of 
self-determination amongst peoples accustomed to being part of the Russian Empire.104  
The Russian Revolution constituted a further threat to the new-imperialists’ goal of 
monopolising the world market.  By championing the right of self-determination the 
Bolsheviks presented a political challenge which disputed the desire by Germany and 
Britain for example for complete control over the sources of raw material and world 
markets.     
 
Ultimately the British considered the stance taken by the Bolshevik 
government as so threatening that in 1918 the British together with France, the USA, 
Italy, Japan and a host of other nations, sent troops to fight alongside the anti-
Bolshevik forces who were also joined in the east at Vladivostok by Japanese 
troops.105  However despite this decision the growing economic challenges facing 
Britain forced the government to rethink the strategy. In a House of Commons 
statement on 13th November 1919, on the subject of opposition to the Bolshevik 
Government in Russia, the Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated that, “The 
Government has repeatedly made it clear to the House of Commons that with the 
crushing financial burden already cast upon it by the Great War, it cannot contemplate 
the assumption of new obligations under this head”.106  Despite the importance that he 
had attached to Russia, because he considered that “a settlement of the Russian 
problem [sic] … essential to the reconstruction of the world”, he nevertheless felt 
unable to go beyond the very substantial commitment of around £100,000,000, “in 
cash and kind” that had been provided as “assistance sent to Russia”.107  The inter-
imperialist rivalry of World War One had drained the economic capacities of the 
country and the losses of life had induced a deep war-weariness.  Even though 
Russia’s economy lagged far behind that of Britain the Prime Minister had to concede 
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that there was nothing more that could be done to support their White Russian allies 
and in 1920 the troops were withdrawn. 
War, Religion and Racism 
Ormsby-Gore’s War Cabinet paper raised a new question concerning the 
potential implications of German influence in the region on  “two great world forces 
… viz., Islam and Jewry”.108   His use of the term “world forces” without elaboration 
suggests a shared evaluation of the two groups by members of the Cabinet though 
there is no analysis of the sense in which they might be called “world forces”, nor in 
what way they might be similar or different.  In numerous papers concerns had been 
expressed about the potential impact on the attitude of the “Moslem world” to British 
policies since a number of countries of the Empire had majority Muslim populations. 
 
The potential for alienating Indian Muslims weighed on the minds of the 
British and numerous Cabinet papers refer to political developments that might affect 
attitudes amongst the Muslim population. General Sir E.G. Barrow, Military Secretary 
of the India Office, submitting a Memorandum to the Cabinet entitled The Military 
Situation in India and the Middle East on 24th November 1915, discussed concerns 
about the potential volatility in India.109  Barrow emphasised the need to send “white 
soldiers” [sic] to counter any notions that the British were unable to supply sufficient 
military to handle any problems and that they might have been weakened by the war 
efforts.  The difficulties inside India could be managed, he argued “if they [the Indian 
troops] remain loyal, and if the 17,000 Imperial and Nepalese troops also can be relied 
on, we shall be able to hold our own, but the “if” is fraught with such tremendous 
issues that I doubt if any Government dare take the risk”.110 
    
Ormsby-Gore was preoccupied with the thought that the Muslim communities 
would be concerned about the fate of the Islamic holy places and held the view that if 
Turkish forces retook Mecca then Britain’s credibility in the eyes of the “100 million 
Moslem subjects of the King-Emperor in Asia and Africa” would be seriously 
damaged.111  This sensitivity to the opinions of the Muslims also related to the 
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importance attached to India and the fear that a defeat would further stimulate the 
developing independence movement.112  The German government were themselves of 
the opinion that anti-British propaganda might be spread by pilgrims to Mecca 
encouraging insurrections in the wider Muslim world.113    
 
If India became independent it would threaten both the economic advantages 
the British had gained from the country as well as the whole structure of the Empire. 
The Indian nationalist movement was partially split between Muslims and Hindus but 
the Muslim community itself was additionally divided by “sect, region, language, and 
socio-economic status”.114  A development which might lead to the Muslim 
community becoming united around their religion could lead to a challenge to the 
credibility of the British rulers and potentially undermine the structures of the Empire 
in India.  If the Ottoman forces and their allies could defeat the British then that might 
encourage all Indians to give even more support to the struggle for independence.  It 
was a pragmatic politico-military consideration that lay behind Ormsby-Gore’s 
apprehension about Muslim responses to the loss by the British of the holy places 
rather than a religious concern.   
 
At the same time Ormsby-Gore expressed anxiety about divisions within Jewry 
which might lead some within Zionism to support Germany’s aspirations.   He 
identified the split between those he called the “Ententophil Jew” and “those who are 
consciously or unconsciously Pro-German” who were preoccupied “lest a Christian 
Power rule in Palestine”.115  Ormsby-Gore voiced concern about the ambivalence of 
these two strands within the Jewish community and the equally equivocal stance of 
non-Jews within Germany who appeared capable of appropriating Zionist aspirations 
to their own imperialist agenda.116  Despite describing Germany as “the home of Anti-
Semitism … the chief centre of Assimilation, and the chief enemy of growing Jewish 
nationalism”, he acknowledged that, out of self-interest, those opinions could easily be 
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put to one side.117  Germany’s reaction towards Zionism and the fate of Palestine, as 
we shall see later, was as pragmatic as that of the British.  Based on the evidence of 
the War Cabinet documents, discussions were taking place about a British occupation 
of Palestine but the arguments for it were presented more as a question of military 
advantage rather than arguments for the establishment of a homeland for the Jews.  
 
Ormsby-Gore addressed the question as to what military measures should be 
taken to secure the region.  He was anxious to advocate the “separation of Syria and 
Palestine from the control of a Power dominated or controlled by Germany (as) the 
only security that can assure our position in Bagdad and along the Red Sea”.118  In 
order to prevent the Ottomans holding on to Syria and Palestine and “prevent(ing) 
Zionism being thrown into the arms of the King of Prussia … when the Germans are at 
this moment making a bid to capture Zionism”, he argued that the British needed to 
draw a clear line of defence “from Trebizond to the Gulf of Alexandretta” a line 
running from the Black Sea south-westwards to the Mediterranean Sea and roughly 
corresponding to the area of Anatolia. 119 
 
According to reports to the Cabinet, a section of the press in Germany were of 
the opinion that the British Government’s concerns for the fate of the Jews and the 
future of Palestine hinged more on imperial self-interest than religious sensibilities.  In 
an article published on 12th May 1918 in the Berliner Tageblatt and translated for the 
Cabinet, Georg Gothein, a member of the Reichstag, is quoted as expressing the view 
that the British “are only concerned to make the Indian Ocean into an English lake, 
and so throw a bridge from Egypt to India over Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia and 
Afghanistan.  Palestine, as a so-called Jewish State, would be merely an English 
colony”.120  Gothein acknowledges that any putative state might be described as  
“Jewish” but that its defining characteristic would be its colonial status within the 
British Empire.  In the view of the journalist, the British viewed the establishment of a 
homeland for the Jews as exactly the same as the creation of a Jewish State and no 
different from any other colonial enterprise.  The view taken by German strategists 
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was that the British regarded Palestine as a means to an end, a mariage de convenance, 
and a bridge to the furthest reaches of the Empire rather than a land to be restored to a 
people because of a religious or biblical covenant.121 Certainly some sections of 
German opinion still hoped for the possibility that the Zionists might align themselves 
with the Central Powers.122   
 
There were others in the German government however, who had been taking 
steps to enlist the support of the Ottoman Empire in a jihad to get the backing of the 
Muslim world for the fight against the Entente Powers.123  Helmuth von Moltke, Chief 
of the General Staff gave orders on 5th August 1914 “one day after Britain declared 
war on Germany – that the German Foreign Office began recruiting spies and agents 
for the jihad”.124  Religious allegiance was clearly not something that concerned 
German imperialism as much as the potential of Islamic communities to add to the 
potency of the war effort.  
 
The views quoted in the documents, both those of Amery and Ormsby-Gore on 
the one hand and those attributed to Delbrück and Gothein on the other, were of course 
partisan, the products of analyses conducted in war time.  They did not address any 
detailed considerations about post-conflict developments in Palestine. The focus of the 
authors was on the general strategies of their respective countries and how each could 
achieve and sustain their empires. Both Germany and Britain gave considerable 
thought to the role that Zionism might play in their ambitions.  Endorsement for 
Zionism was not the exclusive property of the British and nor was Zionism committed 
to any particular power.  In 1889, whilst visiting Constantinople, Theodor Herzl won 
the backing of Kaiser Wilhelm II for Zionism who afterwards sought to persuade 
Sultan Hamid II to support the movement.125  The centre of international Zionism was 
in Berlin and the German Zionist movement was entirely patriotic at the outbreak of 
war, stimulated in part by justifiable concern at the anti-Semitism evident in Russia.126  
German Zionists worked with the German Foreign Ministry to establish a “Committee 
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for the Liberation of Russian Jewry” the hope being that Germany would occupy 
western Russia where most of the Jews lived.127 
 
Even though in the eyes of some British commentators Zionism was allied with 
the German war effort, the notion of the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
had been a subject of discussion for some years in Britain and gained strength from the 
date of Allenby’s entry into Jerusalem on 11th December 1917 when the aspirations of 
Zionism were part of the considerations of the British War Cabinet.  The ambitions of 
Zionism to create a homeland for the Jews in Palestine readily connected with the 
aspirations of British imperialism in the region.128  The support for the colonisation of 
Palestine by Jews was also present though perhaps to a lesser extent amongst some 
Christians in Germany.129  The Zionist perspective for Palestine was much more 
explicitly reflected in the documents considered by the War Cabinet after the 
successes of Allenby.130    
 
General Edmund Allenby’s defeat of the Ottoman army in the campaign raised 
the issue of the post-war political settlement.  On 14th August 1917, a very detailed 
account of the operations, written by General A. J. Murray General Commanding-in-
Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, was presented to the War Cabinet outlining the 
progress of the campaign.131  Accompanying this report and on behalf of Allenby, Lord 
Derby the Secretary of State for War asked the War Cabinet in a document entitled 
“British Policy in Palestine”, to clarify the objectives. He insisted that Allenby be 
clearly informed as to “the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine” 
and expressed the view that “ the time has come when he should have this 
information”.132   It was in his opinion a matter of some urgency because “both the 
French and Italian Governments are closely interested in Syria.”  It is clear that in the 
context of this document that this was a reference to Palestine.133   
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Anglo-French Negotiations and Sykes-Picot 
In looking to advance its position in the Near East, the British government 
were aware of the opposition they would meet.134  As we have noted, the Ottoman 
Empire, France, Russia, and Germany each had their own goals and appreciated that 
the war might have a variety of outcomes.  Mirroring this approach, the Zionist 
movement, appreciating that a favourable outcome for any one of the combatants was 
not a foregone conclusion, solicited support from all the key figures in these countries, 
combining ideological single mindedness with realpolitik.  They believed that a 
British victory was the best option to achieve the establishment of a Jewish homeland 
but they were aware of the need to explore alternatives if that was not the result.135   
 
The British made considerable effort to reach agreements and understandings 
with the two forces they considered to be key in the region in order to safeguard 
Britain’s interests, initially by defining the respective spheres of influence.  In the first 
instance they set out to reach some form of accord with the French who were looking 
to establish their hegemony in those parts of the region they regarded as traditionally 
belonging to them.136 The second goal of the British was to reach some form of 
alliance with Arab forces seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire.  If the 
Arab forces could be won to an alliance with the British against the Ottoman Empire 
this would strengthen their military capability in the area and place them in a stronger 
position to achieve their objectives. 
 
Sir Mark Sykes, a Conservative Party Member of Parliament seconded to the 
military service, led the negotiations for the British whilst the French diplomat 
François Georges-Picot represented French interests. There was an added urgency to 
the negotiations because a successful conclusion would obviate the need to divert 
additional British resources to the area away from an already over-stretched Western 
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Front.  The intention of the Sykes-Picot negotiations was to prevent discord between 
the allies by agreeing defined territorial spheres of influence.  In addition the 
document spelt out their respective economic goals and focused on British and French 
access to ports in the region, the development of the railway services and custom tariff 
provisions.137  In the midst of the war neither side had lost sight of their commercial 
interests and the opportunity to establish trade domination of the region.  The 
document encapsulated the new-imperialist priority of working towards economic 
hegemony in the region. 
 
 Sykes sought to ensure that Palestine fell within the area of Britain’s 
designated responsibility.138  A Palestine under British control would have many 
advantages, not least that of providing a base for troops who could be deployed to 
Egypt to suppress any hostile moves towards the Suez Canal.  The British were well 
aware of the possible difficulties that might arise if their new Arab allies were to see 
documents spelling out the roles that they and the French intended to play.  It would 
clearly mean a denial of any ambitions for independence.139  As Sir Henry McMahon 
explained in a letter written to the Right Honourable Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, on 25th April 1916, “there is the possibility that, when the 
whole truth of the Anglo-French agreement (if one has or shall be concluded) emerges, 
we may be faced with the Arabs preferring the Turkish offers to our own”.140   
 
Although there was no specific reference in the documents to the aspirations of 
Zionism to create a homeland for the Jews, McMahon warned that “the premature 
divulgence of any arrangement with France might even result in active Arab hostility, 
at any rate towards our Ally”.141  The Sykes-Picot Agreement was officially endorsed 
on 16th May 1916 and outlined how the French and British spheres of control would be 
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defined in the event of a favourable outcome to the war for the allies.142  “Notes 
defining the Russian share were exchanged in Petrograd on April 26th, 1916, between 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) and the French Ambassador (M. 
Paléologue), and in London a few weeks later between the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the Russian Ambassador (Count 
Benckendorff).”143 
 
The War Cabinet discussed the strategic significance of Palestine for British 
ambitions on a number of occasions.144  The Ottoman advance, with German 
assistance, across the Sinai Peninsular in 1915 dispelled once and for all the notion 
that the desert could act as a buffer against forces approaching the Canal.145  The 
further the boundaries from which a potential threat to the security of the Canal could 
be launched, the better.  The political and economic importance of Palestine had to be 
seen in the wider context of overall imperialist preoccupations.146  This prioritisation of 
the Suez Canal in the grand imperial scheme was the essential factor determining 
British attitudes towards it and ultimately towards Palestine.   
 
The Arab Revolt and the British  
In the Near East the conflagration played out in its own way, raising further 
questions.  The Ottoman Empire, viewed by the British as a long-time bulwark against 
Russian influence in the region, had demonstrated its fragility as the older essentially 
pre-capitalist agriculturally-focused economy was confronted by the more 
expansionist ambitions of the new-imperialism.147  The British taking advantage of the 
aspirations of the Arab peoples of the Near East to assert their independence from 
Constantinople encouraged the Arab Revolt against their Central Power foe. Their 
commitment to establish states whose founding treaties would include an acceptance 
of military patronage and a privileged economic relationship with the British 
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epitomised the essence of the neo-colonialist agenda arising from the changes inherent 
in the new-imperialist transformations.  The predominantly colonialist and colonising 
programme of previous centuries being supplanted by a new form of dependency 
relationship. 
 
Almost simultaneously with the gambit to reach agreement with the French 
through the Sykes-Picot exchanges, the British were attempting to get an 
understanding with Sharif Hussein of Mecca who expressed a commitment to fight 
against the Ottoman Empire and a strong desire to cement a relationship with the 
British to establish an Arab state under British tutelage.148   Between July 1915 and 
January 1916, Sharif Hussein corresponded with Sir Henry McMahon, the British 
High Commissioner in Cairo, with the object of verifying that a complimentary set of 
interests existed between the British and himself.  He made it clear that in return for 
British support in his fight against the Ottoman forces, he would wish to create an 
Arab state that would be an ally to the British and provide them with a range of 
benefits.149   
 
McMahon was anxious to gain Hussein’s commitment to join the British in the 
struggle against the Ottoman Empire.  At the same time he remained ambiguous about 
what obligations the British might have towards the creation of Arab nations, in 
particular in the area surrounding Palestine.150  McMahon used the idea that the British 
were anxious to retain harmonious relations with the French, in order to avoid any 
agreement on specific definitions as to the boundaries of any future states.151  A 
Memorandum written by the Arab Bureau for McMahon and sent by him with a 
covering letter to Sir Edward Grey, the Conservative Foreign Secretary on 19th April 
1916, conveyed the nature of the thinking behind the process.  In the words of the 
Memorandum:  
 
realising that the present stage of operations in the Ottoman Empire is transitional, but 
daily declaring itself more and more in our favour, we have made every effort to avoid 
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definite commitments for the future; and consequently the longer a final programme is 
postponed the stronger becomes our position as negotiators, and the more reasonable 
will the other two parties, both Turk and Arab, be likely to show themselves towards 
our view.152  
 
He avoided any firm commitments whilst offering words of encouragement in 
areas which did not threaten British goals.  McMahon’s correspondence concluded 
before the detail of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was finalised but, from the British 
point of view, was undoubtedly an important contribution to the whole process.  Any 
developing Arab challenge to the Ottoman Empire would be incorporated by the 
British into their regional scheme thus ensuring that it could not be co-opted by the 
French.  In addition the Sykes-Picot Agreement ensured that if there were to be 
disputes between France and Britain they would be shelved until after the conclusion 
of the war with the Central Powers.153  
 
Throughout 1916 the War Cabinet received reports on the “Arab Revolt” and 
held discussions attended by senior military staff responsible for the conduct of the 
war such as Admiral Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord and Sir William Robertson, Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff.  Minutes of the meetings reveal that discussions took place 
throughout 1916 on the progress of the revolt and that there were concerns about its 
fortunes.  There was particular anxiety about the potential negative consequences 
should the revolt suffer a setback.  Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, 
and Lord Curzon, Leader of the House of Lords, on 9th December 1916 both voiced a 
concern that the War Cabinet “cannot allow the Sharif to be overwhelmed.  One small 
state after another that has willingly or unwillingly, espoused the cause of the Allies 
has been shattered; it is particularly important not to allow the downfall of the Sharif, 
as the effect on our prestige throughout the East would be disastrous”.154  
 
Having secured the acquiescence of the French and created an alliance with 
Arab forces, the task for the British was to turn their attention to defeating the 
Ottoman Empire.  Allenby, who had been reassigned from the European military 
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theatre to the Near East, led the Egyptian Expeditionary Force against the Ottoman 
forces and moved his headquarters from Cairo to Rafah to be nearer to the front lines.  
In keeping with the intentions expressed in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence 
Allenby ensured funding for the Arab forces who were carrying out operations against 
the Ottoman army. The Arab Revolt, which was encouraged by the British, 
complemented their military strategy very well.  The Ottoman army, until the arrival 
of Allenby and his additional troops, had had some successes in defending the 
southern approaches to Palestine but it now had to contend with being attacked on a 
second front.155  The Arab forces led by Emir Faisal the third son of Sharif Hussein, 
with T. E. Lawrence acting as a liaison with the British military leadership, engaged in 
a series of actions capturing Aqaba and attacking the Hijaz rail services which were 
particularly difficult to defend.156   
 
Sir Archibald Murray was replaced as commander-in-chief at the end of June 
1917 and Allenby inflicted a number of defeats on the Ottoman troops before going on 
to enter Jerusalem in December 1917. Ten months later the Ottoman Empire had been 
defeated and the British military goals almost entirely achieved.  The next phase, the 
implementation of the Balfour Declaration, was to begin. The following chapter will 
examine the way in which the British negotiated agreements with the French and the 
Arab leaders in order to advance their goal of taking control of Palestine as an 
important part of their imperial strategy. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the new-imperialism developing at the 
end of the nineteenth century began to impact on the politics and economics of British 
policies.  New finance capital institutions emerging in Britain and in countries such as 
Germany fuelled a worldwide competition for the control over raw materials and 
markets on a much greater scale than had been the case previously.  Critically oil, an 
                                                
155 See unpublished PhD Thesis: Jonathan Quentin Calvin Newell, British Military Policy in Egypt and 
Palestine: August 1914–June 1917 (King’s College: PhD Thesis, 1990).  Newell argues that Allenby’s 
success was a consequence of additional forces he had at his disposal as a result of a change in strategy 
which saw the focus of the Eastern front shift from an intended invasion via Haifa to developing the 
war in the Sinai. 
156 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 216. Please note although different authors use different spellings I 
have standardised all spellings as “Faisal” and as “Hussein”. 
 108 
increasingly vital fuel for industrial and commercial development became a central 
feature of competition.  Ownership and control of abundant supplies of oil granted 
companies and the countries in which they were based, a degree of privilege and 
independence in the battle with competitors.  As the chapter has explained this 
acquisition of resources simultaneously constituted their denial to competitors.  This 
was part of the growth of monopoly economics on a global scale.  This struggle 
culminated in a war in which the armies of the competing imperial powers sought to 
gain military pre-eminence over their rivals in order to secure economic dominance.  
The British preoccupation with the primacy of the Empire was an expression of that 
desire to achieve economic dominance in the world.  The concern for the preservation 
of control over India as the outstanding imperial possession played a central role in 
shaping British policies in order to achieve that end.   
 
Throughout World War One the British Government faced a range of 
challenges to its power and influence on military, economic, and political fronts.  The 
war exposed both the strengths and weaknesses of British imperialism.  With the 
potential to draw on the vast resources of the Empire to conduct its war efforts Britain 
was nevertheless obliged to ensure effective operation of the links with the furthest 
colonies.  In addition the British had to ensure that the rest of the empire was willing 
to respond in a manner that met their goals.  In this Britain faced challenges from a 
number of directions.  Domestically it had to retain popular support to prosecute the 
war particularly on the Western Front, supplying sufficient numbers of troops to fight 
the battles whilst sustaining a level of economic performance that met domestic 
consumption alongside the necessary productivity to supply the material equipment 
with which to fight.   
 
Increasingly dependent on its ability to take advantage of the human and 
material resources it could command from its dominions and colonies, Britain was 
obliged to seek financial and practical support from the United States of America.  
This chapter has demonstrated how this raised political as well as economic questions.     
The post war decades would witness economic convulsions, mass unemployment and 
poverty, financial crashes and social turbulence across the world as a consequence of 
the inter-imperial battles.   The war was both an expression of British power and the 
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means which began to undo its supremacy in the world, heralding its replacement in 
the longer term by the USA. 
 
The alliances which Britain developed throughout the course of the war were 
themselves fraught with difficulties.  Directly confronted by Germany, France was 
unable to defend itself without backing from Britain.  Huge numbers of troops and 
vast amounts of equipment were absorbed in a confrontation which sapped all 
involved.  France, like Britain had its own imperialist ambitions, including in the Near 
East where its goals were potentially in conflict with those of its ally.  Allies in the 
general scheme of the war, the British and the French were also rivals but as the war 
continued, the latter became increasingly dependent on the former.  United on the 
battlefields of Europe, a covert struggle ensued in the Near East over the demarcation 
of their respective spheres of influence especially those covered by the current states 
of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq.    
 
Almost simultaneous with Russian disengagement, the United States of 
America entered the war, adding new human military resources to the already 
indispensable financial backing they had provided the British and their allies.  Their 
direct entry into the combat, albeit towards the end of the conflict, was symptomatic of 
a transition from the dominance of the British to the emergence of the USA as a global 
force.  Throughout the war the British, increasingly indebted to their ally, were 
sensitive to the opinions and reactions of the USA Administration towards actions they 
might take as has been demonstrated in relation to both Ireland and Palestine.  This 
changing interdependence was indicative of the fact that the outcome of the war was to 
reveal the changing nature of the inter-imperialist rivalry in the era of the new-
imperialism and the actual changes in the balance of power between allies as well as 
foes.  The scale of the conflict required the British to act in concert with other imperial 
powers and produced shifts in the alignments between them.  Although the USA did 
not have a veto on British policies on these issues the level of exchange between 
British Prime Ministers and President Woodrow Wilson for example, illustrated the 
symbiotic nature of the relationship and the increasing weight of USA opinion on 
British decision-making. 
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In the next chapter I will look in more detail at the debate around the adoption 
of the policy expressed in the Balfour Declaration analysing the views both of its 
advocates and its opponents amongst the most eloquent of whom in Britain were 
leading political figures who were Jewish.  I will analyse the context of colonisation in 
the Ottoman Empire and the nature of the Zionist settler colonisation in Palestine.  The 
chapter will examine the debates around self-determination which were advanced by 
the main protagonists at the Peace Conference and the nature of the Mandate system 
which emerged from the Paris negotiations.  Furthermore the chapter will examine 
how the British advanced their policies in the region and the way in which they sought 
to apply strategies to achieve their goals.  The chapter will analyse the post-war 
situation and the implementation of the Sykes-Picot agreement and its interpretation in 
the context of the undertakings given to the Arab leaders.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Balfour Declaration, Self-Determination and Arab Opposition 
Introduction 
When the British Cabinet began to discuss Palestine in detail the outcome of the 
World War was by no means predictable.1  The Central Powers and the Entente 
Powers faced major challenges because of the shifting balance of forces between them 
and the questionable capacities of some of their respective allies.2  The year 1917 
threw up a host of domestic and international predicaments which sharpened the 
rivalry between the imperial powers and saw the entry of the United States of America 
into the war and the withdrawal of Russia.3  
 
In the previous chapter I analysed the significance of Palestine for British 
imperial strategy, its location providing a base from which to oversee their interests in 
the Near East and control the Suez Canal.  The government decision in late 1917 to 
support the project for the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine was motivated by a self-interest which coalesced with the ambitions of the 
Zionist movement.  The task was to integrate this project into the goal of sustaining 
the British Empire without appearing to replicate imperialist expansionism and 
colonisation.  The British government was conscious of French hopes to bring parts of 
the Ottoman Empire under its hegemony and consequently sought to avoid provoking 
a rupture with either its French allies or the anti-Ottoman Arab forces.    
 
The chapter will explore how the British sought to advance their interests in a 
world in which anti-imperialism began to flourish stimulated by seismic events and the 
accelerating demand for self-determination in countries under imperial rule.  In the 
midst of this maelstrom the interests of the British government found a congruence 
                                                
1 CAB 23/35. 
2 Chris Harman, A People’s History of the War (London: Verso, 2008), 411.  “The first great eruption 
on the Western Front was in France in April 1917.  An estimated 68 divisions, half the French army, 
refused to return to the front after an offensive which had cost 250,000 lives … 1917 also saw mutinies 
involving some 50,000 soldiers in Italy, and five days of bloody rebellion by up to 100,000 soldiers in 
the British base camp at Étaples, near Boulogne.  The British generals ended the rebellion by making 
concessions and then executed its leaders, keeping the whole affair secret”. See also Niall Ferguson, 
Empire, 328.  
3 The USA declared war on Germany on 6th April 1917 and Russia declared a ceasefire on 15th 
December 1917. 
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with the aspirations of Zionism.  Zionist settlement provided a convenient surrogate, 
effectively implementing colonisation under the guise of national reconstruction.  
Zionism developed from being a peripheral political movement even within the Jewish 
community into being an important adjunct of British imperialist strategy in the Near 
East.  The apogee of Zionist political achievement was the adoption by the British 
Cabinet of the Balfour Declaration proposal for the creation of a homeland for the 
Jews in Palestine. An analysis of the War Cabinet papers reveals the character of the 
discussion within the British government on the subject and the importance they 
attached to it.  
 
This chapter will also examine the opposition to the proposal expressed both in 
Britain and by the indigenous Arab inhabitants of Palestine.  Opposition to Balfour’s 
promotion of the demands of the Zionist Organisation even came from within the 
Cabinet but were also present more broadly within the government and Parliament.  In 
addition antagonism to the idea was expressed in the press and continued even after 
the allocation of the Mandate to the British.4  The most significant opposition was to 
be found amongst the Arabs of the region who initially made some distinction between 
the British Mandate and the creation of a homeland for the Jews, to a certain extent 
tolerating the former whilst vehemently opposing the latter as a thinly veiled 
declaration of intent to establish a Jewish State in Palestine.5  A large proportion of the 
Palestinian political leadership came to recognise that the achievement of the Zionists’ 
goal was only possible because of the Mandate rule by the British.  At the same time 
Arab political leaders saw that their ambitions for a Pan-Islamic, or even Pan-Arabist 
outcome were threatened by the countervailing imperialist forces.  The hope for a 
Greater Syria was destroyed by the Anglo-French implementation of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement fracturing it into separate struggles for self-determination for Syria and for 
Palestine. 
 
The war had brought added problems to the region.  Daily life and the existing 
social and economic relationships were severely disrupted. The situation inside the 
country was one of great hardship for the Palestinian people because the countryside 
                                                
4 J. M. N. Jeffries, The Palestine Deception 1915–1923: The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, the 
Balfour Declaration and the Jewish National Home (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2014).  
The book contains articles written in 1923 for the Daily Mail by Jeffries. 
5 CAB 24/24  
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and the towns had been stripped of men and material by both the Ottoman rulers and 
the British army.  Livestock, crops and trees had been appropriated by both armies and 
men taken from their work on the land.  Furthermore in 1915 the land had been 
devastated by a swarm of locusts reducing available crops.6  To the north in Lebanon, 
an estimated one third of the population died as a consequence of famine which struck 
during the course of the conflict and the silk industry, an important source of income, 
had been virtually wiped out.7  Long term tectonic movements evident in the Ottoman 
period intersected with punctual upheavals caused by the war and the arrival of the 
Zionist settlers.   These sudden changes led to the uncoupling and dislocating of the 
more gradual developments in society creating a dynamic with new challenges the 
product of the imperialist war, nascent nationalism and colonisation.  
 
At the end of the war Great Britain, France and the United States of America 
presided over the Paris Peace Conference which was intended to lay the basis for the 
post-war settlement.  The British, as one of the principal military victors in the conflict, 
were able to dictate to the League of Nations the terms of the Mandate for Palestine, 
and thereby establish their dominant position in the country and the region.  The 
Mandate, which eventually came into effect on 26th September 1923, confirming the 
terms of the British occupation of Palestine, was a product of the First World War and 
constituted the legitimisation of what was the de facto situation following Allenby’s 
entry into Jerusalem in 1917.  The League of Nations Mandate gave international 
legitimacy to the new-imperialist agenda. 
 
Zionism Before the Balfour Declaration 
Long before the Balfour Declaration, a British Christian Zionist lobby existed 
within sections of the establishment and the Zionist Organisation had succeeded in 
establishing itself in Britain as a significant expression of Jewish opinion.8  According 
to some, British public opinion was hostile to Jewish immigration into Britain and 
“felt that something should be done for east European Jewry if they were to be barred 
                                                
6 Naomi Shepherd, Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine (London: John Murray, 1999), 27. 
7 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800–1914 (London: I.B. Taurus, Reprinted 
2009), p. 250.  See also letter from Consul Fontana to Earl Curzon, 20th December 1920. 
8 Masalha, The Bible and Zionism, 94. 
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from entering England”.9   In 1903 Lloyd George had participated in an attempt to 
draft an agreement between the Zionist Organisation and the government which was 
headed by the Conservative Party Prime Minister, Arthur James Balfour to allocate 
land for the establishment of Jewish homeland.10  Although in 1917 their positions of 
seniority in the government were reversed, there is clear political continuity between 
this earlier attempt to meet Zionist wishes and the subsequent adoption of the Balfour 
Declaration. 
 
Theodor Herzl, widely recognised as one of the most important founders of 
modern Zionism, advocated the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine which, to 
succeed, he knew, required the support of an imperial sponsor which he went to 
extraordinary lengths to obtain.  Following the First Zionist Congress in 1897, Herzl, 
travelling across Europe, contacted Kaiser Wilhem II, the Ottoman Sultan, the Pope 
(1903) and King Victor Emmanuel III (1903).  In Britain he met Joseph Chamberlain 
(1902), the Colonial Secretary in the Government of Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, 
and Lord Cromer, Consul-General of British-occupied Egypt.  Evidence of the lengths 
to which he was prepared to go to win the support of the leading imperial powers of 
the day was his effort in 1902 to gain the backing of Vyacheslav von Plevhe, the anti-
Semitic minister of the Interior in the Russian Czarist Government.11  Undoubtedly 
Herzl took the view that in the light of the rivalry between the powers seeking the 
support of all might, in the end, ensure the support of at least one. 
 
In 1903 the agreement which the Zionist Organisation and the British 
government had been working on aimed to establish a homeland for Jewish people in 
any location that could be provided and Cyprus and Uganda were actively discussed.12  
Those prepared to accept any land to create a homeland for the Jews were called 
“Territorialist” and as such, were not dissimilar from other persecuted religious groups 
who sought refuge abroad.13  Although initially not repudiated by Theodor Herzl, 
                                                
9 Lacqueur, The History of Zionism, 121. 
10 Victor Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the origins of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1891–1949 (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 30-31. 
11 Ibid.,97. 
12 Theodor Herzl, The Diaries, 367, cited in Laqueur, The History of Zionism, 120.  
13 HC Deb 20 June 1904 vol 136 cc 561-79. According to Earl Percy in a debate in the House of 
Commons on 20th June 1904  “… it was in the area situated between Lake Victoria and Lake Rudolf, in 
the Kisumu Province.” 
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before his death in 1904, support for the scheme fell out of favour and the 
“Territorialist” current within the Zionist Organisation was defeated at the seventh 
congress in Basel in late July 1905.14   Even though they did not at this time have 
support from the government for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, they 
had won a hearing from some of its leading members and they continued to gather 
support in the following years.  Amongst those who participated in the 1903 debate at 
the Zionist Congress in Basel, were some like Chaim Weizmann who supported the 
case for Palestine as the only place in which the Jewish homeland might be established. 
In 1904 Weizmann moved to Manchester, where he took a post at the university and 
began promoting the call for a Jewish homeland.  The discussion of this aspiration and 
support for it was not restricted to Jewish members of the local community as non-
Jewish figures such as Winston Churchill, then a local Member of Parliament, 
expressed his backing for the Zionist cause.15 
 
Whilst Weizmann sought out and influenced key figures, his success was 
undoubtedly a consequence of their political and religious pre-disposition.  In addition 
to the meetings mentioned above, in 1906 Weizmann met Arthur Balfour, then the 
Leader of the Opposition following his defeat as Prime Minister.  He continued his 
lobbying activities and in early 1914 met Sir Herbert Samuel the Liberal Member of 
Parliament for Cleveland, who was to become Home Secretary in Asquith’s 
government.  Weizmann showed an appreciation for British imperial sensibilities by 
explaining the advantages that a Jewish homeland might have for Britain’s interests in 
the Near East. In 1914 he wrote to C. P. Scott the Editor of the Manchester Guardian 
that should Palestine fall within London’s sphere of interest and “should Britain 
encourage a Jewish settlement there … we could have in twenty to thirty years a 
million Jews there, perhaps more; they would develop the country, bring back 
civilisation to it, and form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal”.16  In November 
the same year, through his connections with C P Scott he met David Lloyd George, the 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer, together with Sir Herbert Samuel.17  Samuel’s 
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14 Laqueur, The History of Zionism,131. 
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commitment to the Zionist cause was demonstrated by his submission in January 1915 
of a memorandum on The Future of Palestine to the Cabinet outlining a proposal for a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine.18  “ I am assured,” he wrote, “ that the solution of the 
problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and 
supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of 
the country to the British Empire”.19  Samuel considered Weizmann’s demands too 
modest.20  Weizmann’s task was not so much persuading these figures to support the 
Zionists objectives but rather encouraging them to consider how those goals might be 
achieved.   Some, though not all, of this discussion took place at the highest 
parliamentary level and the subsequent progress of discussion as to how the 
government should formulate their position is recorded in the Cabinet papers.   
Through an analysis of these papers it is possible to gain an insight into the nature of 
the debate about the Declaration amongst the leading Cabinet ministers of the day and 
how they considered it as reconciling imperialist ambitions with Zionist colonisation. 
 
Debating the Zionist project  
Supporters of the Balfour Declaration 
As I have noted above, links between highly placed government officials and 
the leadership of Zionism were well established.  The ending of the Asquith 
government in December 1916 and its replacement by the Lloyd George coalition saw 
three strong supporters of Zionism enter the Cabinet in the form of the new Prime 
Minister himself, the Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour and Lord Milner.  Discussions 
took place on 7th February 1917 between Sir Mark Sykes, “advisor to the Foreign 
Office on Middle Eastern affairs, … Lord Rothschild, Chaim Weizmann president of 
the English Zionist Federation, and other Zionist leaders, in order to arrive at some 
understanding on the future of Palestine”.21 The Cabinet had further discussions in 
April on a report by W. Ormsby-Gore on “Zionism and the suggested Jewish 
Battalions for Egyptian Expeditionary Force” which reflected on the growing support 
                                                
18 CAB 37/123/43.  See also Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 74.  Jewish by heritage, Samuel 
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19 CAB 37/123/43. 
20 Laqueur, The History of Zionism, 182 
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amongst Zionists for a “British Palestine or a Palestine under the United States”.22  
These exchanges helped create the climate in which the formulation of the Declaration 
was to take place.  
 
However between July 1917 and 31st October 1917 the document, which 
eventually became known as the “Balfour Declaration” was sent by Balfour to Lord 
Rothschild and went through a number of drafts.23  The text developed into its final 
version as the result of a process of private exchanges, between Balfour and 
Rothschild, steering a course that would indicate support for the Zionist objective of 
creating a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, whilst seeking to avoid antagonising 
opponents in Britain of the Zionist Federation’s proposals at the same time as averting 
any information about the proposal being communicated to the people of Palestine 
itself.  As with their handling of the “untried Irish prisoners” question in 1916, those 
on the government side responsible for putting the statement together were influenced 
both by domestic and international considerations.24  The “Balfour Declaration” was 
published in its final form on 4th November 1917.25   
 
Balfour faced opposition within his Cabinet and Rothschild faced opposition in 
the Jewish community including within the Board of Deputies of British Jews.26  
Rothschild, wrote to Balfour on 18th July 1917 from his London home that “our 
opponents have commenced their campaign by a most reprehensible manoeuvre, 
namely to excite a disturbance by the cry of British Jews versus Foreign Jews, they 
commenced this last Sunday when at the Board of Deputies they challenged the new 
elected officers as to whether they were all of English birth (myself among them)”.27 
Rothschild’s draft clearly expected the government to discuss directly with the Zionist 
Organisation the “necessary methods and means” to create “the National Home of the 
Jewish people”.28  For his part Balfour amended Rothschild’s imperative that the 
Government “will discuss … with the Zionist Organisation” to the more equivocal 
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phrasing that the Government “will be ready to consider any suggestions on the 
subject which the Zionist Organisation may desire to lay before them”.29  The number 
of drafts the document went through is clear testimony to the fact that all those 
contributing were striving to avoid formulations which were too specific and might 
provoke wider opposition.  The ambiguities and vagueness of the document were 
deliberate.  
 
What is significant in the first three known drafts: the “Zionist Draft, July 
1917”30; the “Balfour Draft, August 1917”31 and the “Milner Draft, August 1917”32 is 
what they choose to include and what they omitted.33  The titles given to these drafts 
by Charles D Smith in Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict are indicative of their 
sources: the “Zionist Draft” originating with Rothschild’s letter to Balfour; the 
“Balfour Draft” his response to the letter and the “Milner Draft” by Lord Milner, 
member of the War Cabinet.34  What is common to these texts and revealing is the 
status given to the Zionist Organisation as the arbiter of the “methods and means” to 
achieve the creation of the Jewish homeland. 35  For the Zionist Organisation and for 
many leading British politicians the Declaration was to take on the status of a quasi-
treaty fulfilling Theodor Herzl’s objective, “to put it in terminology of international 
law, a State-creating power” which he foresaw in effect as the “creation of the 
State”.36  
 
The Declaration constituted the culmination of an important phase of the 
Zionist movement’s strategy.  The “Zionist Draft” in July 1917 had asserted the 
“principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish 
people”.37  This initial text was unambiguous in its goal proposing that “His Majesty’s 
Government (would) use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this 
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objective”.38  Under the influence of Balfour and the government advisors subsequent 
drafts dropped the assertion that the creation of a “National Home for the Jewish 
people” was a principle in favour of the more emollient formula that the government 
“views with favour the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine”.39  
These changes represented the drive to reconcile conflicting views within the Cabinet 
where Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, had pressed hard to block the 
Declaration or at least to amend the text further.40  A statement which explicitly 
proposed the establishment of a Jewish state would undoubtedly have been used by the 
German government in conjunction with Constantinople to secure the loyalty of the 
Ottoman Arab provinces and especially Greater Syria.41  If Britain’s Arab allies had 
access to the Declaration it would lead some to revoke their alliance with London and 
turn back towards the Ottoman Empire.  It was little wonder that the British delayed 
the release of the text in Palestine. 
 
The “draft declaration on Zionism”, as it was described by M. P. A. Hankey, 
Secretary to the Cabinet, was “submitted to nine – or, including Mr E. S. Montagu, ten 
– representative Jewish leaders”.  In his response to the draft the Rt. Hon. Herbert 
Samuel, M.P. drew attention to the dangers of not proceeding with the conquest of 
Palestine.  “If the Turks are left ostensibly in control of Palestine, the country is likely 
to fall, in course of time, under German influence.  If Germany, or any other 
continental Power, is dominant there, Egypt would be exposed to constant menace.  
The best safeguard would be the establishment of a large Jewish population, 
preferably under British protection”.42  Samuel was repeating the argument he had 
presented in his earlier Cabinet paper of January 1915.43  The reference to Egypt was 
an explicit link to the Suez Canal with its significance for the future of the Empire as a 
whole and the argument was infused with the new-imperialist agenda tying together 
the fate of the Empire and Palestine. 
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This pro-Empire line was echoed by Sir Stuart Samuel, Chairman of the Jewish 
Board of Deputies who worried about the growing influence of German and Austrian 
Jews in Palestine.   He raised the question as to whether they should in fact be allowed 
to remain in Palestine “or if expelled … be allowed to return as Zionists?”  In part 
answering his own question he proposed that they “should be made ineligible for 20 
years”.44  His sentiments were echoed in the comments of another contributor to the 
debate Mr C. G. Montefiore.45  Imperial considerations ran through the debate with 
those supporting the establishment of a homeland for the Jews couching their 
arguments in terms that would resonate with the imperialist agenda of the day.  
 
The Anti-Zionist Opposition  
Those Jewish leaders who opposed the Declaration also argued from a pro-
imperialist position.  Sir Philip Magnus MP, a Liberal Unionist who joined the 
Conservative Party in 1912, worried about the fate of Jews in Palestine should the 
“other Palestinian communities” become aware of the intention to make the land a 
homeland for the Jews.  Perhaps more radically than other Jewish opponents of the 
Zionists he could not agree “that the Jews regard themselves as a nation”.46   Mr C. G. 
Montefiore, President of the Anglo-Jewish Association expressed similar criticisms of 
the idea that the Jews constituted a nation.  He rejected Herzl’s assertions that “anti-
Semitism was eternal, and that it was hopeless to expect its removal” viewing such 
remarks as a “libel” upon both Jews and human nature. Montefiore analysed the 
debates in Russia and argued that the majority of Jews in Russia were in favour of 
autonomy inside Russia itself and not for “exile from Russia”.47  He was confident 
about the positive resolution of anti-Semitism there and feared that the desire for a 
national home would in fact delay if not stop altogether the developing emancipatory 
trends there.  These views were shared by Mr L. L. Cohen, Chairman of the Jewish 
Board of Guardians, who thought that the Jews were not a nation and support for such 
ideas would strengthen the hands of those who were anti-Semitic.48 Cohen pointed out 
that given the number of Jews in Europe the creation of a Jewish homeland in 
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Palestine, only able to take a small fraction of that number, would not resolve the 
problem of anti-Semitism. 
 
The most formidable Jewish opponent of the declaration was the Secretary of 
State for India, Edwin Samuel Montagu, who fought an on-going battle against the 
Zionist proposals.  He placed the primacy of the Empire above all else and viewed 
India as a vital part of it.  In his view asserting the notion of the “principle” of a 
“National Home” would aid the legitimation of the anti-Semitism present already in 
many countries of Eastern Europe where pogroms had taken place over a number of 
decades.49  On 14th September 1917 he wrote underlining that the leadership of the 
Zionist movement came from outside England and that, “in conformity with the 
foreign origin of Zionism as a whole, Jews of foreign birth have played a very large 
part in the Zionist movement in England”.50  Montagu believed that “ … Anti-Zionism 
is a belief held by at least half the Jews of this country”.51  He felt that there was no 
justification for accommodating Zionist ambitions and that the view put forward in 
Cabinet “ … to help the Allied cause in America” was not justifiable.52 
 
On 9th October 1917 Montagu wrote, “I am sorry to bother the Cabinet with 
another Paper on this subject but I have obtained some more information which I 
would like to lay before them”.53   He remained opposed to the Zionists’ proposals 
drawing this time on evidence provided by Miss Gertrude Lowthian Bell, who was 
“acting as Assistant Political Officer in Baghdad”.54  Bell who had spent a 
considerable amount of time travelling in the Near East and was a respected 
commentator on the region had a very definite view about the situation on the ground. 
 
Jewish immigration [to Palestine] has been artificially fostered by doles and subventions 
from millionaire co-religionists in Europe; the new colonies have now taken root and 
are more or less self-supporting. The pious hope that an independent Jewish state may 
some day be established in Palestine no doubt exists, though it may be questioned 
whether among local Jews there is any acute desire to see it realized, except as a means 
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of escape from Turkish oppression; it is perhaps more lively in the breasts of those who 
live far from the rocky Palestinian hills and have no intention of changing their 
domicile.55 
 
Montagu, like Bell, considered the call for a Jewish state as the demand of an 
unrepresentative minority and certainly not those prominent Jews who Montagu felt 
the government should listen to. Whilst he professed admiration for Weizmann, he 
nevertheless regarded him as “near to being a religious fanatic”.56  He thought 
Palestine was not large enough for additional numbers of Jews and feared it would 
require the dispossession of the “existing population”.   He asked, “is it worthwhile 
jeopardizing the position of all Jews who remain in other countries for the 
insignificant fraction of the Jewish population that can conceivably find a home in 
Palestine”?57  He was suspicious too about the real intentions of the French 
government and about the true motives behind some of the non-Jewish support that 
was being garnered by the Zionists.  He reminded the Cabinet that the French were 
already enthusiasts for the Zionist cause and had approached the British government 
with a proposal to establish a Jewish “nation in El Hasa in Arabia” which, Montagu 
pointed out, the British had already promised to Bin Saud and his followers.58  To his 
mind, “the French are anxious to establish Jews anywhere if only to have an excuse for 
getting rid of them, or large numbers of them”.59  The suggestion to create a Jewish 
state in El Hasa owing allegiance to Paris, he maintained, would jeopardise any British 
hopes for a land bridge between the Mediterranean Sea and India because it would be 
under French tutelage.  As the Secretary of State for India he viewed this as an 
important threat to the Empire. 
 
The final draft of the Declaration some weeks later, perhaps modified as a 
consequence of Montagu’s intervention, affirmed that “ nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice … the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” 
as a result of the creation of a Jewish homeland. The clause was a clear attempt to 
counter the argument that a homeland for the Jews would encourage anti-Semitic 
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sentiments or might legitimise pressure being put on Jewish citizens across Europe to 
emigrate.60  Balfour’s letter to Rothschild navigated between the Scylla and Charybdis 
of the two sides.  Its ambiguity was a deliberate attempt to satisfy the Zionist lobby 
whilst avoiding a formulation which would alienate Jewish anti-Zionists in Britain and 
anti-Ottoman Arab allies.  To the authors and those to whom it was addressed, the 
Balfour Declaration dated 2nd November 1917 had the status of a formal treaty with all 
that that implied. 
  
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.61 
 
In the years that followed British politicians continuously used the document 
as the reference point in determining policies for Palestine and considered its 
interpretation their exclusive prerogative.  Whilst the inhabitants of Palestine were 
ignored the War Cabinet did consult others on the text of the Declaration.  
Confidentially and before publication they sent copies to President Wilson, the 
“leaders of the Zionist Movement” and persons in “Anglo-Jewry opposed to Zionism” 
to solicit their views.62  As on the issue of Irish prisoners, and for similar reasons, the 
British were sensitive to the reaction of the United States of America to any steps on 
the matter of a national home for the Jewish people. The Cabinet were anxious not to 
alienate the influential pro-Zionist opinion in the USA lest it adversely affect the 
financial and material support provided by Wilson.63   
 
The Ottoman Empire and Colonisation  
The path of colonisation of a part of the Ottoman Empire, which was what the 
British were proposing to undertake, was not without precedent.  Whilst earlier British 
Governments had considered the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as key to 
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protecting their strategic interests, its accelerating vulnerability, raised serious 
questions about its capacity to serve that purpose.64  Facing internal challenges and 
surrounded by hostile neighbours it was under threat and in the wake of the setbacks in 
the war in France the British saw it as advantageous to switch focus from the Western 
Front to the Near East.65  Given the fragility of the Ottoman Empire, the British feared 
that it would fall completely under the sway of Germany.66  Their aim was to win Arab 
allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire and neutralise potential problems arising 
from French territorial ambitions.  The British, recognising a potential in the growing 
Arab opposition to Ottoman rule, believed that creating an alliance with them would 
strengthen their hand against Germany and might obviate the need to make 
compromises with the French over the division of conquered territories.67 
 
A number of existing and nascent nation states wanted to assert their 
independence from the Ottoman Empire and, in some instances, to go further and take 
additional parts of its territory.68   These included countries like Italy and Greece 
alongside peoples such as the Bulgarians, Armenians, Kurds and Egyptians, some of 
whom, at varying times tried to enlist the support of France or Russia.69  For some the 
task necessitated the military defeat and removal of Ottoman forces from their lands 
whilst for others the ambition would involve some form of occupation or colonisation 
of the conquered territory.  The colonisation of former parts of the Ottoman Empire 
had been taking place for some years.  Following the French occupation of Algeria in 
1830, some 50,000 people from France settled there in the next seventeen years.  
Between 1870 and 1911 the colonial population of Algeria rose further from 272,000 
to 681,000.70  The Italians followed a similar path in Tunisia and by 1911 there were 
143,000 European colonists in the country.  Following the Italian conquest of 
Ottoman-held Libya in 1912, there was an influx of 150,000 immigrants, which 
coupled with the genocidal policies inflicted on the indigenous peoples culminated in 
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the colonists constituting roughly one fifth of the total population.71  The colonial 
activities of Europeans in the former Ottoman territories had established a pattern of 
conquest and colonisation across the area which set a precedent for the British. 
 
Large-scale settler colonisation combined with conquest, displacement and 
dispossession however was not the only method by which imperial rule was imposed.  
In India the British defeated some heredity rulers whilst forming alliances with others 
who were to act as a comprador social layer acting in compliance with the imperial 
rulers.  In the case of the Near East, whilst the British opted for alliances with some 
Arab rulers in parts of the region, they chose a different path in Palestine viewing the 
Zionists’ ambitions as an alternative option to the challenge of creating a base from 
which to oversee the Suez Canal.72  Throughout the debates of the Zionist Congresses 
there had been a clear understanding that, to be successful, the creation of a Jewish 
state would require an act of colonisation through imperial patronage.  This was 
understood equally both by Balfour and by the Zionists.  By claiming that they were 
assisting the return of the Jews to their homeland, supporting Zionist colonisation 
assisted the British in deflecting any criticism of imperial expansionism especially 
from President Woodrow Wilson.73 
 
Kitchener had spelt out the importance of the region from the perspective of 
British interests in India and the adjacent area but more than that he had recognised 
that the Near East was crucial to defining the relationship between Britain and the 
other European powers and between Britain and the peoples of the region.74  As I 
demonstrated in the last chapter he saw Mesopotamia as providing material benefits 
from its agriculture and its oil fields and he even posited the idea that it be colonised 
by “the surplus population of India”.75  He saw a Muslim colonial settler policy as an 
alternative to that of Anglicisation.  He proposed that Muslims from India would be 
used to establish a colony around Basra to form one end of the vital rail link to the 
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Mediterranean and thereby ensuring a base from which to supervise access to the 
Arabian or Persian Gulf.  Kitchener’s suggestions were not carried through in the form 
he proposed but the parallels between the subsequent involvement of the British in 
Palestine and his original idea of seizing Alexandretta and securing a loyal colony in 
Mesopotamia are clear.  He wanted Britain to remain an “Asiatic Power”.  To those 
who accepted the argument he advanced, Palestine was an alternative to his 
Alexandretta scheme. 
 
Zionism, Colonisation and Colonialism 
Having inflicted a major defeat on the Ottoman forces in the southern part of 
Palestine in October and early November, General Allenby officially entered 
Jerusalem on 11th December 1917.   The British established the Occupied Enemy 
Territories Administration (South) which governed the conquered parts of Palestine 
until October 1918 when its responsibilities were extended to the whole of the country.  
Allenby ran Palestine through military rule issuing statements that the places holy to 
Islam, Judaism and Christianity would be protected and instructed everyone to go 
about their lawful business.   The administration had two major objectives: “the 
preservation of the status quo, and the prohibition of any agreement for transfer of 
immovable property until the land registers were established”.76   
 
On the 18th February 1918 Balfour announced to the House of Commons that 
government had agreed “to the request of the London Zionist Central Organisation to 
permit a Zionist Commission to proceed to Palestine at an early date”.77  Weizmann 
left for Palestine in April 1918 to establish the Commission with full British 
government approval.78  Discussion hardly arose in the Cabinet in 1917 about what a 
homeland for the Jews might look like or how it might be created and despite their 
commitment to the idea, Lloyd George and other leading political figures had no 
blueprint for its creation.79  The wording of the Declaration was deliberately 
ambiguous to obscure its true intent or mislead those on whose lands the homeland 
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was to be established but it also revealed that the protagonists themselves were 
uncertain about what it might mean and how it might be achieved.  
 
The connection between Zionism and British imperial interests was a central 
theme for many of the politicians who espoused the Zionist cause. Churchill expressed 
the view in early 1920 that “if, as it may well happen, there should be created in our 
lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish state under the protection of the British 
Crown, which might comprise three or four million of Jews, an event would have 
occurred in the history of the world which would, from every point of view, be 
beneficial, and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British 
Empire”.80  Like many more of his fellow Cabinet members, including the Unionist 
Edward Carson and the South African Jan Smuts, Churchill appreciated the role 
colonists might play.   Churchill’s consistent espousal of the Zionist cause was the 
obverse of his promotion of the “truest interests of the British Empire”.  
 
Non-religious hierarchised notions of civilisation and secularised 
interpretations of religious beliefs were shaped into an imperialist discourse to validate 
political practice.   The Balfour Declaration constituted a unique manifestation of this 
fusion.  I argue that this interpretation contributes to identifying the Zionist movement 
as a part of the imperialist framework fulfilling the colonising role at the moment that 
colonisation was being rejected by countries across the world.  The Zionist project for 
the creation of a homeland for the Jews fused with the British government’s desire to 
have a land base near the Suez Canal in order to protect the route through which it 
communicated with much of its Empire.  Zionism was a useful and timely adjunct to 
British imperialism’s functioning. 
 
Palestine and Self-Determination 
The Arab Palestinian aspiration for self-determination expressed both before 
and following the defeat of the Ottoman forces in the Near East echoed developments 
which had taken place elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire itself as well as in other parts 
of the world.  The ambition for nationhood not only emerged within Europe but was 
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beginning to develop further afield.  The 1857 “Uprising” in India, constituted one 
example of the inception of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements by 
indigenous populations manifesting a nascent nationalism. As I have already noted this 
process accelerated in the early part of the twentieth century leading to the intensifying 
opposition to imperialist conquest, occupation and colonisation.  Hitherto subaltern 
peoples sought to repudiate the inferior status imposed on them. The debate around 
self-determination developed as a counterpoint to that of the new-imperialist 
hegemony of Western European countries in particular.   
 
Allenby, following his entry into Jerusalem, had issued a proclamation that in 
the East, Great Britain sought “the complete and final liberation of all peoples 
formerly oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and 
administrations in those countries deriving authority from the initiative and free will of 
those people themselves”.81  Quite unintentionally the tone of the statement had 
similarities to the unequivocal declaration of the Bolshevik government in Russia.   
 
On 3rd January 1918, prompted by the negotiations taking place between the 
Central Powers and the new Soviet Republic, the War Cabinet discussed its “War 
Aims”.  Soviet Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the war reverberated throughout 
Europe.82  The British government were keen to keep Russia in the war if only to 
occupy one or more of the Central Powers in continued fighting and to prevent 
Russian arms falling into enemy hands.  A telegram from the British military attaché 
in Petrograd made the assessment that “Trotzki [sic] and his friends had so ruined the 
Russian army that if he does break off negotiations the enemy will advance a few 
kilometres and capture his guns”.83  Although the USA had now entered the war they 
could not compensate for the withdrawal of Russian troops because their soldiers were 
not prepared, were not yet available in comparable numbers and they could not be 
deployed to the same battlefronts.84   
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The purpose of the Cabinet statement would be to make clear that British 
objectives were not open-ended, designed to conquer and appropriate all lands 
belonging to the Central Powers but that there were limits beyond which the 
Government would not go.  The Cabinet’s endorsement of the “principle of self-
determination” was an attempt to convey this and defuse the growing war-weariness.  
In Europe the essence of Cabinet terms for ending the war amounted to a return to the 
status quo ante whilst demanding compensation for those countries invaded by the 
Central Powers.  Lloyd George presented the “War Aims” statement to the “Trades 
Union Conference” on 5th January 1918 in the Caxton Hall, London.85 
 
The Prime Minister’s position on the fate of the colonial possessions of 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire was summed up in the War Cabinet Minutes in the 
following way:   
He thought that the War Cabinet were in general agreement that our proper course 
would be to express our willingness to accept the application of the principle of self-
determination to the captured German colonies.  Precisely how the principle was to be 
applied need not now be discussed, but there were chiefs and heads of tribes who 
could be consulted.  The same principle was to be applied in the case of Mesopotamia 
– which was occupied by Arabs and not by Turks – and in the case of Palestine, which 
had a very mixed population.86 
 
The commitment to self-determination was not absolute and unconditional.  The 
acceptance of the “application of a principle” did not constitute a commitment to put it 
into practice.  Before implementation might occur, further discussion would be 
required and the British would remain the arbiter of its operation consulting “chiefs 
and heads of tribes”, an undertaking which was given in a quite desultory and racist 
fashion.87  The imperial power would only implement such a step once it had satisfied 
itself that the potential candidates were capable of guaranteeing continued benefit to 
Britain.  The War Cabinet Minutes of 3rd January 1918 offer no explanation or 
elaboration of the term “mixed population” in respect of Palestine nor why it was 
necessary to distinguish it from other countries of the Ottoman Empire.  
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Notwithstanding the description used suggesting some form of difference between 
Palestine and other regions, the statement, referenced the principle of self-
determination to Palestine alongside other occupied Arab lands.  This might have been 
interpreted as a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and to remove any ambiguity 
the Minutes were duly amended the following day to make clear “that the passage 
dealing with the principle of self-determination of races [sic] should be modified so as 
to apply, not to all races indiscriminately, but merely to the settlement of the New 
Europe”.88  Palestine was not to be included amongst those deemed eligible for 
independence. 
 
Allenby’s words could be read as a straightforward confirmation that the 
principle of self-determination applied to the whole of the region under his military 
control and, since he was speaking in Jerusalem, that included the people of Palestine.  
He did not differentiate between Palestine and the other countries under Ottoman 
control.  Allenby’s promissory words in December 1917 were similar to those used 
later by the United States President Woodrow Wilson who in a speech to Congress on 
8th January 1918 put forward his fourteen points which influenced the subsequent 
peace negotiations in Paris.89  
 
Woodrow Wilson and Self-Determination 
Wilson was something of a contradictory character who whilst appearing 
relatively liberal on some issues was in reality a colonialist holding explicitly racist 
views about African Americans.90  He had supported the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 
1898 which endorsed the USA as a colonial power in Puerto Rico, Guam and the 
Philippines, following its victories over Spain.91  An admirer of British colonial rule he 
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thought that the peoples of these newly colonised lands would only be able to achieve 
independence after a period of oversight by the imperial power.92  
 
Wilson’s speech to the US Congress stating his aims for the war was made on 
8th January 1918, a few days after Lloyd George’s “War Aims” statement.93  He was 
undoubtedly influenced by the growing debate on imperialism and colonialism which 
had sharpened during the course of the war.  However it was the positions adopted in 
Russia which were a more direct threat to imperialism.  The political statements of the 
Bolsheviks and the ‘decree on peace’ which had been adopted and published by the 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 28th October 1917 (O.S.) constituted the polar 
opposite of everything that the imperial powers stood for and resonated across the 
globe.94  The call for a peace without annexation or indemnities by the Bolshevik 
government and its declared intention to publish all secret treaties and negotiations 
jolted the imperialist powers into responding.  In his “Fourteen Points” Wilson 
advanced the proposition that “the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now 
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development”.95  
 
Despite the frequent citing of United States of America President Woodrow 
Wilson as the author of this debate, it is arguable that as someone who already 
presided over imperial conquests this was a qualified accommodation to the realities of 
a situation which had left the USA in danger of marginalisation.  There is no evidence 
from the Paris Peace Conference and its associated processes that Wilson significantly 
challenged Anglo-French priorities and conceptions of how the conquered lands might 
be allocated.  If that challenge came from anywhere it was from the infant 1917 
Russian government which espoused support for self-determination and exposed the 
machinations of the British and the French in respect of the Sykes-Picot negotiations.96 
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Wilson’s position was more ambiguous than has often been claimed.  As Chair 
of the League of Nations Commission addressing questions on self-determination, 
Wilson rejected the Chinese demand for the restoration of the province of Shandong to 
their authority and agreed that it should be ceded to Japan as secretly agreed by the 
British and the French with the small caveat of a verbal commitment that it should at 
some time in the future be returned to the Chinese.97  The outcome of the Shandong 
question like the future of Greater Syria was a matter that had been the subject of 
secret agreements between the imperial allies without any reference to the indigenous 
peoples. The apparent support by Wilson for the rights of peoples to assert their 
sovereignty was perhaps a ploy to ingratiate the USA with newly emergent nations 
aspiring to independence.  This was the expansion of the United States of America’s 
neo-colonialist strategy.   
 
Despite the notional adoption of the concept of self-determination by bodies 
like the League of Nations as a watchword for the political development of countries it 
remained trapped within an imperialist methodology which prescribed its applicability. 
The Bolshevik government was the first to apply the concept in practice and to 
advocate its applicability to all nations without preconditions.  Moreover their 
revelations of the secret agreements between Britain and France expressed in the 
Sykes-Picot negotiations challenged the credibility of those two countries in the realm 
of support for self-determination.  The British implementation of the concept of self-
determination was based on their own priorities and their own interests.   
 
Declaration to the Seven and the Anglo-French Declaration 
Leading figures in the Arab world began to ask questions about the real 
intentions of the British towards the future of the Near East and in particular towards 
Palestine.  On 16th June 1918, under growing pressure from a variety of sources, the 
British issued a statement at a meeting with seven influential Arabs based in Cairo 
which became known as the “Declaration to the Seven” intending to reassure those 
concerned about the ambiguity of Britain’s intentions.  The declaration specifically 
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drew attention to Allenby’s Jerusalem statement and to one made by General Sir 
Stanley Maude on the occasion of the fall of Baghdad on 19th March 1917.98     
 
The “Declaration to the Seven” discussed four categories of territory, the 
fourth of which were those territories “liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the 
Allied armies”.  Palestine and Mesopotamia came within this group and the document 
spelt out the British government’s position on the future of these two regions.   The 
declaration affirmed, that “the policy of His Majesty’s Government towards the 
inhabitants of those regions, … is that the future government of those territories should 
be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed”.99  The Declaration echoed 
the formula used in his “War Aims” speech by Lloyd George and was designed to 
reassure its recipients that the British government endorsed the concept of self-
determination.100  From an Arab perspective the gaining of the right to self-
determination in the manner implied by Allenby confirmed that they would receive 
their liberty as a quid pro quo for their alliance with the British against Germany’s 
partner, the Ottoman Empire. The Anglo-French Declaration published on 7th 
November 1918 though brief reiterated that the establishment of “national 
governments and administrations … shall derive their authority from the free exercise 
of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations”.101  The document, an 
official communiqué, was distributed to the press in Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia 
and posted in towns and villages stating that “France and Great Britain agree to further 
and assist in the setting up of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria 
and Mesopotamia which have already been liberated by the Allies, as well as in those 
territories which they are endeavouring to liberate, and to recognise them as soon as 
they are actually set up”.102  
 
The declaration asserted that the role of the French and the British was to offer 
“support” and “help” for the peoples of those countries in a process which would 
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culminate in self-determination.  In the minds of those receiving both sets of 
statements the imperial powers, it would appear, were giving an undertaking that the 
future of the countries of the region would be a matter for their determination and not 
that of the Allies.  It might reasonably be thought that whatever had been said in 
London at the end of 1917 in the form of the Balfour Declaration was now superseded 
by statements issued seven months later in Cairo and nearly a year later in Palestine, 
Syria and Mesopotamia. Of course in London the Cabinet was already discussing the 
establishment of colonial rule in Mesopotamia.103  Whatever the intentions of the 
British and the French there could be no doubt of the effect that their public statements 
would have on the Arab leadership and amongst the wider population.  It must have 
appeared as though a consensus was emerging amongst the great powers that self-
determination was going to be respected as a universal principle.  However this did not 
mean that the peoples of the region were to attain sovereignty and that the imperialist 
rivalry which had provoked the war would conclude to the benefit of those whose 
lands were coveted for their raw materials and potential markets. 
Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations 
The Mandate System 
From October 1918 the British extended the rule of the Occupied Enemy 
Territory Administration to the whole of Palestine. Initially the French saw the 
advance on Syria and the taking of Damascus by their erstwhile partner as a 
repudiation of the Sykes–Picot agreement.  Following the official ending of the War 
on 11th November, the British and French Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and 
Georges Clemenceau met in December 1918 to resolve these issues before the Peace 
negotiations began.  On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference Lloyd George agreed a 
compromise, for essentially domestic reasons, to give the French a “free-hand” in 
Syria and Lebanon once they had the necessary forces and matériel to successfully 
achieve their goals, thereby removing one major problem hanging over Anglo-French 
relations.104  For their part the British were acting out of self-interest, placating the 
French in order to win the latter’s acquiescence to the takeover of Palestine.105   
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The Paris Conference which began on 18th January 1919 contained echoes of 
the 1884 Berlin Conference convened to reach an agreement between the imperialist 
powers over the division of Africa to avoid competition and conflict.  In part the 
failure of that Conference was that the rivalry between the new-imperialist powers 
resulted in World War One.  The British and the French viewed the Paris Conference 
as an opportunity to give international legitimacy to their ambitions for hegemony in 
the Near East and the importance of the Conference was underlined by the presence of 
major political figures of the Entente Powers including the British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, The President 
of the USA Woodrow Wilson and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. 
The main business of the Conference resulted in a series of treaties, the first of which, 
the Treaty of Versailles, was concerned with Germany.  
 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau had agreed their approach to the Conference 
based on the Sykes-Picot agreement and specifically the allocation of control over 
Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine.106  Five months later on 28th June 1919 the Mandate 
system was established by the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
creating three sets of Mandate listed as Class A, B and C, corresponding to categories 
which the conquered countries were assigned based on the decisions by the imperial 
powers.  Category A was composed of those countries deemed most ready to become 
independent sovereign states. Article 22 of the Covenant stated that the Mandates were 
held on behalf of the League of Nations by “advanced nations” as a “sacred trust of 
civilisation” in order to give “practical effect” to the “development of such peoples” 
who “ are not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world”.  This formula was meant to differentiate between the Mandate system 
and traditional colonial rule though subsequent practices were hardly distinguishable 
from colonialism.  The countries which Britain and France particularly wished to 
obtain the Mandate for were all categorised as Class A Mandate countries which had 
“reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be 
provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance be a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone”.  Critically 
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the Article added the qualification that the “wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”.107 
 
King–Crane Commission 
Following Balfour’s visit to the USA in May 1917, President Woodrow Wilson 
was well aware of his intentions and commitment to formulate a declaration on 
Palestine favouring the creation of a homeland for the Jews.108  However at the 
Conference and before allocating which powers should be assigned which Mandate 
countries he wanted the fourteen points he had presented to Congress relating to self-
determination to be considered as well as the opinions of the peoples in the respective 
territories.109   
 
He proposed the setting up of an inter-allied Commission to hear the evidence 
of the people in Greater Syria in which he included Lebanon and Palestine. Wilson’s 
view was in line with the proposed Article 22 as well as the apparent intentions of the 
Cairo statement and the even more widely publicised Anglo-French Declaration. 
However the British or the French did not support Wilson and they, along with the 
Italian government, withdrew from the Commission.110  As a result the Commission 
was composed exclusively of nominees of the United States of America which were 
the academic Dr Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College and the wealthy 
businessman Charles Richard Crane.   Unlike any British or French politician before 
them, they sought the views of the people in the region including the Syrian Congress 
who made a submission to the Commission.111   
 
Having gathered evidence in Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and at 
Adana from 16th June to early August 1919, the King–Crane Commission, concluded 
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that there should be one state of Greater Syria, to include Lebanon and Palestine, with 
Faisal as its king under a United States Mandate with Great Britain the second 
choice.112  Having started from a position of sympathy for the Zionist project the 
evidence that they gathered led them to revise their views and they concluded by 
recommending “serious modification of the extreme Zionist position”.113  They drew a 
distinction between the concept of a “Jewish homeland” and the aspirations of the 
Zionists for a “Jewish state”.   “For a national home for the Jewish people is not 
equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a 
Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”.114  In general therefore the 
conclusions of the Commission was similar to the positions adopted in July 1919 by 
the Greater Syrian Congress.115  
 
The King–Crane Commission report was handed to the Paris Peace Conference 
in August 1919 with the recommendation that the Zionist project should be curtailed.   
The British and the French governments opposed these findings and, in the absence of 
Wilson through ill-health, the report was marginalised and not published until 1922.  
Perhaps there is little wonder at the disinclination of the two European powers to see 
its publication when the evidence from the petitions to the Commission showed a clear 
repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and a preference to have the USA as the 
Mandatory power.116  These findings were a rejection of the aspirations of the British, 
the French and the Zionist movement and, with certain qualifications, almost entirely 
in keeping with the aspirations of the Greater Syrian Congress and the representatives 
of the Arab peoples of the region. 
 
League of Nations, Balfour and the Mandate 
The Zionist Organisation had made a submission to the Peace Conference on 
3rd February 1919 but this was not the sole route it followed to gain its objective.  
Whilst deliberations were taking place in Paris, the Zionist Commission was in the 
process of establishing itself in Palestine and cementing its privileged relationship 
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with the British Government.  Chaim Weizmann was in regular contact with Winston 
Churchill the Secretary of State.117  On 3rd January 1919 in London Weizmann and 
Emir Faisal, who was under pressure from the British, signed an agreement which 
proposed the adoption of  “such measures … as will afford the fullest guarantees for 
carrying into effect the British Government’s Declaration of the 2nd of November 1917” 
and recognised the other as being the custodians of the “national aspirations” of the 
Arabs and Jews respectively. 118   
 
The Faisal-Weizmann agreement written, like the Balfour Declaration itself, in 
the form of a treaty between states, contained no recognition of the Arab Palestinians 
as having any role to play in determining the future of the area.119  Article IX of the 
agreement specified that any “matters which may arise between contracting parties 
shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration”.120  The document was an 
endorsement of Britain’s hegemonic position and the neo-colonial status of whatever 
entities were subsequently established. Faisal subsequently added a codicil, which 
Weizmann co-signed, stating that “Provided the Arabs shall obtain their independence 
as demanded … I shall concur in the above articles.  But if the slightest modification 
or departure were to be made, I shall not be bound by a single word of the present 
Agreement” .121  Faisal had in fact made a crucial concession to the British and the 
Zionists indicating that Palestine was not his priority and that there was not necessarily 
unanimity between him and other Arab leaders. 
 
In October 1918 Faisal had established an Arab government in Damascus with 
himself as monarch but his credibility was damaged by the January 1919 agreement 
with Weizmann.  In March 1920 the Syrian National Congress declared independence 
for Syria including Palestine.  On 25th April 1920 the Supreme Council of the Allies at 
San Remo confirmed the assignment of the Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia to 
the British and that for Syria and Lebanon to the French. French troops were already in 
Greater Syria having disembarked at Beirut on 8th October 1918 and set up their base 
in the west of the region.  On 14th July, the French gave Faisal an ultimatum to submit 
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which he conceded to but supporters of the Syrian Congress resisted the French who 
defeated them and entered Damascus on 24th July 1920.122  
 
The terms of all the Mandates, including the Mandate allotted to France, were 
contained in the Treaty of Sèvres finalised on 10th August 1920 but it was not until 
24th July 1922 that the League of Nations finally ratified the final document.  The 
Balfour Declaration was the political basis of the British Mandate for Palestine and 
was approved even though within the Cabinet there were dissident voices that argued 
against the formulations contained in it.123  The qualification expressed in Article 22 
that those to be governed under the Mandate system must have their wishes recognised 
as “a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory” were completely 
ignored.   
 
Pre-empting both the treaties adopted following the Paris Peace Conference 
and the decisions of the League of Nations, the British established a structure for the 
implementation of the Mandate.   In April 1920 Sir Herbert Samuel was appointed 
High Commissioner for Palestine to replace the military authority which had been in 
charge since Allenby’s entry to Jerusalem.  As I noted above, he had submitted a paper 
to Cabinet proposing that Palestine be made into a homeland for the Jewish people.124 
Samuel believed that in supporting such a move the British Empire would be 
enhancing its prestige and fulfilling “her historic part as civiliser of the backward 
countries”.125  Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, suggested that he reconsider his 
acceptance of the post whilst both Allenby and General Bols, the chief administrator 
of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration expressed deep concerns about 
Samuel because they regarded him as an inappropriate candidate.126 Arab political 
figures shared Curzon’s opinion that Samuel’s association with Zionism made him 
unsuitable but notwithstanding this opposition on 1st July he took up the post. 127  Both 
the timing and the candidate selected were an indication of the intentions of the British 
government to proceed with the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.  Whatever 
the intentions of the Covenant of the League of Nations in describing the Mandate as a 
                                                
122 Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 25. 
123 Huneidi, A Broken Trust, 19. 
124 CAB 37/123/43 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ingrams, 105 ff.  
127 CAB 24/1156  See also Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, 13.  
 140 
“sacred trust of civilisation” the British were determined to be in sole control of 
Palestine and take little heed of the views of the indigenous peoples.  
 
Arab Opposition to the Mandate  
In Palestine events did not stand still.  The Arab Palestinian population, who 
under British military occupation had no control over immigration, became concerned 
at the increased numbers of Zionist colonists and what this meant for their own 
economic and political aspirations.128  The First Arab Congress meeting in Damascus 
on 2nd July 1919 had already sounded the alarm calling for an independent Greater 
Syria, including Palestine and a special Congress was convened in Haifa later the same 
year to coordinate local committees of resistance.  A second Arab Congress meeting in 
Damascus on 8th March 1920 repudiated the Mandate proposals for the country and 
proclaimed Syrian independence.  Although the Balfour Declaration was not 
publicised in Palestine until 1920, evidence of its existence had emerged in the 
Egyptian press just a few days after its release to Lord Rothschild.129  The Damascus 
Congress gave a clear indication that the intentions of the Zionist Commission were 
well known, well understood and completely rejected.   
 
The increasing immigration from the end of the nineteenth century onwards 
had resulted in the doubling of the Jewish population between 1897 and 1914.130   
Colonial settlement projects such as the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association had 
been inaugurated in the 1880s by Baron Edmond de Rothschild.131  The number of 
immigrants increased rapidly from an estimated 35,000 in the twenty-one years from 
1882 to 1903, to 40,000 in the ten years from 1904 to 1914 and a further 40,000 in the 
five years from 1918 to 1923.132  Events like the Kishinev pogrom of 6th and 7th April 
1903 caused many Jews to leave Eastern Europe increasing the numbers of those 
seeking safety in Palestine, one of the options presented to them.   The antagonisms 
that had already emerged were exacerbated as Jewish immigrants bought land to create 
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colonies displacing Arab families who were deprived of their livelihoods.  Disputes 
arose around the purchase of land by Jewish colonies and the Jewish National Fund 
which invariably resulted in the displacement of the former Arab cultivators.133  With 
the expansion of the influence of the Zionist Organisation successive groups of Jewish 
immigrants tended to have a more explicitly colonising agenda reflected in their 
endorsement of segregationist employment policies which rendered Arab Palestinian 
peasants and farmers both landless and unemployed.134  In the context of an 
overwhelmingly agricultural society these developments had a major impact and were 
resisted by the agricultural workers and their families as land sales increased.135  
 
For the Arab Palestinian population immigration lay at the root of the 
grievances which lead to the incidents of 1920 and 1921.  Between 2nd and 4th April 
1920 violent disturbances took place which resulted in nine fatalities (5 Jews and 4 
Arabs) and over two hundred injured.  These events became the subject of 
investigation by a Court of Inquiry presided over by Major General P. C. Palin of the 
British Army in Egypt.136  Although its findings were never published they expressed 
concern about the growing presumptuousness of the newly established Zionist 
Commission during the military administration.137  Palin’s Court of Inquiry concluded 
that the population of Palestine felt “disappointment at the non-fulfilment of promises 
made to them by British propaganda; (an) inability to reconcile the Allies’ declared 
policy of self-determination with the Balfour Declaration … ; Zionist indiscretion and 
aggression … and that the Zionist Commission and the official Zionists by their 
impatience, indiscretion and attempts to force the hands of the Administration, (were) 
largely responsible for the present crisis … ”.138  Samuel however took steps to ensure 
that the findings were never published.139 
 
Whatever misgivings there were amongst military personnel or sections of the 
political leadership within Britain about implementing the Balfour Declaration were 
                                                
133 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 99-100. 
134 Ibid. 100. Khalidi draws attention to the change in the political character of the Jewish immigrants 
especially after the 1903 and 1905 pogroms in Russia. 
135 Kayyali, 179. 
136 Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest, 83. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.,  84. 
139 Ibid., 85. Citing FO 371/5121. 
 142 
superseded in April 1920 by the San Remo Conference decisions and the actions of the 
Lloyd George Government. However the fundamental contradiction within the Balfour 
Declaration continued to surface.  Samuel tried to assure the Arab community that he 
was committed to an “equality of obligation” based on “a full protection of the rights 
of the existing population” but that this was within a framework which would deliver 
“the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish race throughout the world 
in relation to Palestine”.  He acknowledged that “to install the Jews in Palestine might 
mean the expulsion of the Arabs” but he regarded such an outcome as a failure to 
implement the terms of the Balfour Declaration.140  
 
The British attitude to Arab self-determination was most graphically summed 
up by David Lloyd George’s response to a delegation of Indian Muslims on 24th 
March 1921. 
As to the Arab States, some of them are absolutely free from control.  I do not think 
however that any responsible Arab Chiefs would like to try the experiment of being 
absolutely without the support of a Great Western Power in Mesopotamia or Syria.  
They are people who have not for hundreds of years had control of these States.  They 
are not a coherent people, they are tribal …141 
 
The statement encapsulated the British imperialist perspective and the orientalist views 
of its politicians.  He made clear that any consideration of the future of the Arab states 
was a matter for the British to decide and whilst he professed strong support for the 
religious independence of the peoples of the Empire he was intransigent with regard to 
the creation of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine.  For Lloyd George Palestine fell 
completely outside any consideration of self-determination. 
 
The Mandate, finally adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on 24th 
July 1922, incorporated the wording of the Balfour Declaration committing that “the 
Mandatory (Britain) should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration 
originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, 
and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a 
National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should 
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be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country”.142  At the same time as reaffirming the terms of the Balfour Declaration, 
the Mandate left the British to determine how to implement the policy and what 
Zionist organisation to collaborate with.  Of course this had already been decided by 
the British in 1917. 
 
Conclusions 
Colonising imperialism faced increasing challenges on three fronts.  New anti-
imperialist movements were being established and were beginning to gain ground.  
The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919 and the British West Africa 
National Congress in 1920. Nationalist uprisings occurred in Egypt (1919) and Iraq 
(1920) and the Irish War for Independence took place from 1919 until 1921 whilst in 
China the May Fourth Movement grew.  On a second front the Bolshevik Revolution 
challenged imperialist hegemony rejecting the notion that self-determination was a 
licence to be gifted by the imperialists. The third element of this challenge to the 
established imperial powers was the development of the United States of America as a 
world power.  Although the USA had been economically a world power for some time, 
in the early twentieth century it expanded as a political and military force.143  Despite 
the fact that it was Britain which had financially and militarily supported the Arab 
Revolt, it was to the USA that many of those in the Near East began to look as a 
potential Mandatory power. 
 
I argue that the British-facilitated colonisation of Palestine by Zionist settlers 
following the defeat of the Ottoman forces did not constitute a complete departure 
from pre-existing imperial practices or indeed developments which had taken place 
more locally.  Debate took place surrounding the use of surrogates to undertake the 
role that settlers from Britain might have provided in the Near East.  The Zionist 
settlers, like the Indian Muslims suggested for the Basra area by Lord Kitchener, 
constituted a group that needed little or no incentivising.  Casting Jews as a returning 
people, the British could present themselves as contributing to the fulfilment of their 
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historic homecoming to Palestine rather than as imperialist expansionists.  A 
congruent biblical narrative, linking a Jewish identity articulated by political Zionism 
with a fundamentally imperialist Christian millenarianism, was invoked to legitimise 
the denial of the rights of the Arab Palestinian people.   As I argued in Chapter One 
this narrative was intertwined with the ideas promoted by secular ideologues arguing 
that res nullius applied permitting the occupation of notionally ownerless property by 
whoever asserts that claim.  “A land without people for a people without land” has its 
roots in the philosophy of the classical liberalism of John Locke.  
 
In the subsequent chapters I will analyse the relationship between the British 
and the Arab peoples of Palestine and the area of Greater Syria.  I will explore how the 
British treated the Palestinians and those who might in other contexts have been 
potential partners in the elaboration of a neo-colonial agenda.  I will also examine the 
changes taking place inside Palestinian society itself and the impact of the occupation 
of the country on its economic and social development.  The social relations of the 
overwhelmingly agriculturally oriented economy in Palestine were confronted by the 
occupiers imposition of the norms more associated with a more industrialised 
capitalism.  The advent of the new-imperialism signalled an end to the colonisation 
and colonialist policies which typified the era of capitalist imperialism and the 
emergence of the neo-colonialist phase of imperialist expansionism.  The Zionist 
project for the creation of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine constituted both a 
continuance of the policy of colonisation and a break with that practice and was the 
consequence of the contradictions inherent in the Balfour Declaration itself.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Mandate and Palestinian Politics 
Introduction 
The chapter will explore how British new-imperialism impacted on the political 
development of an Arab Palestinian society existing within the predominantly pre-
capitalist Ottoman Empire.   This society, which was shaped by the changes within the 
Empire during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was confronted by one of the 
most powerful economic and military forces in the world intent on supporting the 
establishment of Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine.  I will argue that this process 
distorted the development of the Arab Palestinian society, impinging on and 
prejudicing the growth and coalescence of social forces critical to the construction and 
development of a perspective to achieve self-determination.    
 
The chapter will demonstrate that British new-imperialism implemented 
asymmetrical economic, legal and political policies favouring Zionist colonisation and 
the development of industries owned by Zionists to the disadvantage of the Arab 
Palestinian people.  The thesis further argues that the specific nature of the 
landownership changes introduced in the nineteenth century by the Ottoman Empire 
and retained by the British facilitated the purchase of land by the settlers which led to 
the displacement of large numbers of fellahin from the land. 
 
    Inward investment from abroad to Zionist owned enterprises led to a faster 
growth of capital in the Yishuv and a more rapid expansion of the social classes 
corresponding to this process whilst the agriculturally based economy in which the 
majority of Arab Palestinians worked generally had a slower rate of growth.  This 
differential rate of economic expansion was reflected in an uneven development of 
social forces with both the capitalist and working classes expanding more swiftly in 
the Yishuv.  Conversely the de-development of those parts of the economy in which 
Arab Palestinians preponderated contributed to a slower growth of these social forces 
within the Arab Palestinian community.   This social process impacted on the 
development of political organisation and the articulation of a programme for self-
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determination based on a repudiation of British imperialism and the Mandate 
administration. 
 
I will demonstrate that the development of a Palestinian politics was not solely 
the consequence of the responses of a traditional hereditary political layer but saw new 
social forces playing a greater part in society.  Women, workers and youth became 
engaged in the political process in both formal political structures and popular  
activities.  A vibrant and growing press articulated some of the views of the day 
calling for opposition to the Balfour Declaration and demanding the right to 
nationhood.  The chapter will conclude by indicating how the traditionalist political 
associations dominated by the families of the a‘yan or notables were being replaced by 
the formation of new political parties and the adoption of more explicitly anti-
imperialist perspectives giving rise to a more explicitly anti-British and anti-
imperialist politics.  
 
The Ottoman Empire and New-Imperialism 
The process of change in the nature of imperialism discussed in Chapter One 
led to the growth of a highly competitive internationalised economic and political 
environment which significantly contributed to causing the world war that engulfed 
the principal competitors, transforming the manner in which inter-imperialist rivalry 
had been conducted from a largely territorial confrontation into one more typically 
based on economic dominance typified by control over raw materials and the 
monopolisation of national markets.  These new features of economic, social and 
political transformation began to supersede direct colonisation as hegemony was 
progressively achieved by the incorporation of subaltern economies into a world 
market. This asymmetrical relationship was then frequently encapsulated in bilateral 
treaties confirming the dominant–subaltern status.    Whilst this pattern had already 
begun to appear in countries like Argentina and Thailand, it became more prevalent 
with the ascendancy of new-imperialism.1  The Arab leaders alliance with the British 
during World War One seeking to break from the Ottoman Empire was based on just 
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such a perspective and formed the basis of the proposals by the Arab Palestinian 
leadership to the British as a means of progressing to self-determination.   
 
The Ottoman Empire which had existed from 1517 until 1917 had established 
economic, social, legal and political structures.  During the nineteenth century the 
Ottoman Empire was undergoing change but British trade with the region expanded 
considerably influencing the crops grown, the forms of landownership, the emergence 
of new social layers, the increased secularisation of society and the development of 
new political forces. The previous chapter noted how sections of the Empire were 
already being separated off and colonised. Western European capitalism, and the 
British specifically, encountered in Palestine a society with established political, 
economic and social relations.  Following World War One, the British, to achieve their 
own goals, proceeded to re-shape Palestine in ways which would disadvantage the 
indigenous population and favour the Zionist project. 
  
From at least the early nineteenth century onwards the whole region was going 
through a process of integration into the world economic market which accelerated 
with the advent of new-imperialism.2  In the second half of the nineteenth century the 
Ottoman rulers had established the sanjaks (sub-province) of Acre and Nablus, within 
the vilayet (province) of Beirut and the mutasarrifate (sub-province or district) of 
Jerusalem.  Jerusalem, perhaps as a consequence of its religious importance, came 
under the direct rule of Constantinople. The political administrative districts also had a 
degree of symmetry with the economic structure of the area linking commercial 
centres to surrounding rural areas.3  Coastal towns developed in response to economic 
expansion the outcome of increased trade and as a consequence of the Ottoman state 
expanding the infrastructure of the area.4   
 
                                                
2 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914; Hourani, A History of 
the Arab Peoples; Martin Lynn, “British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century” in Andrew Porter, ed.,  The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume III (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle 
East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
3 Robert Owen, Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, ed., Roger Owen (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), 2. 
4 Jacob Norris, Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905–1948 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 37. 
 148 
The restructuring of the Ottoman Empire in the Tanzimat period from 1838 
until 1876 brought major changes in many areas including those of finance, economics, 
education and the communications infrastructure.   The Land Law of 1858 and the 
Law of 1867 began to transform the longstanding forms of ownership turning land into 
a commodity to be bought and sold.  Increased international trading encouraged the 
move from the production of crops for consumption to their production as 
commodities for market.  The alienation of the land encouraged purchases by the 
wealthy expanding their ownership and opening it to acquisition by colonisers, 
including British investors, enthusiastic to establish “export-oriented farms”.5  Having 
a greater effect on areas within reach of the coast, which could be drawn into trading 
this pattern was not extended uniformly across all of the Ottoman Empire.  However 
in Palestine, under the British Mandate, these changes to the landownership laws had a 
particular effect on the fellahin as the Zionist colonists with relatively easier access to 
capital were more able to use them purchasing initially from large absentee-landlords 
wishing to sell. 
 
Land Ownership and Social Formation 
Whilst the bulk of the population were rurally based and engaged in agriculture 
the economic changes taking place particularly in the field of commerce led to the 
creation of employment requiring new skills and hence the growth of new social layers.  
The British occupied a land which, unlike many of those which it had previously 
colonised, was already engaged with western European capitalism.6  A developing 
public media existed and, albeit with a limited suffrage, there was a political structure 
and forms of representation.  The British were seeking to hegemonise a country which 
had experienced one imperial rule and where there was an active debate about its 
future political options.  This was a different environment from that which British 
imperialism had met in Australia for example or certain of its other colonies.  
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The population of Palestine in the early 1880s was an estimated 457,592 living 
in 672 villages, most of whom were Muslims engaged in agriculture, the larger portion, 
the fellahin or peasant, working the land.7  The large landowners and those who held 
positions which were part of the structure of the Ottoman Empire tended to live in the 
urban areas and have come to be known as the a‘yan or “notables”.8  This group of 
families held prestigious positions in society arising from posts they held, their wealth 
and the influence they were able to exercise over the rural population.9  Albert Hourani 
has described the symbiotic relationship between the a‘yan and the fellahin as a 
consequence of mutually sympathetic and antagonistic dependencies.  “The political 
influence of the notables rests on two factors: on the one hand, they must possess  
‘access’ to authority, and so be able to advise, to warn, and in general to speak for 
society or some part of it at the ruler’s court; on the other, they must have some social 
power of their own, whatever its form and origin, which is not dependent on the ruler 
and gives them a position of accepted and ‘natural’ leadership”.10   These relationships 
often came to influence the political allegiances which people held. 
 
 Like all ruling groups the Palestinian a‘yan were however not monolithic.  
Some, like the Khalidis, were religious scholars holding more or less hereditary posts 
in the Sharia courts whilst others, like the Jerusalem-based Nashashibis and Husseinis, 
were large landowners.  The changes which had taken place under the Ottomans 
impacted differently on the two groups. This landowning group were the principal 
beneficiaries of the changes brought about by the Land Laws as they “moved quickly 
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to amass agricultural land … (using) … available legal … illegal and extra-legal 
methods” to do so.11  The durability of the influence of the a‘yan as a whole can be 
seen from the frequency with which family names recurred as political leaders 
throughout the Mandate period.12  Members of the a‘yan were to play the leading 
formal role in Palestinian politics for the first decade of the Mandate period. 
 
It is important to note however that not all the owners of land in Palestine lived 
within its boundaries. The first substantial sales of lands to the Zionist colonisers were 
made by absentee landlords like the Sursuq family, based in Beirut, who bought and 
sold land, making the fellahin landless and frequently indebted.13  As a result of these 
sales peasant producers were transformed into sharecroppers, indebted tenants or 
dispossessed wage labourers, as they lost their livelihoods.  The sales were governed 
by the Tanzimat Land Laws and resulted in those working the lands being evicted, first 
by Ottoman troops, and then from 1917 onwards by British troops enforcing court 
decisions.  Opposition to the sale of land to the Zionists led to mass demonstrations in 
both 1920 and 1921 which came “shortly after the purchase in 1920 of vast amounts of 
property (50,000 acres), which had belonged to Sursuk [sic];” a transaction which led 
to the eviction of some 8,000 sharecroppers.14 Those who were removed from their 
lands and able to find employment became part of the small Arab Palestinian working 
class principally based in the docks, quarries, small-scale industries and on the 
railways.  As this process accelerated, those unable to find employment gravitated 
towards the cities and added to the ranks of the landless poor, something the British 
feared. Even those who retained a lot viable, an area of land which was meant to be 
enough to ensure self-sufficiency, were frequently obliged to abandon it in return for 
money to pay their debts.15 
 
The Tanzimat Land Laws of 1858 had codified forms of ownership to extend 
the Empire’s tax base whilst the 1867 Law had extended the heritability of land and, 
                                                
11 Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 34. 
12 See Appendix A: Porath, Emergence, 383. 
13 Those selling also included German and French owners of land.  By 1930 of the 1,200,000 dunams 
which had been sold to the settlers only 75,000 came from Palestinian smallholders. Hillel Cohen, 
Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948 (London: University of 
California Press, 2008), 31. 
14 Nathan Weinstock, Zionism: False Messiah (London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979), 115. 
15 Sarah Graham-Brown, “The Political Economy of Jabal Nalus, 1920–48”, 126. 
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with provisos, granted permission to foreigners to own land.  The land tenure system 
was somewhat complicated with at least six forms of ownership operating in Palestine: 
mulk, miri, waqf, mawat, mahlul and matruka.16  Only the mulk form of ownership 
involved the right of freehold over the land.  All others forms of ownership included 
varying degrees of conditionality which might, under certain circumstances such as 
their non-cultivation over a period of time, result in the loss of the lands. The Arab 
Palestinian community was largely based in the rural area where “the vast majority of 
agricultural land … came under the category known as miri, land in which the usufruct, 
or right of use (tasarruf), was granted by the state”.17  In fact the law “treated the 
usufructuary possession of land as a personal, hereditary, and transferable right”.18   
There was little difference between miri and outright freehold but this did not afford 
protection against distraint.   
 
In Palestine, following the introduction of the Laws, the fellahin “fearful that 
land registration was the harbinger of new taxes, or military conscription … frequently 
preferred, or even sought, the protection of an urban notable, under whose name they 
consented to have their land registered.”19  Furthermore there was no cadastral survey 
of land in Palestine that could readily provide information to the military 
administration about ownership and this subsequently made it difficult for the fellahin 
to establish their inherited right to ownership or even usufruct.20  The fellahin who 
were displaced were deprived of their livelihoods and forced to seek employment 
elsewhere or, if it was possible, to work in the countryside under new terms of daily or 
seasonal engagement.  Many went to the expanding towns on the coast seeking 
employment as workers however there they met challenges produced by the newly 
arrived colonists and the exclusionary policies pursued by the Zionist organisations 
which I will analyse later in the chapter.   
 
From a political point of view the implementation of the Laws which 
facilitated land sales, authorised by the courts and enforced by the state, subverted the 
                                                
16 Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939 (London: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1984), 11. 
17 Martin Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine 1917–1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 36. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Shafir, 34. 
20 Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 31. 
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credibility of a stance which advocated reliance on the Ottoman Empire as the best 
defender of the interests of the agriculturally based Arab Palestinian society. Since the 
turn of the century reports of protests by fellahin facing eviction from lands purchased 
by the Zionist colonisers had already appeared in the Arab media.21  There was a 
growing realisation that the advance of Zionist settlement was unlikely to be halted by 
those whose laws facilitated the purchase of land and colonisation in the first place.  
The war and the Arab Revolt posed an alternative perspective.  Amongst those who 
had been advocating an Arabist political orientation against the Ottoman Empire the 
view grew that an alliance with those Arab leaders who were preparing to link up with 
the British against Constantinople would lead to a more effective way to ensure the 
introduction of measures to prevent land sales and help them retain their lands.22   
 
  The urban-based Arab Christians in Palestine numbered around 25,000 and 
were generally not engaged in agricultural work.    Under terms established with 
successive rulers of the Ottoman Empire, France acted as a “protector” of Christians in 
“Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, while the Orthodox Christians came under Russian 
protection”.23  Benefitting from the protections afforded by the Capitulations or 
concessions “by which foreign residents were virtually outside the law” and their 
access to missionary schools, the Christians were well placed to take on roles in 
commerce working with European traders and the expanding professions.24  Christian 
merchants paid lower rates of duty than Muslim merchants and benefitting from their 
more favourable relationship with European traders often “established themselves as 
the moneylenders and bankers for Muslim artisans, landowners and peasants”.25  
Adding to this growing middle class some newspaper proprietors and editors could 
also be found amongst their ranks.  Like their Muslim counterparts, the names of 
members of prominent Christian families reoccur as leading participants in Arab 
Palestinian political life.26   
 
                                                
21 Muslih, 71-72. The earliest major dispute over land occurred in 1885 at Petah Tikva. Disturbances 
also occurred at Tiberias in 1901-02 and at ‘Affula in 1910–11.  
22 Muslih, 67. 
23 Kayyali, 12. 
24 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 274. 
25 Philip S. Khoury, Urban notables and Arab nationalism: The politics of Damascus 1860–1920 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 6. 
26 Mustafa Kabha, The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929–1939 (London: Valentine 
Mitchell, 2007), 40. 
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Having a population very similar in size to the Arab Christians, the Jewish 
community lived mainly in the four holy cities of Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safed and 
Hebron.27  Whilst many Jews were religious scholars living off alms, others were 
engaged in artisanal work providing services to their communities.28  In some fields, 
like finance, they played a role similar to other minority communities in the Ottoman 
Empire who facilitated trade and exchange at the point of encounter between majority 
communities and those outside.29  These patterns began to change with successive 
aliyah (phases of immigration) especially from the beginning of the twentieth century 
onwards as Jews who arrived from Eastern Europe brought different skills and 
experiences with them. 
 
In an agricultural society like Palestine the nature of the ownership of the land 
was a central factor influencing not only the economic development of the country but 
also its social and political formation.   
Pre-War Politics 
As I indicated above, those a‘yan who were large landowners tended, before 
the War, to adopt a pro-Ottoman perspective accepting the rule of Constantinople 
believing that political changes should take place within the parameters of the Empire.  
The Porte provided the framework for their world and their principal ambition was to 
enjoy greater autonomy within the Empire.  Although they wished to retain the status 
quo, this viewpoint came under greater challenge as Arab resentment grew towards the 
Turkification and the centralisation promoted by the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP) in 1908.30 
 
Through the second half of the nineteenth century coastal towns and cities 
expanded and become more influential and the landowning families who had played a 
                                                
27 Kayyali, 11. Quoting Arthur Ruppin. 
28 Ibid. 11 See also Ann Mosely Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a 
Nationalist Movement (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).  For a more extensive comment on the 
nature of the artisan groups see Nathan Weinstock’s “Introduction” in Abram Leon, The Jewish 
Question: A Marxist Interpretation (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 43.   
29 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 236. 
30 Antonius analyzing the politics of the CUP identifies what he considers as a central contradiction in 
their politics being the adoption of a nationalist Pan-Turanian position promoting the Turkish element 
of their programme bringing them into inevitable conflict with an Ottomanist perspective. Likewise, he 
sees their centralizing tendency, borrowed from the French Revolution, as counter to the needs of the 
Empire.   Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 106-107.  
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leading role within society began to be challenged by a nascent merchant bourgeoisie.  
The latter benefitted from the increased integration of the economy into trade 
primarily with Britain but also with other countries in Western Europe.31  The 
activities generated by these developments produced a middle class of technicians and 
professionals not formed by the traditional relationships and patronage that had shaped 
rural society.32  Property developers like Uthman al-Nashashibi and Raghib al–
Nashashibi, who became the Jerusalem District Engineer in 1914, were representative 
of these emerging groups.33  ‘Izzat Darwaza who was to become the secretary of the 
First Palestinian Congress in 1919 came from a family of merchants in Nablus and had 
worked as an administrator in the Department of Postal and Telegraphic Services.34      
 
The CUP reinstated the Constitution in 1908 and adopted the Electoral Law 
which had eighty-three clauses detailing the nature of the suffrage, the conduct of 
elections, eligibility to stand for positions and the designation of electoral districts. 
Under this law only males over the age of 25 who paid some taxes were eligible to 
vote as “primary voters” who then, on the basis of one man for every 500 voters, 
elected the “secondary voters” who in turn would elect the deputies on the basis of one 
for every 50,000 male residents of a constituency.35  Only males above the age of 
thirty with “ability in Turkish and enjoying civil rights could be elected deputy, unless 
he had accepted citizenship or employment in the service of a foreign government, 
was bankrupt or a domestic servant, or was stigmatized by ‘notoriety for ill deeds’”. 36  
Women and less well-off members of society were excluded from any electoral 
involvement.  Unsurprisingly political representation to the Ottoman political bodies 
was exclusively in the hands of the a‘yan as it had been in the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, by the standards of the day, the concept of elected representatives was 
present within Palestinian society. 
 
                                                
31 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People (New York: The Free 
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33 Porath, Emergence,14. 
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Of course the voting process favoured the election of members of the a‘yan 
and excluded the fellahin, the newer middle class and women. Those who came to 
prominence were often from a‘yan families already playing prominent roles in the 
military, legal or administrative fields within the Empire.37  Ruhi al Khalidi, for 
example, who was elected to the Ottoman Parliament in 1908 was the nephew of 
Yusuf Diya’ al Khalidi who had been a member during a previous period of 
parliamentary rule.  In 1911, Ruhi al-Khalidi and Sa‘id al Husseini, both 
representatives from Jerusalem spoke in the Ottoman Parliament about Zionism and 
the threat it posed.38  They were joined in this intervention by Shukri al-‘Asali from 
Damascus who as a local official had tried to block land sales in Nazareth.  Despite 
their critiques of Zionism these Parliamentarians were loyal towards the Ottoman 
Empire and the Arabism that they expressed was a form of cultural nationalism rather 
than a separatist aspiration.39  
 
Expressions of anti-Zionist opinions were not restricted to the parliamentary 
arena.  Najib Nassar publishing al-Karmil in 1910 simultaneously worked to establish 
an organisation in Haifa to encourage a boycott of the buying and selling of land to the 
Zionist colonisers.  The “Patriotic Ottoman Party” was set up in Jaffa in the same year 
and in 1913 an attempt was made to convene a conference in opposition to Zionism in 
Nablus.40  This growing antagonism to Zionism pre-dated the Balfour Declaration and 
these views were reflected in opinions expressed by the newspapers that began to be 
published around the same time.41   
 
In the post-war environment all existing political, economic and social 
formations were faced with a series of problems.  The a’yan whose privileges rested 
on their capacity to act as intermediaries between the Ottoman rulers and the peoples 
of the area of Greater Syria were, following the war, deprived of their patron and to 
                                                
37 Muslih notes the tendency of the Sultan and the grand vizier to favour certain families, like the al-
Khalidi family, when promoting people to military, legal and political, posts.  He lists a number of 
members of families from Nablus and Jenin who were appointed because of the perceived loyalty of 
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example. Patronage continued to be a feature of Palestinian society into the twentieth century. 
38 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 76.   
39 Ibid. 85. 
40 Porath, Emergence, 29.  Quoting Filastin 12.7.13, 2.8.13. 
41 Muslih, 79.  
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maintain their traditional role they would need to convince the British of their 
indispensability.  The political bodies through which they had made representation to 
those who ruled them in Constantinople no longer existed.  The economic 
environment to which they had been used had already begun to change because of the 
laws introduced by the Ottomans turning land into a commodity for sale and purchase 
on the open market.  The arrival of a colonising power, applying those laws and 
authorising their utilisation by the Zionist settlers resulted in sections of the a‘yan, 
mainly those outside Palestine, selling land to profit from the increases in prices.  
Throughout the 1920s however they were faced by a further problem and that was the 
arrival of Zionist colonisers able to access capital on a larger scale than themselves.  
 
These accumulating challenges emerged in the context of the imperial 
settlement which the British and the French were intent on imposing.  The 
implementation of the Sykes–Picot agreement, mentioned in Chapter Two, imposed on 
the Arab Palestinian society choices about the direction of political travel they should 
pursue.  Following its own agenda the British were to ignore the promises contained in 
the Hussein–McMahon correspondence which Arab leaders believed expressed an 
undertaking to support the right of self-determination for Arab lands.   
 
The War, the Arab Revolt and Palestinian Nationalism. 
 Even though, as I have noted above, Palestinian and other Arab voices were 
heard in the Ottoman Parliament, discontent amongst the Arab provinces of the 
Empire at the path followed by the CUP between 1908 and 1912 began to spread 
amongst numerous groups in Greater Syria.  Amongst the Arab population this 
political shift was reflected in the opinions expressed in the media and through new 
political and cultural bodies such as al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Club) 
established in Constantinople in 1909 and Hizb al-Lamarkaziya al-Idariya al-
‘Uthmani (The Ottoman Decentralisation Party) founded in Cairo in 1912.42  Whilst 
some of the prominent families remained pro-Ottoman, others developed a Pan-
Islamist outlook and yet others gravitated towards a Pan-Arabist opinion.  However 
the Anglo-French imposition of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement virtually 
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forced a shift towards Arab nationalism when Greater Syria was split into two distinct 
French and British zones.43   
 
Amongst sections of the Arab Palestinian a‘yan who held positions under 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II the tendency had been to emphasise the unity of the Empire 
and its status as the Caliphate.44  This perspective, generally described as Pan-Islamist, 
sought decentralisation and greater autonomy within the administrative structures and 
its influence was to some extent reflected during the war by the absence of any revolt 
against the Ottoman authorities.45  In reality the picture was perhaps more nuanced of 
course as “active recruiting was carried out in Palestine for the Sharifian army”.46  
However over time the repressive regime imposed by the Porte coupled with the 
corrosive privations experienced by the mass of the population during the war 
progressively undermined pro-Ottoman sympathies.47  
 
 Following the defeat of the Ottoman forces in Palestine in 1917 a pro-Ottoman 
position became less sustainable and the a‘yan turned to the British to preserve the 
status they had enjoyed.  The a‘yan political leaders at first looked relatively 
benevolently on the occupiers, seeking as little disruption to their way of life as 
possible but then increasingly calling on the Mandate authorities to halt the sale of 
land and impose limits to Jewish immigration.  The Cabinet in Britain however was 
made aware that of the complexities of the situation.  In a report to the War Cabinet in 
January 1918, Sir Mark Sykes complained that despite the many assets that the British 
had in respect of their credibility in Palestine for their defeat of the Ottoman forces, “a 
whole crowd of weeds are growing around us”.  He listed six concerns of which he 
placed “Arab unrest in regard to Zionism” at the top, followed by “French jealousy in 
regard to our position in Palestine … friction among the Arabs … Franco-Italian 
jealousy … (and) … Zionist … suspicion and chauvinism”.  He argued there was an 
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urgent need for the centralisation of British administration in the area to ensure a 
coherent response to the challenges.48 
 
The evidence given from a variety of Arab sources in Greater Syria to the King 
Crane Commission in 1919, mentioned in the previous chapter, reflected an awareness 
that the old Ottoman dispensations were no longer operative.  The Commission’s 
findings echoed the predominant Arab hope that a Mandatory power be installed 
which was favourable towards self-determination and the report of Sir Mark Sykes 
quoted above made plain the range of problems confronting the British.  Although the 
United States of America was named as the preferred option, there remained the view 
that the British, having endorsed the Arab Revolt, would look favourably on their 
hopes.49   
 
Generational Shifts and the Development of Arab Palestinian Politics 
After World War One new Arab political organisations appeared shaped by a 
younger generation whose experiences differed from their predecessors.  The older 
generation had been used to the customs and practices of the Ottoman rulers but the 
occupation of Palestine severed that link.  Perhaps understandably the older generation 
attempted to maintain the existing state of affairs by attempting to replicate those 
relationships with the British.  The younger generation, not having had that association 
with the Ottomans or having benefited from such relationships, did not have these 
experiences to inform their attitudes towards the new rulers.50  This younger group was 
composed of people born at the end of the nineteenth century or in the early years of 
the twentieth.   To a degree this generational break was also linked to the emergence of 
new social layers mentioned above.  Typical of those who were, in the coming years, 
to play a prominent part in the initiation of a Palestinian response to the British was 
Yusuf al-‘Isa, the editor of the newspaper Filastin, who like the aforementioned ‘Izzat 
Darwaza, typified the newly emergent urban middle class.51  Darwaza was amongst a 
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group who met and discussed politics in Damascus alongside another young 
Jerusalemite, Haj Amin Husseini, and Aref al-Aref, the young editor of Suriyya al-
Janubiyya, and formed al-Jam‘iyya al-‘Arabiyya al-Filastiniyya (the Palestinian Arab 
Society) on 31st May 1920.52 
 
Whilst within the political groupings there was of course no absolute division 
on the basis of age it was nevertheless a recurring phenomenon that a younger 
generation came to the fore to take the lead in opposition to the Mandate.  The attitude 
adopted by those groups dominated by the older generations, like the Muslim 
Christian Association (MCA), formally established in February 1919, was less 
confrontational than bodies formed and led by those who were younger like al-Nadi 
al-‘Arabi (the Arab Club) and al-Muntada al-Adabi.  British officials recognising 
these differences, looked upon the MCA more favourably and were even thought to 
have facilitated its establishment.53  However although these age differences were 
evident they did not produce a complete break of those involved with their respective 
family allegiances.54  
  
The Damascus Protocol and the First Palestinian Congress 
The emergence of these younger generations was foreshadowed by earlier 
events.  New political forces often including of members of a younger generation 
began to emerge oriented towards a Pan-Arabist future for the region viewing 
Palestine as “Southern Syria”.  This Greater Syrian political project was developed 
clandestinely by members of groups like al-Fatat and al-‘Ahd who proposed an 
alliance between the Arab peoples seeking self-determination.55  Having originally 
approached Emir Faisal in January 1915 they formally presented to him on 23rd May 
in Damascus their proposal with the request that it be presented to his father Sharif 
Husain in Mecca for his approval.  Faisal, now a member of al-Fatat, returned to 
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Mecca on 20th June 1915 and with the support of his brother, Abdullah, persuaded 
Husain to endorse the document.56   
 
The Damascus Protocol, as the document is often referred to, has been called 
the “foundation document and the lodestar of the Arab Revolt”.57  The Arab leadership 
who were to enter into discussions with the British about an alliance against the 
Ottoman Empire defined their territorial expectations in a very precise manner.  
The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying 
within the following frontiers: 
North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37º N. and thence along the line Birejik-
Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn ‘Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier; 
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; 
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be 
maintained); 
West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin. 
The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to the Capitulations. 
The conclusion of a definitive alliance between Great Britain and the future 
independent Arab state. 
The grant of economic preference to Great Britain.58   
 
Following Faisal’s return to Mecca Sharif Husain’s first note to Sir Henry McMahon 
sent on 14th July 1915 used exactly the Protocol formulations to define the 
geographical boundaries adding the proposition that “Great Britain will agree to the 
proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam”.59  The letter reiterated the proposal to 
give the British preferential economic treatment and proposed the abolition of all 
capitulations in the Arab countries and the “summoning of an international congress to 
decree their abolition”.60  This was a proposition which was entirely congruent with 
the British new-imperialist perspective. The importance of what was happening in 
Syria and Palestine was reflected in a meeting with the War Cabinet on 16th December 
1915 where Sir Mark Sykes expressed the view that, “With regard to the Arab 
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question, the fire, the spiritual fire, lies in Arabia proper, the intellectual and the 
organising power lie in Syria and Palestine, centred particularly at Beirut”.61      
 
The formula of the Protocol was partially echoed in the positions adopted by 
the First Palestinian Congress held in Jerusalem from 27th January until 10th February 
1919.62  The Congress, presided over by ‘Aref Pasha al-Dajani, president of the 
Jerusalem branch of the Muslim Christian Association discussed and agreed a number 
of proposals including the sending of a delegation to take part in the Paris Peace 
Conference.63  They agreed to support the view that “this district of ours, meaning 
Palestine, remain undetached from the independent Arab Syrian Government that is 
bound by Arab unity, and free from all foreign influence or protection”.64  Expressing 
its desire for an Arab Palestinian State, its opposition to Zionism and its rejection of 
France as a mandatory authority, the Congress viewed Palestine as part of “Arab Syria” 
and insisted on the unity of Palestine and Syria calling upon “its friend Great Britain in 
case of need for improvement and development of the country provided that this will 
not affect its independence and Arab Unity in any way and will keep good relations 
with the Allied Powers”.65  This positive attitude towards the British was of course a 
product of the alliance that had been struck in the course of World War One against 
the Ottoman Empire.  It was believed that what they were seeking was in fact the 
application of the terms contained in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence.  
 
Adopting an explicitly anti-Zionist position the Congress nevertheless 
emphasised the difference between its opposition to Zionist immigrants and the Jews 
“who have been Arabized, who have been living in our province since before the war; 
they are as we are, and their loyalties are our own”.  There were some sections of the 
Sephardic Jews resident in Palestine who, in April 1920, responded to an appeal by the 
Muslim Christian Association to hold a meeting in a synagogue expressing support for 
these views.66  In general however the focus of the opposition to the British actions 
and policies centred on the issues of the land sales and Jewish immigration.  
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The question of the relationship between Palestine and Syria was not entirely 
resolved however and, as a consequence, delegations to Paris and to Faisal in 
Damascus were prepared reflecting the two wings of the Congress opinion.67  Those 
who put forward the proposal for Palestinian independence did so on the basis of 
securing an alliance with the British rather than breaking with it. The Anglo-French 
coalition was beginning to exert pressure on the united position of the Congress.68  The 
British prevented the delegation to Paris leaving or from publishing their views, a fate 
similar to that which befell the attempts by Egyptian nationalists seeking 
representation at the Peace talks.69  In Egypt, faced with pro-independence protests, the 
British had been forced to stop the demobilisation of the army concerned that there 
might be further demonstrations against them.70   
 
It was the call for a united Greater Syria that prompted the British to block the 
publication of the Congress decisions and ban the delegation leaving for the Paris 
Peace talks.71  Although some smaller nations from Europe were present at the 
Conference, alongside a number of representatives from Latin America, the 
Palestinians were not given a seat.72  Leaders of the Zionist movement were allowed to 
address the Conference but it was only through Emir Faisal speaking on the 6th 
February 1919 that the Arab Palestinian demands for self-determination were 
presented.73    Faisal’s statement emphasised that the Palestinian claims were based on 
President Woodrow Wilson’s declaration in favour of the right of nations to self-
determination.74  Whatever the thoughts of those who attended the Conference the 
major decisions were ultimately however made by the “Big Three”: Lloyd-George, 
Clemenceau and Wilson.75 
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Imperialism Challenged 
Both during and after the war the British Empire came under attack through 
anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggles as movements in a number of countries 
disputed Britain’s right to rule over them.  The war had weakened the capacities of all 
the imperial powers to maintain their control over vast colonial territories.76  This 
heralded a further rupture with the imperialism of the capitalist era revealing the 
limitations of colonisation as the staple hegemonising practice.77  The sharpest of these 
struggles was undoubtedly in Ireland but elsewhere, in Egypt, Iraq and India, British 
hegemony was under question as mass nationalist movements were formed some of 
which took on the form of armed confrontation.  
 
In the Near East the response of the British, as it had been during the war, was 
to seek to create alliances which would benefit the achievement of its longer term 
goals.  At the beginning of January 1919, the British persuaded Emir Faisal to enter 
into an agreement with Cham Weizmann, in that hope that the Emir would then 
encourage the Arab Palestinians to endorse the Balfour Declaration.78  The accord 
dated 3rd January 1919 expressed support for the proposal that Faisal and Weizmann 
would draw up boundaries “between the Arab State and Palestine” and that all 
“necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews 
into Palestine on a large scale”.79   Britain was endorsed as the sole arbiter should any 
disagreements arise regarding the implementation of the agreement.80  Although little 
or nothing came of this, it did of course reveal to the British the extent to which Faisal 
was committed to pursuing the objectives of the Damascus Protocol and what his 
personal priorities were.81  According to a report to the British Cabinet dated 12th June 
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1919, Emir Faisal had from the preceding month “begun the work of breaking down 
the dislike of the Arabs to the policy of the Zionist Jews” and had informed an Arab 
Delegation in Damascus that “he did not consider the aims of the Arabs to be 
incompatible with those of the Zionists”.82  Whatever the estimation of Faisal’s stance 
on the British position and the Zionists, General Clayton, the military commander in 
Jerusalem, was sufficiently cautious about the response of the people in the area he 
controlled, to ban the distribution of a Muslim Christian Society circular affirming that 
Palestine was part of Syria and opposing the proposal for a “national home for the 
Jews”.83 
 
On 2nd July 1919 the General Syrian Congress opposed Faisal’s position 
rejecting the “claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth 
in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine” and, echoing the First 
Palestinian Congress mentioned above, asserted that: “We desire that there should be 
no dismemberment of Syria and no separation of Palestine … from the mother 
country”.84  Whilst both placed their trust in the British, Faisal and the notables who 
led the Muslim Christian Association were at odds with each other about the direction 
of travel expressed in the agreement with Weizmann.  At root this disagreement was a 
reflection of the ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration and the policies of the British.  
It is little wonder that a degree of confusion reigned when, in November 1919, the 
British Cabinet itself was discussing the release of a statement repudiating any notion 
that the creation of a national home for the Jews would result in “the government of a 
majority by a minority”.85    
 
The British however faced other challenges especially in Egypt where 
widespread revolt, including orchestrated strikes, broke out.86  The Home Secretary 
circulated monthly and sometimes weekly reports to the Cabinet on the “Progress of 
Revolutionary Movements” assessing political developments within the Empire and 
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beyond. Cabinet papers reveal that the British were even more worried about the 
trajectory of any anti-colonialist movements since the 1917 Russian Revolution.87 
Although there was no substantial evidence of widespread Bolshevik influence the 
support of the Russian revolutionaries for the right to self-determination and 
disclosure of secret pacts, including the Sykes-Picot agreement, caused anxiety in the 
Cabinet.88  These concerns contributed to the decision by the British to invade Russia 
in a bid to overthrow the Bolshevik government.  Additionally of course the British 
had still not resolved, to their satisfaction, the issue of the future of Ireland and there 
was considerable discontent inside Britain itself.89   
 
The British, having excluded any direct representation to the negotiations by 
the delegation nominated by the First Palestinian Congress, insisted on the 
incorporation of the terms of the Balfour Declaration in the Peace Conference 
conclusions.  Furthermore the Declaration terms were incorporated in the Mandate 
system, which was confirmed at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, and Article 
95 of the Treaty of Sèvres in August that year determined its legal framework.90  As a 
result of these processes the Balfour Declaration had been endorsed by the major 
international powers and Palestine was separated from the rest of the areas of the Arab 
Revolt as defined by Emir Faisal and clearly stated in the Damascus Protocol. 
 
The refusal by the British or the French to consider the General Syrian 
Congress formulation, let alone accept the recommendations of the King-Crane 
Commission of 1919, was the prelude to the French invasion and overthrow of the 
newly established kingdom of Syria in July 1920.  The attack was carried out with the 
full support of the British who took steps to dissuade “the inhabitants of Transjordania” 
from giving any backing to those attempting to defeat the French.91  The unified 
movement for Greater Syria faced a fundamental dilemma as a result of the British and 
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French occupation and division of the two zones.  The choice lay between continuing 
to struggle against the British and the French for a united Greater Syria or accepting 
the division of the region and thereafter fighting for self-determination in these areas 
separately.  Two of the most powerful nations in the world with the acquiescence of a 
third had resolved on a course of action and even though the Administration of the 
USA, through its support for the King–Crane Commission, held a different view it was 
either in no position to assert that alternative or chose not to.92 
 
The White House position on negotiations at the Peace Conference was set out 
in the 26th November 1919 confidential “Memorandum on the Policy of the United 
States relative to the Treaty with Turkey”.  Directly addressing the issue of the Sykes-
Picot agreements, it asserted that “No Power except the United States can prevent the 
carrying into effect of those notorious ‘secret’ agreements, which would lead certainly 
to war and probably to another world-war”.93   The tenor of the memorandum had 
much in common with the findings of the King–Crane Commission recommendations 
although the latter were not made public until 1922.  For their part the official British 
position stated that their intention was to “set up the framework of a Palestinian State, 
of which all the inhabitants of the country would be citizens, with equal rights, 
irrespective of nationality or creed”.94  They further asserted that there would be 
proportional representation of the “Zionist Jews and the Arabs” who following 
training “should be able, at the earliest possible moment, to govern themselves”.95 
 
Following the War the British, in concert with their allies, received their 
backing to assert their political and military control over Palestine.  The position taken 
by the British and the actions of the French left the Arab Palestinian people with no 
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other choice than to seek to establish the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination within the boundaries established under the Mandate.   
1920 The Year of Catastrophe 
The proposed separation of Palestine and Syria led to protests across the land 
and to “several major clashes between Arab tribes and the British garrisons along the 
Beisan–Samakh frontier with Syria” which resulted in “heavy casualties on both 
sides”.96  There had already been mass demonstrations.  On 27th February 1920, 1,500 
Arabs demonstrated in Jerusalem, a further 2,000 in Jaffa and around 250 in Haifa 
against British policies.97  On 4th April, following the Nebi Musa Pilgrimage violence 
broke out resulting in the deaths of 5 Jews and 4 Arabs.  On 24th April the Jam’iyyat 
Fata Filastin (the Palestinian Youth Society) “organised a military attack against a 
British unit in Samakh by over 2,000 armed Bedouins from the Hawran and Beisan 
Valley”.98  
 
The inquiry into these events under Major General P.C. Palin, which took 
place in Cairo, concluded that, “the causes of the alienation and exasperation of the 
feelings of the population of Palestine … (included an) … inability to reconcile the 
Allies’ declared policy of self-determination with the Balfour Declaration”.99  The 
report contained Palin’s assessment of the general situation in which he made clear 
that in an operational sense “The Zionists’ system of intelligence evidently knew a 
great deal more about the inner workings of the Administration than the corresponding 
department of the Administration did about the Zionists”.100  Palin’s overall judgement 
was that the Zionists “adopted the attitude of ‘We want the Jewish State and we won’t 
wait’, and they did not hesitate to avail themselves of every means open to them in this 
country and abroad; to force the hand of an Administration bound to respect the 
‘Status Quo’ and to commit it, and thereby future Administrations to a policy not 
contemplated in the Balfour Declaration”.101  The report’s conclusions focussed on the 
events stating that although there were a number of operational errors in the handling 
of the demonstration the sense of duplicity felt by the Palestinian population coupled 
                                                
96 Kayyali, 84. 
97 Porath, Emergence, 96. 
98 Muslih, 150. 
99 FO 371/5121 
100 FO 371/5121, 31. 
101 Ibid. 
 168 
with a feeling that the British were predisposed to favour the Zionists was 
unjustified.102  The judgement on the 4 days of rioting around the Nebi Musa 
pilgrimage by the Palin Commission, which was not released until many decades later, 
expressed the view that “the Zionist Commission and the official Zionists by their 
impatience, indiscretion and attempts to force the hands of the Administration, are 
largely responsible for the present crisis”.103    
 
In Syria tensions between Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi groups surrounding 
Faisal led to irreconcilable splits nullifying the prospect of a Pan-Arabist solution and 
hastening the adoption of distinct nationalist perspectives.  Faisal intervened to stop 
the publication of articles on the role of Zionism in the Damascene press and prompted 
the formation of the Syrian National Party, composed of leading notables, to further 
the aim of establishing Syria as a separate entity with him as constitutional monarch.104 
Pressure built to dismiss Palestinians, and indeed Iraqis, from his government as 
members of the Syrian National Party, having felt marginalised by the “foreigners”, 
sought to carve out their own niche in the administration.105   
 
Faisal, under threat from the French, capitulated and abandoned the Syrian 
Congress programme.  The French swiftly intervened and suppressed any opposition 
forcing Faisal to leave Damascus on 27th July 1920 seeking refuge in Haifa where he 
was greeted by the newly arrived British High Commissioner.106  The British were 
complicit in allowing the French to occupy Syria and opposed any attempt by Arab 
forces to resist.  In so doing they isolated the Palestinian national struggle and adopted 
an interpretation of the McMahon–Hussein correspondence which contradicted the 
understanding held by Arab leaders.   The goals of the Arab Revolt embodied in the 
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Damascus Protocol which summarised their hopes were ignored.  This represented the 
implementation of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, discussed in Chapter Two, as 
interpreted by the British and the French.   
 
The whole region was far from stable as opposition to British rule in Iraq 
erupted into armed struggle resulting in thousands of Iraqi and British deaths and 
injuries.107  Faced by an uprising which had inflicted significant defeats on the British 
and removed their control of the majority of the territory of Iraq, Churchill convened a 
conference in March 1921 in Cairo to assess the consequences and determine the 
response of the government.108 
 
In a very short space of time the Palestinians had experienced a rejection of the 
demands expressed by the 1920 demonstration and repeated in 1921 and had 
witnessed the military defeat of nationalist movements in neighbouring areas by the 
French and then the British. In both cases there had been an armed uprising against far 
superior military forces which ended in victory for the imperialist power.  According 
to George Antonius, “the year 1920 has an evil name in Arab annals: it is referred to as 
the Year of Catastrophe (‘Am al-Nakba)”.  So widespread was the anger at what was 
perceived of as a betrayal that “There came a time when practically the whole of the 
Arab Rectangle was seething with discontent expressing itself in acts of violence”.109   
Whilst the expression of Palestinian opposition to British policies did not, at this 
moment, take the form of a national armed struggle as it had in Iraq and to a certain 
extent in Egypt, it did lead to mass popular expressions of opposition to their policies 
and especially the increased immigration of Zionist settlers into the country.   
 
The arrival of Sir Herbert Samuel as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, 
taking over from the military in July 1920, did not convince those opposed to the 
Zionist movement, that Whitehall intended to treat the Arab inhabitants equitably.  
Samuel had argued in a memorandum to the British Cabinet in January 1915 that, 
“(w)idespread and deep-rooted in the Protestant world is a sympathy with the idea of 
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restoring the Hebrew people to the land which was to be their inheritance, an intense 
interest in the fulfilment of the prophesies which have foretold it”.110  His appointment 
had been the subject of debate in the House of Commons the day before he was due to 
leave to take up his new post.  In Palestine itself, according to one account, his 
appointment “was greeted with enthusiasm and unrealistic, almost messianic 
expectations by the Jews and corresponding dismay by the Arabs of Palestine”.111  
 
It was perhaps in response to these demonstrations that Samuel moved to set 
up an Advisory Council.112  The British sought to demonstrate their impartiality by the 
establishment of an institution composed of Arab Palestinian and Jewish members. 
The Advisory Council proposed by Sir Herbert Samuel in July 1920 was to be 
comprised of ten members consisting of four Muslims, three Christians and three Jews 
members all appointed by the High Commissioner.  It was severely criticised even by 
British political figures like Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, on the 
basis of its unrepresentative character.113  They continuously proposed the creation of 
administrative structures, which whilst containing Muslims, Christians and Jews were 
constructed in such a way that complete unanimity was required in order to effect any 
proposal.   The Arab Palestinians or the Jewish representatives or the High 
Commissioner could veto any proposal.  Effectively this blocked majority rule by the 
indigenous people and handed disproportionate power to the Zionists.  
 
The Third Palestinian Congress – consolidating the resistance. 
It was against this backdrop of mounting expressions of popular anger that, 
following the banning of the Second Congress, the Third Palestinian Congress took 
place in Haifa from 13th to 19th December 1920.  This exclusively Palestinian 
gathering represented a more concerted effort to coordinate the process of challenging 
British policies. Representatives gathering from Haifa, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Nablus 
and a number of other towns included members of the Muslim-Christian Association, 
the Association of Christian Youth, the Association of Muslim Youth alongside 
members of al-Nadi al-‘Arabi (Arab Club) and al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary 
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Association). Local organisations or prominent local figures had endorsed the 
credentials of those attending. The Congress established the Palestinian Arab 
Executive Committee as the leadership of the movement and elected Musa Kazem al-
Husseini as President with ‘Aref Pasha al-Dajani as his Deputy.114  This represented a 
real attempt to formalise the coordination of an effective national leadership.    
  
Three items were prominent on the agenda of the meeting: “a) the 
establishment of a national government (hukuma wataniyya); b) the rejection of the 
idea of a Jewish National Home; c) the organisation of the Palestinian Arab nationalist 
movement”.  The Congress called for the creation of an elected body “whose members 
would be chosen from the Arabic-speaking people who have been inhabiting Palestine 
until the outbreak of the War”.115  This model, based on the form of mandate operating 
in Transjordan and Mesopotamia, accepted British overall control.  The idea of a 
Greater Syria was removed from their platform although unity between Palestine and 
Syria re-emerging at a later date was not ruled out.  The Congress marked a decisive 
shift towards the establishment of nationalist perspectives.  The High Commissioner 
moved to dismiss its significance on the grounds that it was not a truly representative 
gathering.  His attitude was rejected by a wide variety of leading people, including the 
representatives of various Muslim Christian Associations, village leaders, Muslim 
scholars and leaders of a number of professions all of whom endorsed the authority of 
the Congress.116  In composition the Congress continued to reflect the dominance of 
the a‘yan families and the principal officers elected to the Executive Committee, 
mentioned above and the Secretary, Jamal al-Husseini, were also of the same 
background.  
 
Following the Third Congress the Arab Executive agreed to send a deputation 
to meet with Churchill in Cairo in March 1921.117  They held a further meeting with 
the Colonial Secretary in Jerusalem on 28th March though as Churchill was at pains to 
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point out it was a courtesy meeting rather than an official one.118  Presenting the 
positions of the Congress to Churchill, Musa Kazem drew the distinction between 
Britain occupying a country and owning it and further argued that whilst the Arab 
Palestinians constituted a nation and a “power”, the Zionists were neither.119  The 
Balfour Declaration he said, was “a contact between England and a collection of 
history, imagination and ideals existing only in the brains of Zionists who are a 
company, a commission but not a nation”.120  Churchill’s reply was direct re-affirming 
the Balfour Declaration both as a matter of British policy and his personal wish.  The 
British government, he said, was committed to the “establishment of a National Home 
for Jews in Palestine, and that inevitably involves the immigration of Jews into the 
country”.121  Furthermore he asserted the British had a right to determine the future of 
the country because of the numbers of British troops killed fighting the Turkish army 
but the completion of the task of establishing the national home for the Jews, would 
take some time.  “The present form of government will continue for many years, and 
step by step we shall develop representative institutions leading up to full self-
government.  All of us here to-day will have passed away from the earth and also our 
children and our children’s children before it is fully achieved”.122    
 
The British Government fully understood the positions of the Congress as the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, had met with a deputation of 
Palestinians in Cairo on 28th March 1921 and they had spelt out the positions that had 
been adopted.123  The position of the Deputation is recorded in the Cabinet papers of 
the Cairo Conference.  Having expounded their arguments they asked: 
For all the above reasons, we ask in the name of justice and right that— 
First: The principle of a National Home for the Jews be abolished. 
Second: A. National Government be created, which shall be responsible to a 
Parliament elected by the Palestinian people who existed in Palestine 
before the war. 
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Third: A stop be put to Jewish immigration until such a time as a National 
Government is formed. 
Fourth: Laws and regulations before the war be still carried out and all others 
framed after the British occupation be annulled, and no new laws be created 
until a National Government comes into being. 
Fifth: Palestine should not be separated from her sister States.124 
 
Their views had been unequivocally presented to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies who had in turn presented the report containing their demands to the Cabinet.  
They were easily accessible to the British and if there were any doubt the response of 
the first Palestinian Delegation to London in July 1921 should have clarified that.  The 
Delegation met with Churchill on 12th August and were encouraged to meet with 
Chaim Weizmann whilst there. Although Musa Kazem al-Husseini made clear that 
they had come to speak with the British Government and that they did not recognise 
Weizmann as having any locus in those meetings, after much persuasion they met him 
on 29th November, however nothing of significance came from the meetings.125 
 
The scale of the mobilisations in 1920 and 1921 demonstrated the depth of the 
opposition to the Mandate and the British proposal for the creation of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. The Congress stance was a reflection of and a stimulant to 
the development of widespread popular opposition against the growing process of 
colonisation.  Dispossessed fellahin and those fearing the loss of their livelihoods in 
the countryside and in the towns expressed their opposition to the policies they felt 
threatened by.  The British response was to the actions of 1921 was to establish 
another commission, the Haycraft Commission, to investigate.   
 
The Haycraft Report  
Less than six months after the Third Palestinian Congress the opposition to the 
British policies became evident with an outbreak of attacks on settler colonies.  In 
proportion to the size of the population these were on a large-scale.  The outbursts 
were triggered by a clash on 1st May between two socialist demonstrations, one 
authorised Zionist and an unauthorised one.  The fighting spread into nearby 
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neighbourhoods and, over the next five days, resulted in a large numbers of casualties.   
Following this new wave of popular mobilisations and fighting the British established 
a Commission under Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, which produced 
a report on the “Disturbances in May 1921”.  Of those killed 47 were Jews and 48 
Arab Palestinians whilst those injured were 146 and 73 respectively. The Arab 
casualties were largely due to British police action.126  On 9th June, before Haycraft 
had reported, Churchill presented to the Cabinet the account of events by Captain C. D. 
Brunton of the General Staff Intelligence who reported that, “We are not faced by a 
simple outbreak of mob violence, in spite of pillage and other signs of participation of 
criminals and evil elements of the population.  The troubles in Jaffa and other parts of 
the country are only the expressions of a deep seated and widely spread popular 
resentment at the present British policy”.  He concluded his report by saying that “If 
that policy is not modified the outbreaks of to-day may become a revolution to-
morrow”.127  In many ways Haycraft repeated the concerns voiced by the earlier Palin 
Report discussed above. 
 
Presented to Parliament in October 1921, the report, according to the High 
Commissioner Samuel, was viewed favourably by the Arab Palestinians and adversely 
by the Zionist Commission.128  Like the Palin document it focussed on trying to record 
the sequence of events that had taken place, the attitudes and behaviour of the 
participants.  One proposal from the report was to remove Dr Eder, acting Chairman 
[sic] of the Zionist Commission, from his post because the views that he had expressed 
were at odds with the professed position of Weizmann and the Commission.  “In his 
opinion there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and 
no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as 
soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased”.129  Despite the concerns 
expressed the proposal was dropped on the grounds that a rapprochement was being 
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negotiated in November 1921 between the Zionists and the Arab Delegation which 
was in London.130 
 
The “disturbances” had included an attack on the Jewish colony of Petach 
Tikvah, about seven miles northeast of Jaffa.131  The report suggested that when the 
attack took place on 5th May the numbers involved might have been anywhere from 
1,000 to 2,000 people, some of who were armed and some on horseback.  The 
following day the numbers involved declined to around 400 of whom about 20 were 
carrying rifles.132  Troops and aircraft were used by the British to disperse the attackers.  
The Haycraft Report made clear that the sentiments recorded in the Palin Report about 
the previous year’s demonstrations in Jerusalem were echoed at Petach Tikva.  The 
Commission asserted that “(w)e consider that any anti-British feeling on the part of the 
Arabs that may have arisen in the country originates in their association of the 
Government with the furtherance of the policy of Zionism”.133   The report noted that 
one of the main Arab grievances is that the Zionist Commission is given pre-eminence 
by the British and is an “imperium in imperio” [sic].134 
 
In dealing with the events the Haycraft report commented on Palestinian 
perceptions about the increasingly discriminatory way in which British rule tended to 
favour the Zionists.  Various aspects of the administration, including specifically the 
Orders governing the sale of land, were viewed as advantageous to the Jewish settlers 
and discriminatory towards the Arab Palestinians.  In some cases this was identified as 
a consequence of the actions by partisan individuals within the administration, on 
others as a result of government policies or actions.  Haycraft noted the displacement 
of Arab workers by Jewish ones in the Public Works Department and on the railway; 
the tendency of a Jewish official to favour contracts being awarded to Jews; the 
tendency of Jewish traders to purchase only from Jewish businesses. Haycraft 
identified this as systemic and not an occasional phenomenon, endorsing the view that 
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sectarian practices impacted on the evolution of social groups, and, in this instance the 
working class.  
 
The report drew attention to social differences between the communities giving 
examples of contrasts in the social mores of the newly arrived Jewish settlers which 
caused offence to the Arab community suggesting that there was an insensitivity on 
the part of the “immigrants” towards the indigenous population. The report however 
recorded that in the view of its authors “there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the 
country, racial or religious”.135  The thrust of the Haycraft report was that the 
Palestinian attacks on the Jewish colonies were a surrogate for confronting the British.  
 
The “riots” or “disturbances” reported on by Palin and Haycraft were presented 
as having a degree of spontaneity, arising out of particular incidents, but they clearly 
reflected underlying grievances held by large sections of the Arab Palestinian 
population relating principally to the sale of land and the subsequent evictions.  
Haycraft draws distinctions between the urban and rural populations singling out 
religious affiliation as constituting the closest bonds within society rather than social 
or class interests.  His estimation of the Palestinian working class is quite blunt and 
infused with the imperialist and orientalist values of the day.   
The non-Jewish working people of Jaffa, while forming a compact community, 
differ in important respects from a European proletariat.  There are a large 
number of boatmen, porters, artisans and labourers, who inhabit principally old 
Jaffa, Menshieh and “Tin Town”. They are sociable, credulous, excitable, 
readily collecting in crowds at any moment when any cause of excitement 
arises; but with Moslems there is no class consciousness, as in a European 
proletariat, cutting through the bonds of race and religion.  There are no classes 
in the European sense of the word.136     
 
Leaving aside its tendentious character, the comment underscores the more 
general point that the Arab Palestinian working class was small and in the process of 
formation as dispossessed fellahin seeking employment gravitated towards the 
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towns.137  The chief aspiration of many of those evicted remained to win back the 
lands they had worked.  Initially this may have contributed to a degree of ambivalence 
towards severing all links with the land.  Those displaced to the urban areas may not 
have been able to gain employment or the work on offer may have been unskilled, 
lowly paid with little guarantee of security of employment. The initial hope to return 
to working on the land may not have seemed unreasonable given, as I explained above, 
there were a variety of forms of land ownership available.138  In this context it is 
understandable that the organisations of workers which were established were initially 
more concerned with social welfare than the traditional trade union concerns relating 
to pay and conditions of employment.  This pattern however began to change through 
the 1920s.139 
 
Mandate Politics and the Palestinian Economy 
Palestine, alongside Syria and Mesopotamia, had been identified by the League 
of Nations as being in the “Class A” category of mandate territories and were expected 
to achieve their independence once the designated Mandatory power was satisfied that 
the country could take responsibility for itself.  It was the Mandatory authority which 
determined whether a country might become self-governing and not the people of the 
country itself.  Indicative of the British attitude towards Palestine was the view 
expressed by the pro-Zionist political advisor to the occupying forces, Colonel Richard 
Meinertzhagen, who said in August 1919 that “The people of Palestine are not at 
present in a fit state to be told openly that the establishment of Zionism in Palestine is 
a policy to which HMG, America and France are committed.” It was not until 
February 1920 that the British publicly acknowledged inside Palestine itself that the 
Balfour Declaration existed and a further two years before the League of Nations 
formerly confirmed Britain as the Mandatory authority.140 
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The opposition to British proposals on Palestine was not only voiced by people 
inside the country but additionally by Britain’s ally Emir Faisal.  He clarified his 
attitude towards the proposal to establish a homeland for the Jews in a statement on 
the decisions of the San Remo Conference forwarded by Allenby to the Cabinet on 
13th May 1920.  Faisal explained that “Palestine … is an inseparable part of Syria” and 
invoked his letter to McMahon of 25th October 1915 to show this had been his 
consistent position.  He explained that he wished to “safeguard the rights of the Jews 
in that country as much as the rights of the indigenous Arab inhabitants are 
safeguarded and to allow the same rights and privileges”.141  Notwithstanding this 
accumulating evidence of complete opposition to the Balfour Declaration the 
Government of Palestine, on 26th August 1920, published an Immigration Ordinance 
which clearly stated that “Entry into Palestine … shall be regulated by the High 
Commissioner”.142  The British intended to override Arab Palestinian desires to assert 
sovereignty over the country.  
 
British and French imperialism with all their collective resources imposed a 
division on the area of Bilad al-Sham or Greater Syria based on the Sykes-Picot 
agreement.  Two of the most powerful countries in the world, having defeated the 
Ottoman Empire and its German ally, could not be opposed by force and the aspiration 
for a unified Bilad al-Sham was defeated and to all intent and purposes ceased to be a 
viable perspective from an early date.  The programme agreed at the First Arab 
Congress in Damascus in July 1919 which had called for independence of the whole 
region, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the recognition of Emir Faisal 
as King of Syria and the designation of the USA as the mandatory power was brushed 
aside by the French with the complicity of the British.  Syrian aspirations were 
crushed under the boots of French troops simultaneously wrecking the hopes of those 
who wanted Palestine, as “Southern Syria” to remain part of a unified Greater Syria. 
 
Political developments in Palestine were inextricably intertwined with 
decisions about the economy of the country.143  Overwhelmingly the economy was 
structured around the agricultural sector with the vast majority of the Arab Palestinian 
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population working on the land or in related employment.  Even where industrialised 
urban production was developed it was frequently based on the utilisation of 
agricultural products.144  Geared principally to domestic consumption and 
sustainability it was confronted with the advent of an administration which 
increasingly invoked Article 6 of the Mandate which stated that: “The Administration 
of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and positions of other sections of the 
population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable 
conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in 
Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands 
not required for public purposes”.145  The stipulation to encourage the “close 
settlement by Jews on the land” and its implementation, as interpreted by the British, 
added to the impact of the changes introduced by the Ottoman Land Laws. 
 
Those who owned the land, as well as those who worked on it, faced a 
changing scenario in which land, products and labour itself were being transformed 
into commodities.  The expansion of production which hitherto had more often than 
not resulted from an increase in the amount of land cultivated was now confronted by 
the capitalist imperative of profitability.  The Arab merchants, landowners and the 
fellahin had functioned within a longstanding set of relationships premised on the 
production of surplus products rather than commodities for sale.  The Mandate 
Administration imposed economic constraints which severely disadvantaged the 
growth of the Palestinian capitalist class, itself largely connected to agriculture.  In 
order to meet this changing situation agriculture required access to loans and 
investment but, until 1930, there was no Palestinian bank, and constant requests for 
investment and the creation of agricultural educational institutions were ignored by the 
British.146  Produce, immoveable objects and animals were the subjects of tax and the 
tithe system which had operated under the Ottoman Empire remained in place. 
Agriculture was heavily taxed providing 60% of the revenue.   
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One of the central features of British colonialism was the insistence that the 
colonised should pay for the costs incurred by the coloniser.147  Palestine was no 
exception and the taxes which were levied contributed towards the costs of roads, 
railways and communication systems.    However many of the roads that were built 
serviced the Zionist settlements and British economic priorities rather than the 
population more generally.  Further some of the major schemes, like the expansion of 
Haifa harbour, were constructed specifically for imperial purposes.148  When cutbacks 
on expenditure took place they tended to fall on areas such as education, health and 
other social amenities. 
 
Whilst the Arab Palestinian population had little facility to raise loans at a 
reasonable cost in order to invest, no obstacle was placed in the way of the import of 
foreign capital and investment from abroad was frequently provided interest free by 
Zionist supporters and on occasions the British assisted by supporting appeals from the 
Zionists for loans.149  “Zionist banks, credit, and cooperative societies were 
encouraged by a succession of ordinances”.150  Not having had an extensive banking 
system this placed Arab Palestinian producers at a distinct disadvantage. One Colonial 
Office official summed up the situation by saying that “Palestine is as rigidly 
controlled as the most backward protectorate and has not the remotest vestige of 
sovereignty or independence”.151  It is indicative of the nature of the relationship 
between Mandate Palestine and imperial Britain that it was the occupied land that was 
placed under constant pressure to “cover its own defence bill”.152 
 
As the already-existing economy was forcibly integrated into the world market 
the commodities it produced came into competition with those of other producers, 
were vulnerable to price fluctuations and the periodic crisis in the world economy as 
became evident with the 1929-1931crash in world prices for cereal crops.153  “The 
domestic price of wheat had fallen from P£40 per ton in 1929 to P£6-7 in mid-1930, 
while the price of olive oil had fallen from P£100 in April 1929 to P£40 per ton in 
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June 1930”.154  To a certain extent Zionist settlers were similarly affected by periodic 
economic crisis but the consequences for them were mitigated to some extent by 
changing patterns and character of immigration which rose or fell according to the 
changing circumstances and as a consequence of the inflow of capital investment from 
abroad.155 
 
Arab Palestinian capitalists whose enterprises were in transition from the 
economic practices and relationships dominant in the Ottoman period, were at a 
disadvantage in comparison to the resources available to the developing bourgeoisie of 
the Yishuv. Irfan Habib in his article “Understanding 1857”, speaking of India argues 
that during a period of colonialism it is possible to have a complex combination of 
“modern or quasi-modern” relationships.  Refusing to put a label on the 1857 Revolt, 
Habib argues that “To characterise the revolt as either feudal or bourgeois would be 
unhistorical.    The time for one was past, the time for the other had not yet come”.156  
The colonialist experience of Palestine could be similarly described as one in which 
the indigenous society was caught in a pincer between an earlier set of economic 
relations including both pre-capitalist and capitalist features, albeit themselves 
undergoing change, and the imperatives of the new-imperialism world market 
introduced by the British. 
 
The concessions given to Pinhas Rutenberg exemplified the preferential 
treatment afforded to Zionist entrepreneurs by the High Commission.  Rutenberg was 
given exclusive rights to the use of water in the north of the country and for the 
creation of an electrical supply company that would provide the power for Palestine, 
with the exception of Jerusalem, and for Transjordan.  The ownership of the Palestine 
Electric Corporation Ltd. was organised in 1923 in such a way as to ensure that it was 
always in the hands of a pro-Zionist holding company.  In order to minimise 
opposition much of the preparation to establish the company, including discussions 
with the Brandeis-Mack group in the United States of America, was undertaken and 
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remained in secret and the British further proposed protecting the scheme by 
prohibiting local municipalities from opening up contracts for competition.157  
 
In the financial sphere the Palestinian economy faced a similar monopolistic 
domination.  According to a 1949 United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine report, “(d)uring the decade following the first world war, the presence of the 
foreign banks and credit co-operatives left little room for the development of local 
banks”.158  Banking was dominated by foreign banks such as Barclays Bank (DC&O), 
the Ottoman Bank and the Banco di Roma and it was not until 1930 “that the first 
Palestinian Arab-owned bank, Arab Bank Limited” was established.159  The economy 
was completely controlled by the British Administration who centralised money 
regulation in 1926 through the establishment of the Palestine Currency Board.  “The 
currency system as established in Palestine was colonial in all respects”. The money 
used in Palestine was minted in London having been exchanged for money sent from 
Palestine in the first place.  Initially the Egyptian pound was used but this was later 
changed to pounds sterling and “the monetary reserves of Palestine were held in 
Britain and so constituted a virtual loan to HMG”.160   
 
Industry based on the imported capital tended to focus on the production of 
consumer goods to meet the demands of the newly arrived settlers.  In the mid-1920s 
the immigrant settlers entering Palestine were skilled workers or members of the 
middle classes bringing with them additional capital and an experience of industrial 
forms of production which facilitated the creation of new capitalist enterprises.   “An 
example of this type of industry was the Lodzia Textile Factory, founded by 
immigrants from Łódź, Poland who had been previously engaged in textile 
production”.161  The trade which existed between the indigenous community and the 
newly arrived settlers was disrupted by the boycott initiated in 1929 but the increase in 
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immigration led to the growth of the market based on Jewish consumers, eventually 
offsetting its impact.162   
 
It is important to assert however that there were not two distinct economies 
developing along parallel lines but rather a single economy in which there existed 
competing and contradictory components owned by those aligned with the Arab 
Palestinian community or the Yishuv.  The policies and actions adopted by the 
Mandate administration clearly favoured the one associated with the Yishuv against the 
other associated with the Arab Palestinian community.  The capital imported to the 
Yishuv was invested in areas with higher rates of profitability often using more 
technologically developed processes with the consequence that existing indigenous 
production of soap for example was undercut in price.  As with the fellahin, the Arab 
Palestinian land owning classes, manufacturers, merchants and other members of the 
nascent capitalist class were at a disadvantage which was exacerbated by the Mandate 
administration.  This had political consequences as the components which contributed 
to the shaping of nationalist aspirations were distorted by a settler bourgeoisie, more 
familiar with the capitalist environment.  This economic dislocation also contributed to 
the political splits within the Arab Palestinian bodies which had such a bearing on the 
functioning of the leaderships of the struggle for self-determination.163  
 
The economic policies pursued by the British privileged the capitalists within 
the Yishuv and discriminated against the Arab Palestinian capitalist class which did not 
have recourse to new sources of capital with which to invest.  The majority of Arab 
Palestinian capitalists were merchants and as such their capacity to develop was 
conditional on the control of trade, the exercise of controls over imports and exports 
and the costs of goods on the world market.  The British Mandate administration 
essentially exercised its control over most of these features severely prescribing the 
ability of indigenous capital to expand.   
 
The Arab Palestinian Working Class and the Challenge of Zionism 
Those fellahin who were evicted from their lands gravitated towards the cities 
and towns to find employment.  “In Jaffa, most of the street cleaners were ex-villagers; 
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the Arab Cigarette and Tobacco Company in Nazareth reported that most of its 
workers were also of village origin”.164  If they did find work their levels of pay were 
far less than Jewish women workers who themselves received less than their male 
counterparts.  Although a relatively “new” social force the Arab Palestinian working 
class, as the Palin Commission report noted, from the outset began to challenge the 
discriminatory practices of the Zionist employers and the Mandate administration.  
This newly forming working class faced the considerable challenge of an economic 
environment shaped by the dual exigencies of British imperialism and Zionist 
colonialism.  
 
The Histadrut (General Organisation of Workers in the Land of Israel), 
growing out of organisations such as the Union of Agricultural workers set up in 1911, 
was established by Jewish workers in 1920 in Haifa and was the main body through 
which debates on policies of employment took place.  By early 1931 the Histadrut had 
“more than 30,000 members, 18,781 in cities (including the industrial enterprises in 
Nahara’im, Atlit, and the Dead Sea area), 7,783 in moshavot, [towns or settlements] 
and 3,496 in collective settlements” constituting 75% of workers as a whole.165  The 
organisation was always a political project with the principal intention of 
incorporating Jewish workers into the national enterprise.  In the view of one its 
founding figures David Ben Gurion, the Histadrut was a vehicle for achieving the 
objective of creating a Jewish state in Palestine and for him “(t)he building of a Jewish 
state requires first the creation of a Jewish majority in the country … (and) … the only 
person who can bring us such a majority is the Jewish worker in Eretz Israel”.166  
 
The Histadrut was a central part of the project seeking to hegemonise the 
political allegiance of Jewish workers to the state aspirations of the Zionist movement.  
It was an arm of the colonial settler endeavour which won the allegiance of Jewish 
workers through its increasing capacity to exclude Arab Palestinian workers from 
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employment and through ensuring that materially, through differentiated rates of pay 
for example, they received preferential treatment”.167  
 
The Histadrut adopted the Zionist policy of kibush haavoda (conquest of 
labour) which had both a social and a political impact creating divisions between 
Jewish and Palestinian workers.  Although debates took place within the Zionist 
movement on this issue, those political factions arguing for the exclusion of Arab 
Palestinian workers from the Zionist trade unions won the majority.  This policy had 
major implications subsequently affecting the formation of both trade union and 
political organisations.168  As a result, in the middle of the 1920s, having experienced 
the consequences of kibush haavoda and the corporatist Zionism of the Histadrut, the 
dispossessed fellahin who found work together with the rest of the Arab Palestinian 
working class were effectively obliged to develop a distinctly Arab Palestinian trade 
union movement.169   
 
Jewish employers were encouraged, and in some cases coerced, into adopting 
the policy of only employing Jewish workers.  The policy of avoda ivrit was pursued 
vigorously resulting in almost complete segregation in certain industries between Arab 
Palestinian and Jewish workers who were employed on more favourable terms.  This 
policy was operated by some of the largest companies in Palestine including the 
Shemen Oil Company and the Société des Grand Moulins though the Nesher cement 
factory did not.  The reason behind the difference lay in the fact that the Nesher 
Company wished to trade with neighbouring Arab countries and was concerned lest its 
discriminatory employment policies adversely affected that.170 
 
When it came to matters of industrial dispute between employers and 
employees the Mandate Administration in 1924 viewed the issue as one to be resolved 
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within the Yishuv since the majority of workers likely to be affected by proposed 
changes to labour legislation were Jewish.  The British Administration effectively 
refused to intervene leaving any resolution of the disputes to the Histadrut and the 
employers to resolve with the occasional intervention of the Palestine Zionist 
Executive.171  Further the British succumbed to the argument that when capital for a 
project was provided from the settler community preference should be given to the 
employment of Jewish workers.  Typical of this was the agreement made between the 
Zionist Executive and the Administration to construct a road linking settler colonies.172 
 
Despite the application of the policy of avoda ivrit this did not mean a 
complete segregation between Arab Palestinian and Jewish workers.  There were 
many instances where both groups were employed.  Arab Palestinian workers were 
present in a variety of industries, including in the railways and in other productive 
sectors but were excluded from the “trade union” structures.173  In the early 1920s 
there was an attempt to establish joint Arab-Jewish organisation in a number of 
workplaces, most notably amongst the railway workers, but this soon ended.  A group 
of Arab Palestinian workers joined the Union of Railway, Postal and Telegraph 
Workers but disillusioned by the lack of support shown by their Jewish co-workers 
they left after a few months and began the process which led to the setting up the 
Palestinian Arab Workers Society (PAWS).174  This experience was replicated 
elsewhere.  
 
During a dispute with the employer that broke out during the building of the 
Nesher Cement Factory at Haifa, the 200 Jewish workers sought the support of the 80 
Egyptian workers employed by the company.  Together they won a favourable 
settlement but the Histadrut successfully pressurised its members to return to work 
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and abandon the Egyptian workers.  The traditions of trade union solidarity which 
informed the basis of their initial approach were not extended to the Egyptian 
workers.175  Arab Palestinian workers were therefore forced to establish their own 
organisation because of the political character of the Histadrut which at the outset only 
permitted Jewish workers to become members even when they were working in the 
same workplace and some degree of cooperation was taking place.   
 
PAWS was established in 1925 in Haifa, at the time a major industrial port, a 
centre of commerce and the centre of trade union activity.  Whilst PAWS was an 
important organisational step forward the critical challenge to the Palestinian working 
class arose from the policies adopted by the leaders of the Jewish working class which 
grew as immigration increased and the newly arrived colonists gravitated towards the 
burgeoning coastal cities.  These new groups of workers brought a range of skills 
which placed them in a more advantageous position for employment.  Critically of 
course they benefitted from the discriminatory practices which gave them preferential 
access to employment as Jewish employers were encouraged not to employ non-
Jewish staff.  The political character of the Zionist colonisation impacted on the 
growth of the Arab Palestinian working class excluding them from employment in 
areas critical to economic development and pushing the, towards jobs with less 
effective levers of influence to express their views.     
 
Meanwhile inside the Histadrut there was opposition to the growth of an 
independent Arab Palestinian trade union such as PAWS and steps were initiated to 
finance a separate Arab Palestinian organisation under Zionist influence. The 
dominant political current amongst the Jewish workers within the Histadrut was Ahdut 
Ha’avoda (Unity of Labour), which opposed cooperation between Arab Palestinian 
and Jewish workers.  Of course this pattern of seeking to divide Arab Palestinians was 
a recurrent practice when organisations began to voice nationalist sentiments.  
However the formation of trade unions was beset not only by the problems created by 
the Zionists but was inhibited by the resistance of some sections of the Palestinian 
community.  This pattern continued through to the 1930s when strong opposition was 
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voiced against the influence of Communist Party in PAWS and supporters of the Mufti 
and the oppositionists “attempted to set up rival unions whose aims and activities were 
strictly partisan and political”.176 
 
The composition of the new trade union organisation continued to reflect its 
origins in the coastal cities and amongst certain groups such as the railway workers.  
However between the founding of PAWS in 1925 and the calling of the Congress in 
1930 there was a period of inactivity.177  When the Congress was convened its agenda 
focussed on both the traditional concerns of employment, wages and conditions and 
opposition to Zionism and to immigration. PAWS saw these issues as inextricably 
linked and in contrast to the Histadrut the Congress called for a proportionate 
distribution of jobs in the government spheres of employment based on the relative 
sizes of the two communities and it called for Palestinian independence.  This was a 
clear distinguishing feature of its politics from that of the Histadrut. 
 
The traditions and practices of political and trade union organisation which 
some of the newly arrived European Jewish socialists were familiar with, had in the 
early 1920s, no organic roots in the nascent Palestinian working class.178  As we will 
see below the predominantly Jewish-led communist and socialist organisations that 
sought to win political backing from the Arab Palestinian working class faced the dual 
obstacles of having few Arab Palestinian members and were opposed from within the 
Yishuv by other political groups.179   
 
To some extent the Jewish working class was also in the process of formation 
since there were not necessarily jobs available for newly arrived immigrants to walk 
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into. Whilst the industrial enterprises and settlements which had sprung up in the pre-
occupation period had to some extent been based on employers seeking the biggest 
return for the smallest investment, much of the “newer” capital coming into Palestine 
in the post war period was both earmarked as part of the Zionist national project and 
under much more centralised management by the Zionist Commission.180 The jobs 
created as a result of the importation of this capital led to the establishment of 
enterprises utilising the policy of kibush haavoda to recruit staff.  The partisan 
selection process arising from this form of investment and employment policy had the 
concomitant effect that the job opportunities for non-Jewish Palestinians were 
restricted, with the inevitable consequence that it hampered the growth of the working 
class.181  The ideology which informed the structures created by the Jewish workers 
was entirely in concert with the nationalist aspirations of Zionism. The net result was, 
de facto, one of collaboration between two major social forces of the Yishuv, the 
bourgeoisie and the working class.182 
 
Prior to the Mandate there were no joint Arab-Jewish trade union or political 
organisations.  The Histadrut was the dominant organisation of workers in the Yishuv.  
Over 4,000 people took part in the election of its delegates to the founding congress.  
By 1923 it had a sick fund, a builders’ co-operative, consumers and marketing 
organisations and a bank. The Histadrut was a quasi-state institution playing a welfare 
role providing for the needs of newly arrived settlers and it was a large employer in the 
building and construction sector.183  Additionally it founded the Haganah, a 
paramilitary organisation initially acting as guards to prevent colonies being attacked 
which eventually evolved into the Israeli army.  Acting simultaneously as employer 
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and representative of employees was one characteristic differentiating it from 
conventional trade unions.184  
 
Facing the discriminatory practices of both the imperial power and the colonial 
settlers, the Arab Palestinian workers faced a considerable challenge to defend their 
own employment let alone improve their pay and conditions of work.  The growth of 
the young Arab Palestinian working class was inhibited from the outset and 
consequently took some time to become organised and to become a political force in 
the society.  It did however begin to address the issues of trade union organisation and 
political empowerment. 
 
Self-Determination and the Palestine Communist Party 
Perhaps uniquely at the time, the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) adopted an 
orientation which sought to unify a class oriented politics with a nationalist 
perspective in Palestine.  Led by Jewish members it sought to gain support amongst all 
workers, making a particular effort to recruit Arab Palestinian workers and to make 
links with PAWS.185  The Party was influenced by the Bolshevik leadership of the 
Comintern which following its foundation after the Russian Revolution of 1917 paid a 
great deal of attention to the politics of the Muslim world.186  However the success of 
the party was impaired by the fact that the majority of its members, who were Jewish, 
were more inclined to orientate to the debates within political organisations competing 
for the ear of Jewish workers.  Despite the failure to win large numbers of Arab 
Palestinian workers to its ranks, the PCP gained respect and a hearing due, for 
example, to its intervention in support of the campaign by dispossessed fellahin in the 
Affula region whose land had been sold.187  “In Jaffa it succeeded in setting up the 
Transport Workers Society, and the communists involved themselves in the struggle of 
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the Jaffa Arab Workers’ Association against Zionist pickets formed to enforce the 
policy of “conquest of labor [sic]”.188   Conversely the Party lost the support of some 
of its Jewish members, especially those influenced by Zionism.  The Party had the 
most radical programme of any Palestinian party for self –determination.  In 1931, the 
PCP adopted a resolution which declared that “the only solution to the question of the 
peasantry lies in an insurrectionary revolutionary struggle, waged against the 
imperialists, the Zionists and the Arab landowners by the fundamental stratum of the 
peasant masses, under the direction of the working class led by their Communist 
Party”.189  Although it advocated a militant line against land grabs, including by armed 
resistance, it did not gain large numbers of members amongst the fellahin.  
 
However whilst it did not recruit large numbers of members its viewpoints 
began to win something of an audience through its weekly journal Haifa and other 
material which argued for an anti-British perspective, criticising the leaders of the 
Arab national movement and championing the position of unity between Jewish and 
Palestinian Arab workers.190  The Party remained very small reflecting the relatively 
small size of the constituency from which it tried to recruit, the Arab Palestinian 
working class. Coupled with this orientation towards winning workers to its ranks was 
a critical attitude towards those in the leadership of Palestinian politics especially 
criticising the role of the a‘yan in the national movement and their periodic closeness 
to the Mandate authorities.  Undoubtedly it was this criticism of the dominant political 
leadership that resulted in it playing no role in any of the Palestinian Congresses.   
 
Women and Palestinian Politics 
In general, in the nineteenth century, a majority of women within Palestinian 
society had played a domestic role working in the household, as carers for children 
and undertaking work in the home.191  Women in poorer rural households however 
tended to work in the fields.  The changing social situation had begun to challenge that 
dominant tradition and contributed to women becoming more active in the public 
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political sphere.  “There are reports that, as early as the late nineteenth century, women 
joined with men in strongly and even violently resisting Zionist settlement, 
participating in protests against Jewish immigration in the countryside in 1884 in 
Affula”.192  This evidence challenges the view that women’s political activity was 
exclusively confined to the middle class unless a very narrow definition of what 
constitutes political activity is applied. Whilst it was true that the Arab Women’s 
Committee was established in 1929 principally by women from the families of male 
notables involved in national politics it clearly succeeded in reaching out to women 
members of the middle class and through its commitment to more extensive social 
work to make contact with women in other social groups.193    
 
 From the letters pages and content of the newspapers, there is consistent 
evidence of women’s involvement in social and political life including involvement in 
activities such as political fundraising.194  There were women’s organisations involved 
in welfare activity or education in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa in the 1920s, although 
often led by the wives of leaders of the political bodies. A women’s society in 
Jerusalem for example was active in 1931 distributing “food to poor families, and 
(sending) nurses to help mothers learn proper sanitation methods and care for their 
children”.195  However bodies like the executive committee of the Women’s Congress 
also issued more overtly political statements on “Jewish immigration, land buying, and 
alleged educational and economic discrimination”.196  Despite the fact that many of the 
women involved in these activities were the wives of members of differing political 
factions they nevertheless worked together in the same organisations and did not 
replicate the divisions found in the male-led bodies.197    
 
The First Arab Women’s Congress took place in Jerusalem in October 1929 
and was attended by over two hundred women from both the Muslim and the Christian 
communities. The movement which laid the basis for the Congress “evolved from a 
complex matrix of charitable, reformist, feminist, and nationalist impetuses, which 
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overlapped and informed the nature of women’s initial organisational endeavours”.198 
The Congress passed three motions calling for the “abrogation of the Balfour 
Declaration, an assertion of Palestine’s rights to a national government with 
representation for all communities in proportion to their numbers, and the 
development of Palestinian industries”.  Additionally they made the specific proposal 
that land should be only be bought from the Jews and that every other form of 
transaction should be prohibited.  They publicised their political positions by means of 
a closed motorcar procession through Jerusalem although this was not repeated in 
1933 when women joined protest rallies in the same city and Jaffa.199   
 
In 1933 the militancy of the women was even recognised by the High 
Commissioner Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, who, writing of an action in Jerusalem, 
expressed concern at “ (a) new and disquieting feature of this demonstration was the 
prominent part taken by women of good family as well as others … They did not 
hesitate to join in assaults on the Police and were conspicuous in urging their menfolk 
to further efforts”.200  Wauchope was clearly shocked by these developments but they 
were further evidence of the broadening of political engagement within the Arab 
Palestinian community. 
 
The Role of the Media  
As we have already noted the population of the early part of the twentieth 
century was predominantly rural distributed in towns and villages across Palestine.  
The social changes developing in Palestine led to a progressive growth of the urban 
population which in turn contributed to the emergence of a lively press.  Literacy rates 
were generally low under Ottoman rule even though across the region there were 956 
“education establishments … most of which were primary and elementary schools”.201 
Even though there had been an expansion of missionary schools there were not enough 
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schools available to the population in comparison to the needs.  A government census 
on literacy published in 1932, indicated that literacy rates for all Arab Palestinians 
stood at 25% for males and 3% for females and it seems reasonable to assume that the 
figures for the pre-Mandate period would have been similar.202  Amidst those who 
were literate there were significant differences between different social groups which 
to some extent were reflected in the figures for different religious communities.  
Amongst Christians the figures for male and female literacy were 72% and 44% 
respectively and amongst Jews the comparable figures were 93% and 73%.203  Given 
the predominant distributions of the three communities this also probably reflected a 
divide between urban and rural communities.  
 
Whilst literacy rates were relatively low, access to literature was possible 
through sources such as “the town café and village guesthouse (which) provided social 
centers where someone would read articles from newspapers and the men would 
discuss political affairs”.204  A number of libraries opened at the turn of the century.205  
In some factories “newspaper breaks” took place.206  The potential readership of the 
press before the First World War, although still limited in numbers, had been 
expanding.207  At least one publisher sent a copy of their newspaper to all the villages 
in their surrounding areas. The numbers of pupils in the “Arab Public System – 
Government Schools” increased by approximately 150% between 1920 and 1930 and 
the number of teachers nearly doubled to meet the needs.208  This phenomenon 
alongside other informal patterns of communication undoubtedly led to the 
dissemination of ideas more widely than the immediate readerships.   
 
Newspapers began to flourish in the first years of the twentieth century and in 
1908, no less than fifteen newspapers were printed in Palestine.   One of these papers, 
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the weekly al-Karmil, published in Haifa by the owner and editor Najib Nassar, was 
very influential. Its viewpoint as expressed in a March 1909 column can be 
summarised as supporting “the just demands of the people … (serving) the trader, the 
craftsman, and the fallah, and all other sectors of the population”.209  Its views drew 
the attention of the Ottoman authorities who closed it down in 1914 because of its 
critical attitude towards the government.   
 
From 1911 onwards al-Karmil was rivalled by the Jaffa-based Filastin which 
championed the anti-Zionist cause.  Taking up the interests of the rural population 
threatened by eviction as a result of land purchases, the articles of both papers were 
reprinted in other local newspapers and in nationally distributed papers in Damascus, 
Beirut and Cairo.210 Filastin in particular switched from a focus on the threats posed by 
Zionism and Jewish immigration to a concern for the plight of the fellahin whose 
families faced dispossession and displacement from the land.  This sharpening of 
focus was matched by an increasing number of articles shifting attention from the 
failures of the Ottoman rulers in restricting the growing colonisation to the longer-term 
threat posed by the Zionist settlers.211  Undoubtedly the newspapers published 
elsewhere in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Istanbul were influential in developing an 
understanding of the significance of Zionism not only for Palestine but also for the 
region.212 
 
Each of the papers, as with the political formations that began to develop, to 
some degree reflected the social origins and priorities of their owners.  In the early 
1930s, for example, Filastin owned by the wealthy citrus industry al-Issa family, was 
explicitly anti-communist, opposing workers’ strikes to improve wages or conditions.  
Whilst they supported the anti-Zionism implicit in the actions of those striking the 
paper was reluctant to endorse policies which, they viewed, as jeopardising the owners’ 
income.  The wider implication of the position adopted by the paper was that Arab 
Palestinian notables in the process of undergoing embourgeoisement were not about to 
sacrifice their profits for the Palestinian national cause.  Individual interests 
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superseded nationalist aspirations. Whilst social position was clearly a factor the 
opinions expressed by these newspapers on the question of Zionism were not 
influenced by their owners’ religious allegiance as much as by their political attitudes 
towards the CUP government.  Those opposed to the Istanbul rulers tended to be more 
anti-Zionist than those who favoured unity with the Empire.213 
 
Evidence of the interconnections between the press and political organisations 
can be found throughout the British Mandate with papers promoting the standpoints of 
their proprietors.  Some, like Boulus Shihada who owned Mir’at al-Sharq and ‘Issa al-
Issa who edited Filastin for example, were themselves members of important political 
bodies such as the Palestinian Arab Executive Committee and intervened to ensure 
their opinions were reflected in the pages of their papers.  However these connections 
did not mean that political organisations were exempted from criticism. Writing in al-
Karmil on 14th February 1926 for example, Sheifh As’ad al-Shuqari said: 
Since the start of British occupation until the present day I have not been aware of the 
existence of a real National Movement [Haraka wataniyya haqiqiyya]. The prominent 
and less prominent members of the National Movement, Muslim, Christian and Druze, 
welcomed the British occupation, although, their leaders were clearly aware that this 
occupation carried the attendant ‘gift’ of a national home for the Jews in Palestine.  
The British military and administrative staff began their occupation with the act of 
every wise conqueror, by granting positions to the sons of prominent families who 
were infatuated with them, in order to win their sympathy, support and various 
services.214 
 
These links were also noted by the Mandate authorities.  In a report dated 8th 
December 1922 submitted to the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, the High Commissioner Herbert Samuel makes the evaluation that the 
“Moderate Party … have considerable support in the press”.215  At other times the 
authorities moved to close down the press and impose censorship because the papers 
were clearly expressing their support for anti-Mandate viewpoints.    In a Secret 
Intelligence Report presented to the Cabinet in November 1929 it is clear that the press 
is regarded as an important factor in the events that were taking place.  “The Arab 
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press continues to be very inflammatory, in particular a paper which is now for the 
first time published in English”.216  The paper was unnamed but al-Wihda al-‘Arabiyya, 
published from December 1933 in both Arabic and English was censored by the 
British on charges of incitement in 1935.217  The press raised the major political issues 
of the day and presented the perspectives of Palestinian opinion on issues. 
  
Sections of the press became in effect political organisers.   Al-Karmil, sought 
to intervene more generally in the political process calling for the organisation of 
opposition to Zionism whilst others, such as al-Mufid, linked to al-Fatat the Arab 
nationalist secret society, were directly connected to nascent political organisations.218  
There was of course a long tradition linking the development of the press with the 
emergence of political bodies and indeed the whole process of political organisation.  
In 1905, Najib ‘Azuri who had founded the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe in Paris, 
published Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe, “which predicted a momentous conflict 
between Zionism and Arab nationalism”.219  In 1907 he went on to publish a monthly 
review entitled l’Indépendance Arabe. 220  
 
Newspapers expressing concern about Zionism could be found not only in 
other parts of the Arab world such as Cairo, Damascus and Beirut but even in Istanbul 
where al-Hadera was published.221  There was an amount of direct and indirect 
collaboration between the sections of the media.  The Haifa and Jaffa papers 
frequently used articles from papers published elsewhere in the Arab world.  There 
was a sense that the decisions of the World Zionist Organisation constituted a 
challenge both to Palestine and to the Arab world in general.222  Even after the 
imposition of the Mandate, newspapers in Damascus were still publishing stories 
which concerned the British Government.  A letter from P. Z. Cox, the British High 
Commissioner in Baghdad presented by Winston Churchill to the Cabinet in October 
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1921 complained bitterly of the “anti-British propaganda … still published in Syria …  
(as) evidenced by the article published in ‘Muqtabas’ (on) 24th August 1921” and of 
articles in the French language monthly “L’Action Assyro-Chaldeénne” published in 
Beirut.223   
 
The political response was not confined to the publication of newspaper 
articles, books were also published on the issue of Palestine, the Mandate and Zionism.  
Two books written by Muhammad Izzat Darwazah and Isa al-Sifri were printed in 
Jaffa in 1929 followed by further publications in the mid-1930s.224  Cultural events too 
promoted political ideas including a January 1920 production of a play called “The 
Ruin of Palestine” in Nablus, staged by al-Nadi al-‘Arabi which recounts a story of 
two Arabs losing their property to a “young flirtatious Jewess”.  These activities were 
complimented by initiatives setting up schools and clinics for the poor and engaging in 
discussion on a wide range of topics including literature.225  This burgeoning growth of 
cultural activity acted as a counterweight to the atomising impact of the social changes 
which Palestinians experienced.  Maturing at a slower pace perhaps they nevertheless 
constituted a more sympathetic atmosphere in which the Palestinian national identity 
could develop.  Political, social and cultural activities were interwoven and had an 
effect on other areas of life such as religion. 
Religion and Revolt 
From the beginning of the twentieth century expressions of political ambition 
were interlinked with the most widespread religious allegiance in the region.  The 
Ottoman Empire claimed its status as the Caliphate and to some degree the initial 
debate about political identity was couched in terms shaped by this discourse.  Pan-
Islamism was superseded by Pan-Arabism and subsequently by Arab nationalism but 
throughout the religious affiliations of the people of Greater Syria and then Palestine 
remained an aspect of the struggle for self-determination.   
 
There was undoubtedly linkage between religious affiliation and the social 
background to which political activists belonged. Certainly the religious affiliations of 
leading members, both Muslim and Christian, contributed to the development of ideas 
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about nationalism.  The name of one of the foremost organisations, the Muslim 
Christian Association, both reflected the composition of its membership whilst 
simultaneously attempted to convey an aspiration for unity between the two 
communities.226  Political ideas were also spread by religious figures from their pulpits 
and they used their positions of authority within their communities to give support to 
those political ideas.  “In 1925 a Muslim religious authority issued, for the first time, a 
fatwa (Muslim legal ruling) forbidding land sales to Jews”.227  The ruling was 
published in the press.   
 
Although this statement did not appear to have much resonance at the time it 
was indicative of the close connection for some between religious allegiance and 
political inclination.228  Figures with religious affiliations appeared throughout the 
early part of the Mandate period associated with most shades of political opinion 
including the most radical.  From the mid 1920s onwards for example this linkage was 
embodied in a figure like Izz al-Din al-Qassam, described as “a man of immense 
religious learning … an eloquent orator … an ardent Muslim and a patriot” who would 
come to play a critical role towards the end of the decade and into the 1930s.229  The 
British were aware of the significance of religion in Palestinian society and paid 
attention to matters related to it.  Arguably the British utilised a confessional politics 
to exploit divisions within the Muslim community by the judicious use of patronage.  
Choosing a person from one notable family above another might have the effect of 
elevating one group to pre-eminence.  The tactic of divide and rule was not only used 
to advantage between different religions but at times also used to divide one group 
from even another group of their co-religionists.  
 
Under Ottoman rule a number of posts for administering and running the 
Sharia courts were appointed by or approved by Constantinople.  With the advent of 
the Mandate and under the terms of occupation the authority for confirming such posts 
was assumed by the British.  They enhanced the status of the Mufti of Jerusalem by 
designating the position as having jurisdiction over the whole of Palestine and on 8th 
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May 1921, in contravention of established practices for the elections and in preference 
to other candidates they appointed al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini as the Grand Mufti.230  
Al-Husseini was chosen by the British over three other candidates who, under the 
procedures for making such an appointment, had priority.  In doing so the British 
made a deliberate choice both to intervene in the processes and structures of the Sharia 
courts and quite specifically, to select someone they had identified.   
  
From the date of his arrival, the High Commissioner Herbert Samuel was 
enthusiastic to establish an authoritative body representing the Muslim community 
with which the British could work officially.231  On 9th January 1922 the Supreme 
Muslim Council was inaugurated and granted a degree of autonomy by the Mandate 
authority to administer Sharia courts and choose the muftis who advised them perhaps 
as a response to the pressures from the May 1921 riots.232  In its composition, 
leadership and formation, it replicated the existing traditional religious and social 
structures and the influence of the a‘yan.  The initial disputes for leading positions 
reflected the rivalry between the prominent families with al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini 
winning out over Raghib al-Nashashibi for the post of Ra’is al-Ulama, a position 
which would make the bearer the permanent President of the Supreme Muslim 
Council alongside four other councillors.  By raising al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini to the 
post the British placed him in a position of esteem and one which gave him a 
privileged position in relation to the British administration.  In so doing this enhanced 
his status amongst the Muslim community giving him an authority through which he 
too could exercise patronage and political influence.  Whilst the powers to administer 
Sharia courts and choose the muftis who would advise them were devolved to the 
Council, they were paid by Mandate authority.  
 
The British authorities faced a political challenge from the Christian 
community as well as the majority Muslim one.  From the outset members of the 
Christian community were involved in the establishment of political bodies opposed to 
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the influx of Zionist settlers and these views were reflected in the columns of the 
papers they owned.233  According to one report Christian opposition to the appointment 
of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner was “even more bitter than the Moslems”.234  
Samuel himself expressed the view in 1922 that the attitudes of the Christian 
communities tended to change depending on political developments.  He was of the 
opinion that their anti-British Government and anti-Zionist positions lessened as a 
consequence of their perception that there was a growth in the influence of an Islamic 
politics.235  Where differences emerged between leading Christian political figures and 
Muslim leaders they were no greater or smaller than those within the Muslim 
community and reflected their respective social and economic interests rather than a 
confessional divide.  
 
From Congresses to Parties 
The Third Palestinian Congress was followed in May 1921 by a further 
Congress which called for a representative government and agreed to send a 
delegation to London to negotiate with the British.236  Overtures made by Syrian 
political bodies to maintain unity against the challenges both countries faced initially 
met with support, but in reality this position soon ceased to influence the direction 
pursued by subsequent Arab Palestinian Congresses.237  According to some this was a 
consequence of the fact that Palestinian political leaders considered that the Syrian 
nationalists were too close to the Zionist movement.238  The delegation led by Musa 
Kazem Pasha al-Husseini met with Churchill on 22nd August 1921 in London where 
he confirmed to them that British were not prepared to move and clearly intended that 
the Mandate would be implemented on the basis of the Balfour Declaration.239 
 
The White Paper by Winston Churchill published on 3rd June 1922 reiterated 
existing Government commitment to the Balfour Declaration but expanded on a 
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number of the questions relating to it.  He expressed the view that the British 
Government regarded the proposal that “Palestine is to become ‘as Jewish as England 
is English’ … as impracticable” and that it had “no such aim in view.”  He developed 
the idea that “ the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be 
Palestinian … (and that) … immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed 
whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new 
arrivals”.240  Following the rejection of the White Paper, the Fifth Palestinian Congress 
meeting in August turned down the proposal for a Legislative Council viewing it as an 
inadequate response to their call for self-government.  Seeing that they were making 
no headway with the British, the Congress proposed that alliances should be sought 
with other parts of the Arab world.241   
 
The breadth and depth of the opposition to the British Mandate was reflected in 
the decisions of the Palestinian Congresses, the demonstrations of public anger against 
the land purchases, in the press and in numerous other public manifestations against 
the Balfour Declaration and the increasing settler immigration. The decisions 
expressed at the Fifth Congress in August 1922 were quite specific and counter to 
Churchill’s White paper.  Agreeing eighteen resolutions the Congress called for a 
boycott of the elections to the Legislative Council and affirmed that it would “continue 
(its) endeavours for the independence of our country, and for achieving Arab unity by 
all legal methods, and that we shall not accept the establishing of a Jewish National 
Home nor Jewish immigration.”  The plan of action adopted went on to propose the 
establishment of a “Palestine Arab Bureau in London”, a boycott of Jewish goods and 
the Rutenberg electricity scheme alongside steps to stop the sale of “immovable 
property to Jews”.  The Congress appeared to be reaching out to groups beyond their 
immediate circles with proposals that seemed to suggest a greater degree of awareness 
of the plight of the dispossessed fellahin and a commitment to “provide means for 
enlightening the fellah on national affairs.”  The seriousness of their intent was 
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perhaps evident in the decision to establish “a ‘finance scheme’ for the collection of 
funds”.242 
 
The programme adopted at the Sixth Congress signalled an attempt to develop 
a wider political perspective introducing proposals to benefit the economy more 
generally.  This broader approach was indicated by the holding of an Arab Economic 
Agricultural Conference on 1st February 1923 which called for the abolition of some 
taxes; the improvement of roads; the promotion of schemes to encourage the growth of 
tobacco; the reopening of the Agricultural Bank and a call for the establishment of an 
agricultural school.  Additionally the Conference called for the introduction of a law 
forbidding the sale of land below a certain size based on the minimum requirement to 
sustain a family.  This manifesto signalled an attempt to develop a more productive 
economy but it did not raise questions beyond the limits of buying and selling, such as 
proposing new forms of landownership or redistribution of the land to the benefit of 
the fellahin.243  The implicit political perspective of the Agricultural Conference 
remained within the parameters established by the Fifth Congress. 
 
The Arab Executive Committee prevailed over those who wished to stand for 
the Legislative Council and Samuel, under the weight of the campaigning, was unable 
to convene the body.  A stoppage of work and closing of shops was called for on 12th 
March 1923 to celebrate the victory isolating further those who had wished to become 
involved in the body.  On 20th June the Sixth Congress was convened in Jaffa and 
agreed that a new Delegation be sent to London to express opposition to the proposed 
Anglo-Arab Treaty.244  From the British point of view the intention of the Treaty was 
to acquire Hussein’s acceptance of the Balfour Declaration as the terms under which 
they would govern in Palestine.  The Delegation sought to intervene in the Cabinet 
Committee discussion but was turned away whilst Hussein was treated with disdain by 
the British for appearing to constantly equivocate.245  The defeat of Hussein by his 
rival the Sa’ud family and his loss of control of the Hejaz effectively ended the 
discussions on the Treaty.  
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The failure of the Sixth Congress to adopt a position of tax boycott was due to 
a split between those who came from and supported the positions of the large 
landowners and those who came from the ranks of the middle classes. The wealthier 
landowners, some it is alleged well disposed towards the Zionists, strongly opposed 
the proposal even though evidence suggests that the boycott of tax payments would 
have had wide popular appeal.246  The political divisions developing within both the 
Fifth and the Sixth Congresses were becoming sharper as those who opposed the 
majority positions eventually formed themselves into a political party al-Hizb al-
Watani al-Arabi al-Filastini (the Palestinian Arab National Party) in November 
1923.247  This body was, in the main, led by members of the Nashashibi family who 
were opposed to the policies of the Arab Executive and the positions adopted by 
Congresses which were politically dominated by members and supporters of the 
Husseini family.   
 
This process of political differentiation was evident too in the establishment of 
Hizb al-Zurra (Party of Farmers) which sought improvements in the agricultural sector 
including, for example, the ending of certain taxes, the establishment of a bank and 
improvements in relevant education.248  The social base of Hizb al-Zurra was amongst 
those families in the rural areas who owned land in the villages but were not 
themselves fellahin.  Their development was certainly supported and encouraged by 
Zionists such as Chaim Kalvarisky, who was in charge of the Arab Department of the 
Zionist Executive, and his superior, Frederick Kisch, a former British colonel working 
for the intelligence services who was head of the Zionist Executive’s political 
department.249  Despite the Zionist backing the existence of the Party undoubtedly 
owed something to an attempt to counterweight the influence of the urban areas by 
increasing the voice of the rural population.  The Party did not adopt an anti-Zionist 
stand and at least one of its leading figures, Haider Tuqan, reported to Kalvarisky on 
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the growth of the organisation which, by the winter of 1924, he claimed had the 
support of around 200 villages.250    
 
The process of party formation related to a number of factors not least the 
changing social topography of Palestinian society.  Those who held the dominant 
positions within the Supreme Muslim Council and the Arab Executive belonged to the 
a‘yan and tended to ally themselves or indeed be members of the Husseini family.  It 
has been argued that because of the prominent religious and secular roles they held in 
society, it did not appear necessary to form a party to achieve hegemony for their 
views.  The appearance of new parties challenged this status quo and even amongst 
those who belonged to the Husseini faction it began to raise questions about political 
relationships.  An attempt was made by Jamal al-Husseini to obtain the support of the 
Palestine Communist Party (PCP) in the city council elections of 1927 in order to 
defeat the candidates backed by the Nashashibi faction.251  This reflected a recognition 
that there were social and political forces beyond the confines of the traditional 
leaderships which had so far hegemonised political discourse in Mandate Palestine.   
These changes heralded the beginning of a new period in the development of the 
political response to the British Mandate by the Arab Palestinian people.  The gradual 
coalescence of relatively new social layers created the potential for a reshaping of the 
political landscape.  In the next chapter I will examine how these changes, which were 
incubating in the first decade of the British occupation burgeoned and led to the 
establishment and growth of new political parties and formations which challenged the 
nature of the British Mandate rule. 
 
Conclusions 
The long period of Ottoman rule underwent a transformation throughout the 
nineteenth century which accelerated towards the end of the century and into the 
twentieth.  The Arab provinces of the antebellum Ottoman Empire, already 
experiencing the disruptions caused by the increased penetration of an expansionist 
European imperialism then faced the dislocations produced by war, famine, 
occupation, suppression, colonisation, evictions, exploitation and above all, the denial 
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of the right of self-determination which they had been led to believe would be granted 
in return for their support for the British against the Ottoman Empire. 
 
Albeit with different social, economic and political characteristics, the 
Palestinian people experienced the rule of one imperial power, the Ottoman, being 
replaced by that of another, the British.  Control from Whitehall took the place of 
governance by Constantinople.  The rule of the Ottoman Empire was supplanted by 
the imposition of a High Commissioner issuing Ordinances decreeing the terms for the 
conduct of political and economic life.  All major questions of government, finance, 
defence and public security, the law and almost every facet of politics, economics and 
to a certain degree religion came under British control.252   The military defeat of the 
Central Powers resulted in the establishment of a new colonising regime with a new 
agenda.   
 
The capital resources arriving from abroad and the profitability of the 
economic areas in which they were invested far outstripped the capacities for 
endogenous growth.253    The land and agricultural investment which the a‘yan 
undertook faced the growth of an industrialising economy, in which the Zionist 
investors were granted monopolies which enabled the accelerating creation of a 
usurping industrially oriented bourgeoisie. The dynamic of finance capital fusing 
finance and industry, discussed in Chapter One, displaced the overwhelmingly 
agricultural and mercantilist character of the indigenous economy. 
 
Economically confronted by invasive capital, the a‘yan oscillated between 
adopting a political perspective that sought to mitigate the most egregious 
consequences by seeking to establish an alliance with the imperial power or 
developing a strategy based on the assertion of national rights which inevitably would 
lead to a confrontation with British imperialism.   The role that they had played under 
Ottoman rule, based on their relative economic privileges, had not prepared them for 
the challenges they faced.  Accustomed to being recognised as holding the prerogative 
of go-between the majority developed a political position which reflected this custom 
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thereby rendering them incapable of constructing a perspective for independence or 
the capacity to create the necessary alliances to draw together all the social forces into 
a united front against the British imperial power.  
 
Decoupled from the Ottoman Empire and severed from the prospect of a 
Greater Syria the a‘yan split into various currents based on contending perspectives.  
On the one hand this was exemplified by a tendency towards the establishment of a 
relationship with the British and an accommodation with Zionism in order to achieve 
some sort of self-governance and on the other a majority current which maintained an 
anti-Zionist position, seeking to pressurise the Mandate authority into abandoning the 
terms of the Balfour Declaration.  The former congregating around what became al- 
Hizb al-Watani al-Arabi al-Filastini (the Palestinian Arab National Party) and the 
latter associated with the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council.    
 
Amongst those who normally related to the traditional leadership patterns 
defined by the pre-eminence of one or other a‘yan group, others, like Hizb al-Zurra 
(Party of the Farmers), sought to stake a claim to advantage their particular 
constituency reflecting the growing disparity between the influence of the rural and 
coastal communities.  In all of these political developments both the British authorities 
and the Zionist Executive attempted with greater or lesser successes to exert an 
influence on the path that Palestinian politics would take.   
 
 The social convulsions which threatened the a‘yan as a consequence of these 
processes simultaneously represented a traumatic moment for the fellahin whose 
livelihoods and security were endangered or in some cases destroyed.  Deprived of 
their landholdings evicted fellahin were largely disbarred from entering into the newly 
developing industrial sector by the aggressive application of the Zionist policy of 
avoda ivrit.  Urban society was increasingly dominated by the Zionist colonists.  “In 
1922 the Muslim urban population was twice that of the Jewish community, but by 
1935 the urban Jewish sector had outstripped the total Muslim urban sector”.254   
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Imbued with the experiences of organisation in an industrial context the 
colonists were better equipped to bring into being forms of coordination which 
enabled them to monopolise employment within the newly developing industries.  The 
body established by the Zionists to achieve this goal, the Histadrut, had some of the 
organisational features of trade unionism but more closely resembled a corporatist 
structure sublimating social interest to the establishment of a Zionist state.  In contrast 
Palestinian workers and the evicted fellahin newly forced into a position of having to 
seek employment in order to survive, did not have the same degree of experience in 
creating structures to express their interests at the economic or political level.  The 
forms of organisation which did emerge such as the Palestinian Arab Workers Society 
(PAWS) in 1925 were created initially as a benefits group seeking to support workers 
faced with unemployment or injustices in the workplace.255  Political organisations, 
like the Palestine Communist Party, which sought to root themselves in the working 
class were unable to develop an authentic indigenous voice which might resonate with 
those whom they sought to recruit.  
 
The boycott, mentioned above, began around the time of the Seventh 
Palestinian National Congress convened from 20th June until 22nd June 1928.   It was 
this Congress which sought to unify the different constituencies of the Palestinian 
opposition to the policies pursued by the British Mandate and to elaborate a 
programme for the achievement of Palestinian self-determination.  In the next chapter 
I will examine the political components that sought to create a united opposition to the 
Mandate and the social forces and political parties that coalesced to challenge the 
British in period from 1935–1939. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Towards the Palestinian Revolt 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse how the contradictory character of the Balfour Declaration 
ineluctably led to the continuous frustration of Arab Palestinian ambitions.  The 
British commitment to the Zionist project resulted in the introduction of proposals for 
forms of administrative structures which, whilst appearing to constitute a compromise 
between the majority Arab Palestinian community and the Zionist led Yishuv, resulted 
in the institutionalisation of colonial rule and denial of self-determination.  Moreover, 
successive Arab Palestinian political initiatives aimed at persuading the British 
government to jettison the Balfour Declaration and accept the claim for self-
determination. 
 
This chapter will also underline how British political policies were replicated 
in the economic field with consequential social ramifications.  The social, political and 
economic were inextricably linked as the British themselves were to underline.  These 
developments in their totality were to shape the context which was to result in the 
thawra or Arab Palestinian Revolt of 1936–1939 as the parameters of Palestinian 
politics became more sharply defined.   The preferences which the British bestowed on 
those sections of the economy held in pro-Zionist hands, coupled with a deterioration 
of the agricultural sectors as a combination of crop failures and highly competitive 
imports intensified the disadvantages experienced by the predominantly rural Arab 
Palestinian community.  The almost recurrent British response to the Arab Palestinian 
lobby for self-government was the production of reports cataloguing their plight and 
especially that of the landless fellahin without addressing the impact of a partisan 
administration on the economy exacerbated by the exclusionary practices of the 
Zionist employers and the Histadrut. 
 
The British also tried to co-opt a level of comprador notables in a variety of 
institutions with whom they could work.  In this chapter I will briefly outline 
Palestinian responses to ever-increasing inequality but, predominantly using the 
reports, will demonstrate that the British were not particularly interested in addressing 
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the situation.  I will explore British responses to the Wailing Wall/Buraq 
demonstrations and the general unrest which ensued. 
 
Mandate and Zionist Proto-State Structures 
From the outset the British had recognised the Zionist Commission which 
subsequently became the Zionist Executive and then the Jewish Agency, as the voice 
of the Yishuv.  Chaim Weizmann, as the leader, already had well-established 
relationships with the Government in London and in Palestine and the British 
appointed William Ormsby-Gore to act as the liaison officer to the Commission.  As 
has already been pointed out the Balfour Declaration took the form of a quasi-treaty 
and formed the basis of the League of Nations Mandate adopted on 24th July 1922.  
Article 4 of the document stated that “an appropriate Jewish agency shall be 
recognised as a public body … (and) … the Zionist Organisation, so long as its 
organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be 
recognised as such agency”.1   The League of Nations document in Article 11 gave the 
Jewish Agency the power to “construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any 
public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the 
country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration”.2  
There was no equivalent Arab Palestinian body with a comparable status and terms of 
reference and although Arab Palestinians were employed in the Administration this 
was a body charged with the implementation of British policy.   
 
Whilst Samuel promoted the creation of bodies to discuss political 
arrangements in Palestine based on Churchill’s assurances there was no intention to 
establish a Jewish state, he had at the same time accepted onto the Advisory Council 
those with that intention. One characteristic of a state is to have a standing army and 
the Zionists were eager to establish one or as close to one as the British would allow.  
Yitzhak Ben Zvi who was a member of the Advisory Council until his resignation in 
April 1921, was a leader of both Ahdut Ha-Avodah (Jewish Labour Party) and the 
Haganah (The Defence) and advocated the establishment of an armed force and the 
status attached to the Haganah by the British reflected the intrinsic ambivalence of the 
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Mandate Administration on this matter.  Initially it had been formed around 1918 as a 
successor to the pre-war Hashomer Jewish watchman’s association.  Officially it was 
illegal but it was tolerated by the British administration and throughout the twenties 
and beyond it organised as a “self-defence” force.  Following the events in Jaffa in 
May, the Haganah began to organise the secret import of arms from Vienna.3  
Alongside this illegal importation of arms the Haganah was also given arms by the 
Mandate Administration despite the latter’s occasional protestations about the 
paramilitary activities it undertook.4   As early as July 1921 a Secret War Office report 
records that in anticipation of “outbreaks of violence … (t)he High Commissioner, 
with the assistance of the General Officer Commanding is taking steps to form a 
species of “Town Guards” in the Jewish villages and colonies by issuing arms to 
selected men”.5   
 
In the 1930s and especially after 1936 the units of the Haganah were 
recognised as legal.  “In 1937 the Haganah had ten thousand men trained and armed 
and another forty thousand available for rapid mobilisation.”6 Added to these forces 
were the 5,000 strong Notrim or Supernumerary Police who were recruited by the 
British to cooperate with the Army and the Police.7  Whilst initially they undertook 
defensive duties guarding oil pipelines and the like they became a force that was used 
in offensive duties during the course of the Arab Palestinian revolt.8  This did not 
however bring all Zionist armed forces into some form of official relationship with 
British as the Irgun Zvai Leumi under the Commander-in-Chief Ze’ev Jabotinsky were 
determined on a course to transform Palestine and Transjordan into the Jewish state of 
Eretz Israel and would not work with the Mandate administration. 
 
The economic protectionism afforded to Zionist enterprises by the Mandate 
Administration was complimented by a tolerance for and to a degree the 
encouragement of other forms of embryonic state institutions.  Monopoly rights were 
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established for Jewish Enterprises through a series of Ordinances which gave 
protection to new industries started with settler capital.  Through the imposition of 
import duties these new companies were shielded from competition with the existing 
indigenous producers.  The imported capital on which they were based was more 
likely to use motor power in their productive process contributing to levels of 
productivity which exceeded the more artisanal character of existing Arab Palestinian 
owned industries.9   Focussing on “Jewish industry” Deborah S. Bernstein has pointed 
out that “The number of establishments increased from a baseline of 100 in 1925, to 
395 eighteen years later, while the number of workers, the capital invested, the output 
and the horsepower used, increased even more rapidly”.10  As a consequence this led to 
a concentration of the Yishuv in the urban areas which, together with the application of 
the policy of avoda ivrit contributed to Arab Palestinian workers being marginalised 
even though their numbers were increasing. 
 
A contribution to this industrial expansion was undoubtedly made by changes 
in the character of the Zionist Organisation which had a significant effect on non-
Zionist Jews in the USA.  A political shift took place when the Zionist Organisation 
moved towards a position of encompassing non-Zionist Jews into its structures.  For 
long periods during the 1920s Weizmann had sought to reconcile the two components 
of Jewish society internationally by seeking to draw non-Zionist Judaism into support 
for the creation of a homeland for the Jews.  Within world Zionism there was a sense 
that it had been easier for Soviet Russia to obtain capital towards its Crimean 
settlement scheme from Jews in the United States than it was to obtain contributions 
from the same source towards the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.11     
 
From the outset of the Mandate and with the full endorsement of the British 
authorities political developments had followed a confessional path which was 
replicated in the social and economic life of Palestine.  In what might arguably be 
described as the kernel of Zionist ambitions was a conscious process of separation and 
displacement which had long been central to the logic of its ideology. Whilst the 
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notion of transfer out of the country was not to impact directly on the majority Arab 
Palestinian society until the events of 1947 onwards, it was already being actively 
considered as one outcome of the creation of a homeland for the Jews by leaders of the 
Zionist movement.  There had been attempts to claim Transjordan as a possible 
destination for Zionist settlers throughout the 1920s but this began to be promoted by 
Weizmann in private discussions with the British in 1929.12  The increasingly frequent 
presentation of the case for Arab Palestinian population transfer by the Zionists 
contributed to the drift by British towards the proposals for partition which were to 
emerge in the 1930s.13 
 
The notion of transfer, already intrinsic to the ideology of Zionism, began to be 
explored as a practical proposal in the late 1930s with the establishment of Transfer 
Committees which began to look at how to put such a policy into practice.14  The 
privileging of the investments of firms approved by the Zionists alongside the 
implementation of the exclusive employment policy of avoda ivrit and the 
introduction of protective economic measures, discriminated definitively in favour of 
the Zionist colonists.  This was not a process of separation of the economic spheres but 
rather one of taking measures which had the net result of clearly benefiting enterprises 
which were owned by members of the Yishuv in contrast to those which tended to be 
owned by members of the Arab Palestinian economic community.15 These 
asymmetrical policies had repercussions in many spheres of life beyond the purely 
economic. 
Fourth and Fifth Palestinian Congresses 
The Arab Palestinians kept up their lobbying of the British but following the 
unproductive meetings with Churchill in March 1921 the Arab Executive decided to 
organise a further Congress for 29th May 1921 in Jerusalem.  This Fourth Congress 
took place shortly after the violent disorder in Jaffa on 1st May which became the 
subject of the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry which I commented on in the previous 
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Chapter.  It decided to send another deputation to London to present its views 
regarding the future of Palestine but by this date the call for a united Greater Syria was 
no longer a demand put forward by the Congress.  The central item on the Conference 
agenda was the organisation of the deputation which additionally demanded putting in 
place a leadership structure that would remain at the helm in Palestine whilst the 
delegation travelled to London. As a result two leading Jerusalem political figures Arif 
Pasha al-Dajani, and Jamal al-Husseini took over the positions of President and 
Secretary respectively whilst the latter’s uncle Musa Kazem al-Husseini led the 
delegation.   
 
On their return from London the delegation made their report to the Fifth 
Congress which met in Nablus from 22nd to 25th August 1922. They reported that 
Churchill had met the delegation but, echoing his comments in Jerusalem the previous 
year, he dismissed their representations on the grounds that the British were 
committed to their objectives of the Balfour Declaration.  Having heard the report the 
Congress reaffirmed the general political positions of previous gatherings and 
discussed how to win support amongst the Arab people of other lands to intensify the 
campaign against the Zionist project.  The agreement to reach out for support beyond 
Palestine represented an important political step especially when coupled with the 
decision to agitate for coordinated action within the country through a boycott of 
Samuel’s proposed Legislative Council elections.  Following the Congress the 
Executive Committee became involved in “protests and representations over land 
concessions to the Jews and the necessity of safeguarding the interests of the Muslim 
fellahin who lived on the lands”.16  This represented a change in emphasis away from a 
solely anti-Zionist focus towards one which began to address social and economic 
issues and, critically, the role of the British authority.  This move took place even 
though there remained a strong inclination on the part of many of the a‘yan not to take 
direct anti-British actions.  It marked a beginning, albeit modest in scope, of popular 
campaigning as a compliment to a focus on lobbying of the Mandate authority.   
 
An orientation to a more broad-based engagement of the people in opposing 
the Mandate was at the centre of discussion at the Sixth Congress in Jaffa which began 
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on 16th June 1923.17   The Congress called upon King Hussein not to sign the Anglo-
Arab Treaty because a majority at the Congress believed to do so would amount to an 
endorsement of the project to establish of a homeland for the Jews.  At the centre of 
the debate over what tactics to employ was the question of taxation and a proposal for 
a boycott.  Jamal al-Husseini argued the position of boycott on the grounds of no 
taxation without representation.  The proposition stemmed from a resentment against 
the British who were accused of distributing monies to Zionist bodies whilst 
withholding them from Arab Palestinians.18  This resulted in a deep division within the 
Congress reflecting social divisions between the protagonists.  Those who opposed the 
call were led by “rich effendis … on friendly terms with the Zionists”.19  Those 
supporting the demands like ‘Isa al‘Issa owner of the newspaper Filastin belonged to 
the emerging middle class.20 
 
From a political perspective the splits which took place at the Sixth Congress 
reflected a fundamental line of divide between those who wished to continue to pursue 
a campaign of lobbying the British Government and those who increasingly were 
coming to the conclusion that there was a need to confront the British.  The moves 
towards the signing of the Anglo-Arab treaty had called into question the commitment 
of Hussein to Palestinian independence indicating that he was prepared to acquiesce to 
the Zionist project and that he had ambitions about his own future role in respect of 
Palestine.  Even some of those who had been sympathetic towards him now became 
sceptical suspecting that his actions might thwart their own ambitions to play a leading 
role in Palestine.  Eventually it was agreed that a delegation should be sent to London 
to clarify what the draft treaty said. 
 
The delegation left for London on 15th July 1923 spurred on by news that, 
following a decision on 27th June, a Cabinet Committee had been set up to look at the 
question of Palestine.  The British Government was reflecting on the conduct of the 
Mandate although they were anxious not to be seen to be deviating from the Balfour 
Declaration.  “There are some of our number who think that the Declaration was both 
unnecessary, and unwise, and who hold that our subsequent troubles have sprung in 
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the main from its adoption.”  However in the view of the Committee “Whether this 
policy has been wise or unwise … it is well-nigh impossible for any Government to 
extricate itself without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not of 
honour”.21  Despite the Committee’s reflection on the whole nature of the Mandate and 
even consideration as to whether it should be reformulated by the League of Nations, 
in the end it concluded, by agreeing with the comments of Sir Gilbert Clayton, that 
“that there is no ground what-ever for advocating the abandonment of the Zionist 
policy or relinquishing the Mandate”.22  The Committee report appeared before the 
Cabinet on 31st July that year with an agreement that “for the present nothing should 
be made public in regard to the Government’s policy, but that this should be 
announced by the High Commissioner on his return to Palestine in September”.23     
 
The Palestinian delegation was refused permission, on Samuel’s advice, to 
speak to the Committee and no Government minister or official met with them.24  The 
delegation returned to Palestine and they remained unaware of the Committee’s views 
until October 1923. They did however make contact with Hussein’s representative in 
London, Dr Naji al-Asil, whom they briefed on the Congress view of the Anglo-Arab 
Treaty. The delegation returned to Palestine but reflecting the continuing divisions that 
existed one pro-Hussein member, Amin al-Tamimi, remained behind continuing to 
promote to the Arab Executive a sympathetic attitude towards Hussein.25  Ultimately 
however pressure from supporters of the majority positions of the Sixth Congress 
contributed to the Treaty not being ratified.  The attacks by the Saudis and their defeat 
of Hussein’s forces ended the negotiations rendering it irrelevant since a central aspect 
of the Treaty had been to seek an agreement on borders between the two contending 
forces.      
 
Palestine, Syria And Iraq 
The failure of the traditional Palestinian political leaderships to influence the 
British towards any real acknowledgement of the demands for an end to Jewish 
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23 CAB 23/46 
24 Porath, Emergence, 174. 
25 Ibid., 181. 
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immigration, the sale of lands or acceptance of any form of move towards majority 
self-government began to impact more profoundly on the evolution of political 
organisation.  Neither the Congress resolutions nor the delegations to London, the 
meetings with the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner had brought any 
substantive change in British attitudes.  The next Arab Palestinian Congress was not to 
take place until June 1928 nearly 5 years later.  In part this reflected the impasse that 
the Arab Executive politics had reached but as will be examined later in this chapter it 
was influenced by a relative decline in Jewish immigration caused by developments in 
the world economy.  For a period Jewish emigration actually exceeded the inward 
movement of settlers despite growing anti-Semitism across parts of Europe. 
 
Political actors in Palestine were keeping a watch on the developments in Syria 
and Lebanon, variously described as the Great Syrian Revolt or the Great Druze 
Revolt, which took place between 1925–1927.  During the course of the conflict which 
began in the area of Jebel Druze but extended to link up with nationalist forces in 
Damascus an estimated 6,000 people were killed.26  For a time the French lost control 
of parts of Syria during the two year rebellion and ultimately felt obliged to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude entering into discussions about a Constituent Assembly.  
The document produced as a result of negotiations between the rebels and the French  
“declared Syria (including Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) to be one and 
indivisible”.27  The uprising however did not lead to any of the former supporters of a 
Greater Syria in Palestine resurrecting the demand for re-unification with Syria 
although money was collected in Palestine for the rebels indicating a degree of 
sympathy for their cause.28  Whilst France remained in control of the country the 
political initiative in Syria was taken by others.   
 
A number of those who fought against the French in 1925–1927 subsequently 
participated in the Palestinian Revolt of 1936–1939.  Fawzi al-Kawukji who played a 
prominent role in the Syrian Revolt brought a group of volunteers with him in 1936 to 
join the uprising, declaring himself as its leader.29  Said al-‘As and Sheikh Muhammad 
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al-Ashmar were two other veterans of the fighting who also travelled to Palestine in 
the same period.  Within Syria however it was the ambitions of Faisal, now King of 
Iraq, who was pushing forward an agenda based on creating bonds between Syria and 
Iraq in part as a protection against the perceived ambitions of Turkey towards northern 
Iraq.  Faisal had of course for a brief interlude been the King of Syria in 1920.  In later 
years these ambitions were to strengthen as in some respect they echoed those of the 
British mentioned in Chapter Two, to secure a safe outlet for oil from Mosul to the 
Mediterranean Sea.30  Neither Faisal nor his brother Abdullah however wished to 
become involved in a strategy incorporating Palestine in a reunification of Bilad al-
Sham.      
 
The British, the A‘yan and Comprador Politics 
As has been explained an Arab Palestinian national identity had been in the 
process of formation over a number of decades if not centuries.  Political and military 
resistance to invasion alongside ever more strengthening economic and social links 
had contributed to the formation of that identity within the Ottoman Empire.  
Parliamentary representatives, intellectuals and public figures contributed through a 
developing media to express that identity.  New generations and new politically active 
social layers created by the driving force of changing economic relationships began to 
change the way the Palestinian identity was expressed.   
 
The fundamental ambiguity and contradiction at the centre of the Balfour 
Declaration affected British attitudes towards the indigenous community. For their 
part the a‘yan too faced a contradiction. From the British perspective the dilemma was 
that they were attempting to co-opt the a‘yan to play a role in a project which was 
fundamentally antipathetic to their aspirations and the achievement of which meant the 
very negation of their significance. At the same time the British did not wish to 
provoke a reaction from the a‘yan and thereby risk jeopardising the incorporation of 
Palestine into the empire itself.  Although the a‘yan recognised that the Balfour project 
was contrary to their long-term goals they nevertheless wished to retain their status by 
demonstrating they were effective interlocutors. The British did not wish to co-opt the 
a‘yan and, as they had done elsewhere, create a comprador social layer because their 
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aim was to displace them and fulfil that end by building a strategic alliance with the 
Zionist settlers.  The harsh realities of the struggle for existence which confronted 
increasing numbers of Palestinians forced the a‘yan to resist the enticements of 
London.  Arab Palestinian political leaders were made aware that the base of support 
that they held would disappear if they failed to challenge the sale of land, the 
discriminatory employment policies and immigration as the perceived source of all 
these problems. 
 
The social and economic character of Palestine underwent a dramatic change 
from the period of the Ottoman Empire to the implementation of the Mandate which 
was reflected both in the forms of political organisations which arose and the political 
positions which they subsequently adopted.  When the British occupied Palestine two 
groupings of notables or a‘yan existed whose prestige was based on distinct sets of 
functions and relationships.  As I mentioned in the previous chapter the first consisted 
of those families whose prestige was based on the positions they held within society 
emanating from the structures of the Ottoman apparatus such as the Nashashibis, one 
of whose members, Raghib al-Nashashibi, had been a member of the Ottoman 
Parliament and the chief engineer for Jerusalem.31  This grouping who owed their 
status much more directly to the Ottoman apparatus was in a more vulnerable position 
in Mandate Palestine as the basis for their standing within society was removed. These 
fissures were to a degree mirrored across Palestine in other cities like Nablus and 
Acre.32     
 
The second grouping held positions based on local structures which continued 
to function under the British Mandate in the spheres of urban and local religious 
administration.  These structures remained in place and continued to function with 
British administration consent after the Ottoman army had been defeated and links 
with Constantinople were severed.  Those who belonged to the second grouping 
included members of the Husseini and Khalidi families whose positions and therefore 
status remained largely intact under the British.33  This changed circumstance 
influenced the political attitudes of members and supporters of the two groups of 
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notables’ families towards the British which was reflected in the political 
organisations they established and held allegiance to. 
 
Those, like the Nashashibis, whose status was linked to the Ottoman Empire, 
believed that Palestine should remain within the framework of a Greater Syria.  They 
were inclined towards a positive relationship with the French believing that this would 
ensure the best prospect of retaining the unity of Bilad al-Sham.  The steps taken by 
the British and the French to enact the Sykes–Picot agreement separating Palestine 
from the rest of the region swiftly led to a realisation that this was not a viable 
orientation.  Henceforth those associated with this perspective began to base their 
aspirations for Palestine on a strategy of alliance with the occupiers but this path was 
strewn with the problems arising from the political realities of the day and most 
importantly by the response of the mass of Palestinians towards the British and the 
Zionist settlers.    
 
Those who fell into the second category of a‘yan, like the Husseini and Khalidi 
families, whose positions were based on the authority they derived from localised 
structures adopted a more or less independent position depending on the degree of 
pressure exerted on them by way of their contact with the local communities in which 
they were based.  These groupings were never rigidly fixed as members of both joined 
the other group from time to time and advanced the positions of their new grouping 
against their erstwhile associates.  
   
Samuel remained quite sanguine about the situation when he met the Executive 
Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress on 6th February 1923.  The political report 
by Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, placed 
before the Cabinet in January 1923 suggested that the programme of boycott agreed in 
August of the previous year showed little evidence of being pursued. Two subsequent 
events stimulated optimism amongst those aligned with the majority position at the 
Fifth Congress in Nablus.  The one was the victory of Mustapha Kemal at the battle of 
Dumlupinar, which constituted the last battle of the Greco-Turkish War and almost 
coinciding with the dates of the Fifth Palestinian Congress.  Samuel suggested that the 
victory gave confidence to the “Opposition” because it resurrected hope that the 
Treaty of Sèvres might be renegotiated placing Palestine back under Turkish influence.  
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The second was that with the change in government in Britain arising from the 
election of the Conservative Party in October 1922 there was a belief that this might 
provide an opportunity to change the stance of the British on the Mandate.34  The latter 
not such an unreasonable expectation of course given that as mentioned in Chapter 
Four above the House of Lords had voted in June to refer the Mandate back to the 
League of Nations. 
 
This combination of factors almost certainly strengthened the position of those 
amongst the Arab Palestinian population who rejected the proposal for an elected 
Legislative Council.  The positive response to voter registration indicated an 
enthusiasm to engage in a democratic process.  However the overwhelming political 
rejection of the proposal for the Council bore testimony to the unity of opposition to a 
measure which was regarded as disingenuous. Samuel prided himself that he had 
sought to win support for a more accommodating approach without recourse to 
coercion or bribery.35  “Not a pound has been spent by the Government on douceurs to 
individuals or in subventions to newspapers”.36  Despite this disavowal of interference 
in the political process Samuel sought to encourage the growth of the Moderate Party 
in order to encourage Arab Palestinian engagement with the Mandate authority. Both 
he, subsequent High Commissioners and Mandate Administrations, were not averse to 
seeking to exercise influence in the promotion of individuals, political groupings, 
organisations and parties whom they thought would be favourably inclined towards a 
relationship with them.37  A practice of course also pursued by a variety of Zionist 
organisations and individuals who tried to cultivate those whom they thought could be 
encouraged to take a sympathetic position on the Zionist cause and endorse the 
Balfour project.38 In the eyes of at least one author “there is no doubt whatsoever – 
abundant evidence exists in the files of the Zionist Executive – that the majority of the 
prominent personalities of the opposition benefited from financial support from the 
Zionists, made use of their help for various personal needs, and, when they came to set 
up their first political organisation, enjoyed the active support of this element”.39 
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After the collapse of the Legislative Council proposal, it was perhaps hardly 
surprising that Samuel’s attempts in 1923 to establish an Advisory Council also came 
to nothing.  In the Arab Palestinian leadership there remained on-going divisions 
reflected in the preparations and discussions for the Palestinian National Congresses.  
The splits revealed differences of perspective between two tendencies composed of 
social groups with divergent though not contradictory objectives.  The divisions which 
had existed around support for the policy of a Greater Syria continued to influence the 
positions taken by different groups.  Those who had originally wished to retain the ties 
to Bilad al-Sham were now deprived by the French of a partner and those holding 
more local positions not beholden to the Ottoman authorities adopted an orientation 
more inclined towards independence.  
 
The structure of the Advisory and Legislative Councils which Samuel 
proposed during his period of office as High Commissioner were based on this fictive 
narrative of creating an equilibrium between the Arab Palestinian community and the 
Zionist settlers.  The previous chapter indicated that the Arab Palestinian community 
had a good knowledge and understanding of the Zionist project.   
 
One institution that was established with British endorsement in Palestine was 
the Supreme Muslim Council which was inaugurated on 9th January 1922 at a meeting 
in Government House. The Supreme Muslim Council was comprised of members 
from the four districts of Acre, Nablus, Jaffa and Jerusalem/Gaza, voted on by an 
electoral college and not selected by the Administration. It was a body which by its 
very nature was intended to be responsible for the conduct of Muslim affairs, the 
management of awqaf (religious endowments), the appointment of qadis (sharia law 
judges), waqf commissioners (office holders responsible for religious endowments), 
imams (leader of mosque) and other responsibilities in the religious field. Al Hajj 
Muhammad Amin al-Husseini was elected its President with the support of forty of the 
forty-seven members of the Council and held the post from 1922 until 1937.  For their 
part however the Council members played a role in society beyond the boundaries of 
Islam and acted in a political role in their own capacity sending delegations to parts of 
the Muslim world to raise funds, working in alliance with the Arab Executive and 
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attending all of the Palestinian Congresses.40  Rashid Khalidi in The Iron Cage 
expressed the opinion that “never in the preceding several hundred years of Ottoman 
rule had such power over religious institutions and the resources they allocated been 
concentrated in local hands”.41  By legitimating its establishment Samuel had hoped to 
gain a degree of gratitude for his patronage and perhaps in turn use the body to assess 
wider community opinion.42  
 
Despite the rejection of the proposal in 1923, the idea of a Legislative Council 
remained an option for the Mandate Administration and at varying times appeared to 
receive a more favourable consideration from bodies like the Arab Executive, one of 
whose leading figures, al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini voiced support for the idea in 1925.  
His backing however reflected the debate amongst members of the Arab Palestinian 
community further demonstrated by the divisions between the Nashashibi supporters 
organised in Al-Hizb al-Watani al-‘Arabi al-Filastini, (Arab National Party) and their 
allies in Hizb al-Zurra (Peasants Party) on the one hand and those supporting the 
majority in the Arab Executive grouped around Musa Kazem al-Husseini.  Those who 
supported the Nashashibi grouping were sometimes referred to as Mu‘arada 
(opposition) whilst those around Husseinis and the Supreme Muslim Council were 
referred to as the Majlesiyoun (coalition).43  These divisions can be traced back to the 
historic social and economic divisions between different sections of the a‘yan 
groupings each with their own agenda which they used to enhance their own standing 
in the Arab Palestinian community and with the Mandate Administration.   
   
 An initiative to create a Legislative Council mooted in 1929 by the then High 
Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor came to nothing because of the political situation 
in Palestine.  The area known as the Wailing Wall to Jews and as Buraq to Muslims 
had been contested for a number of years but beginning in 1928 the dispute took on a 
more serious character as the area which had profound religious significance for both 
groups effectively became a dispute about national rights.  The view of the British 
Administration had been that the status quo should apply allowing Jewish worship at 
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the site but not the construction of anything of a permanent nature.44  The matter 
remained unresolved however and the area became the centre of a further dispute in 
1929.  
 
The events around the Wailing Wall or Buraq with Zionist and Arab 
Palestinian demonstrations and counter demonstrations beginning from 15th August 
1929 were to constitute a watershed in the evolution of politics in the country.45  A 
procession of Jews though Jerusalem led by Zionists from Tel Aviv culminated in a 
demonstration at the site with the singing of the Zionist anthem.  By way of response 
around 2,000 Arab Palestinians demonstrated in Jerusalem against what was 
considered a provocation.46  In the ensuing days a Jewish youth was stabbed and died a 
few days later.  On 23rd August Muslim villagers converged on Jerusalem responding 
to what was perceived as an attack on the Buraq.  The police were unable to disarm 
those present and news spreading to other parts of Palestine led to attacks on Jews in a 
number of places. In Hebron 60 Jews were killed and a further 45 in Safad.  Altogether 
133 Jews were killed and 116 Arab Palestinians with 339 and 232 wounded 
respectively.   The majority of the Arab Palestinians were killed by British forces.47  
 
Alongside the killings, attacks and retaliations took place on buildings, 
neighbourhoods and places associated with one or other of the communities.   Whilst 
the confrontations began around an ostensibly religious focus they took on a more 
overtly nationalist character. In some areas the attacks by Arab Palestinians were 
solely against Jews whilst in other areas, predominantly those which were almost 
exclusively Arab Palestinian, attention had turned against the British or places 
associated with the administration of the Mandate.  Within sections of the Arab 
Palestinian community a debate began on the events and within the Arab Youth 
movement for example this led to a split between a majority current who wished to 
focus the attack against the Jewish community and a minority who wanted to turn 
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attention towards the British.48  The response by the British Administration was sharp 
and effectively resolved the debate in favour of what had been the minority current.49  
 
The British response was swift and, for the time being, decisive.  In the 
following days over 1,000 Arab Palestinians were arrested of whom 26 were 
sentenced to death.  Collective punishments were imposed on those towns and villages 
considered to have participated in the actions and with the introduction by the British 
authorities of these punitive measures sections of the a‘yan leadership disavowed any 
association with the events, rejecting accusations that they had inaugurated them or 
played any role in them.   At the same time a different dynamic was playing out 
amongst wider sections of the Arab Palestinian population with the creation of popular 
committees designed to assist the conduct of armed struggle and an estimated 400 
volunteers coming forward to take part. Police reports from Haifa sub-district for 5th 
October describe arms “being smuggled both from Syria and Transjordan” whilst a 
secret memorandum from the Office Commanding the Arab Legion (Transjordan) 
reported meetings of Sheikhs who had discussed  “the possibility of marching armed 
force into Palestine”.50  The report details the spread of “gangs” prepared to take action 
and the movement of arms to assist the anti-British forces including rifles and 
ammunition smuggled in via camels and hidden away in the countryside.51   Perhaps 
indicating the growing seriousness of these threats is the comment that “Experienced 
bandits are being consulted as to the best means of carrying out guerrilla warfare, 
which may commence after the Commission for London arrives and completes its 
report”.52  The report warns that preparations are being made across Palestine of this 
kind. 
 
A Secret Intelligence Report of 13th November 1929, received by the British 
Cabinet, identified a “Boycott Committee” which consisted of  “24 members, eleven 
of whom are stated to be members of the Palestinian Communist Party”, the objective 
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of which, it claimed, was to assassinate any Arab Palestinian who broke the boycott.53  
A further allegation in the report is that the purpose of the organisation was to 
undertake reprisals against Jews in the event that death sentences were carried out on 
Arab Palestinians.  This latter suggestion seems unlikely in view of the presence of 
members of the Palestinian Communist Party in the Committee given that Party’s 
opposition to attacks against Jews. 
 
This creation of popular committees constituted a departure from the 
traditional forms of organising and political representation which had hitherto been the 
voice of Arab Palestinians.  This break with previous traditional hierarchical and 
hereditary forms of politics was based on layers who were the product of the social 
differentiation mentioned in the last chapter.  The emergence of a significant number 
of people volunteering to be part of a militant opposition to the British is suggestive of 
a widespread movement towards a more sharply articulated ant-imperialist perspective 
and away from a focus which concentrated on the Jewish settler immigrants. 
Additionally whilst the Palestine Communist Party did not represent a mass 
organisation it had a singular orientation towards the Arab Palestinian working class 
and its presence on the Boycott Committee signaled its intent.54  The importance of the 
Communist Party should not be exaggerated but its development and the role it played 
was a small indication that sections of the Arab Palestinian working class felt the need 
to have their own voice within the struggle for self-determination.  
 
The response of the British to the events surrounding the Wailing Wall or 
Buraq was to set up an inquiry which would examine the riots that took place and 
report to the Cabinet.  The Commission, chaired by Sir Walter Shaw, published their 
report in April 1930 and found that the Arab Palestinians were the instigators of the 
events but recognised that, “the fundamental cause of the outbreak was the Arab 
feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the 
disappointment of their political and national aspirations, and fear for their economic 
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future”.55   Whilst largely reiterating the White Paper policy of 1922 the Commission 
questioned whether the land could support the growing numbers of immigrants 
without real investment in agriculture in particular.   
 
The upsurge which occurred in 1929 was only reversed by the British 
mobilisation of considerable resources to effectively impose martial law and initiate a 
regime of blanket repression in the country. The Officer Commanding the British 
troops was reported as saying: “The whole country is disaffected, practically 
everywhere disorder, or threat of disorder, has occurred, and demands for protection, 
which cannot be ignored, are still being received by me. Originally, it is true, the 
trouble was between Jews and Arabs, and not against the Government, yet there is 
clear evidence that Arabs are now becoming antagonistic to authority if only because 
their designs are being frustrated, and the tendency is growing”.56  Troop and police 
presence was increased and collective fines were imposed on villages from which 
those arrested originated. 
 
Two distinct features began to emerge in the uprising.  The development of 
groups prepared to enter into armed confrontation with the British in a systematic 
fashion and the appearance of popular committees organised across Palestine linked to 
an anti-Mandate agenda.  These features which appeared during the course of the 1929 
uprising were to become a characteristic of Palestinian politics from then on.57  On 17th 
January 1930 Chancellor, the then High Commissioner, asked the Cabinet to consider 
amending the Mandate either to place both the Jewish and the Arab Palestinian 
community on a similar footing or else to increase the military presence in order to 
protect the Jews from the inevitable attacks by the Arab Palestinian population.58  This 
was not something that the Labour Party Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord 
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Passfield, was prepared to agree to however. 
 
The sharpening of political differentiation, from the politics of the a‘yan 
dominated Arab Executive Committee and the Supreme Muslim Council, was evident 
by the appearance of new political parties which adopted a more explicit anti-British 
position and broke with their exclusively anti-Zionist and anti-Yishuv stand.  Sir 
Arthur Wauchope replaced Chancellor in October of 1931, a period shaped by the 
events around the Wailing Wall which had resulted in both an International 
Commission of Inquiry conducted by the League of Nations and the emergence of a 
more explicitly anti-British politics as reflected in the positions adopted by bodies like 
the Istiqlal Party.  The Istiqlal Party, founded on 4th August 1932, took a position of 
intransigent opposition to serving on any bodies established by the British and in 
September 1932 persuaded the Arab Executive to adopt a similar stance despite the 
inclinations of supporters of the Mufti and the Nashashibi faction.59  For their part the 
Zionist Executive, which had already taken a decision in August 1930 that they would 
not participate in the Legislative Council then being floated by Chancellor, maintained 
their opposition.60 
 
A further attempt to establish a Legislative Council took place in December 
1935 but as with the previous effort in 1929 this was also in a political context with 
very different characteristics than that in which the initial proposals had taken place 
when Samuel was High Commissioner.  Preliminary consideration of the proposal was 
aired in a “Very Secret” Memorandum written by the Conservative party politician Sir 
Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies on 28th March 1934.61  He 
himself had wished “that the proposal had never been made” but he accepted that it 
was as a result of undertakings given to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates 
Commission that it had to be considered.  His assessment was that based on the 
assumption that the High Commissioner would have the last word on any decisions he 
saw no real objection but he remained fairly sceptical as to the advantages of 
establishing it. “The Arabs are very insistent that we should carry out these 
undertakings while at present the Jews are opposed to the setting up of a Legislative 
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Council. … I have made it plain that such a Council could have no executive authority 
and that the power of the High Commissioner to ensure the passage of measures which 
he thinks essential remain unimpaired, and that he would, of course, have the power of 
veto, which exists in all Colonies.  Provided the High Commissioner has these powers, 
I do not myself attach much importance to an official majority”.62 
 
His discussion with “several influential Arabs” led him to believe that the 
Council could be established without too much aggravation although his description of 
the body differs so little from previous attempts that it is difficult to believe that he had 
any greater expectation of it being set up than any other previous initiative. According 
to Cunliffe-Lister’s report the “Jews (were) opposed to the setting up of a Legislative 
Council”.  It was a matter of the British being obliged to go through their paces.  
Whatever the sincerity of the British the proposal for the Legislative Council went 
ahead only to be met with rebuttal from another quarter.  In response to the uprisings 
against the British in 1936 the House of Commons, at the instigation of the pro-Zionist 
members of Parliament defeated the Government proposal to establish the Legislative 
Council.63 
 
Whilst all these initiatives of course took place in differing circumstances the 
Arab Palestinian verdict on each occasion was a clear rebuttal of structures which they 
perceived as thwarting their progress towards self-determination.  Sections of the 
leadership, principally, though not exclusively, those associated with the Nashashibi 
led political current, repeatedly gave their support to the proposals in the first instance.  
On each occasion Arab Palestinian popular opinion resulting from political events 
obliged the leaderships to repudiate the idea of a Legislative Council or forced them to 
turn away from it.   
 
The British were capable of creating alliances with a local hereditary ruling 
class as they were to do in Mesopotamia and Transjordan but their objective for 
Palestine was the creation of a national homeland for the Jews.   Palestine fitted into 
neither the comprador model nor did it follow a traditional pattern of colonisation.  
The British having decided that they wished Palestine to be a strategic component of 
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the imperial architecture they did not want however to enter into a relationship with 
the dominant ruling class group the a‘yan because that was in contradiction with the 
objectives. The fulfilment of the obligations the British had agreed in the Balfour 
Declaration was fundamentally antithetical to an approach which would include the 
indigenous ruling class in any form of privileged relationship with the imperial power.  
To do so would, in reality, have eliminated the Zionist project as an option.  
 
The British intention and the trajectory of its political and economic policies 
was to establish a clientelistic coterie from within the Zionist Movement well disposed 
towards London and willing to protect British interests.  Uniquely however this group 
did not constitute a hereditary ruling class but were settler-colonists with divergent 
social roots who at this stage were by no means a homogenous social entity.   Some of 
those who arrived in Palestine did so with their own capital with which to launch 
enterprises and were not dependent on the British for investment in the companies 
they set up.  The a‘yan group for its part, having seen its own aspirations to remain 
within Bilad al Sham dismissed by the rigid implementation of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, were, despite their willingness to play the role, rejected as a group suitable 
to and capable of fulfilling the role which the British intended.    
  
The world economy and the development of politics in Palestine 
The reasons for the apparent political hiatus between 1925 and 1928 have been 
ascribed to numerous causes.  The decline in immigration, the effects of an economic 
boom in the United States of America and the difficulties being faced by the Zionist 
Organisation itself.  In the period prior to the Wall Street crash of 24th October 1929 
the stock market had doubled in value and the apparent boom in the United States 
economy no doubt acted as a magnet for immigrants.  Paradoxically one might argue 
that the crash which took place in the United States economy served to further 
illustrate its increasingly hegemonic position in the world since its effects were 
global.64 
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During this period the British were also pursing their own economic goals 
related to their interests in oil in the Near East and the advantages afforded by their 
presence in Palestine to secure a port terminal for their shipping in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.65  The new-imperialist ambition to gain a dominating position in 
the oil industry in the region remained as fervent as ever.  The British and French 
economic rivalry remained as strong as it had been throughout the negotiations over 
the demarcation of spheres of influence between Syria and Palestine and the 
government played a key role in liaising with the Iraqi Petroleum Company 
throughout the discussions on this.  It was a matter which was of great interest to the 
Cabinet, for military and commercial reasons, potentially benefitting the oil industry 
and companies involved in the railway industry, whilst possibly alleviating 
unemployment amongst certain groups of skilled workers.66 
 
The period roughly coincides with the Fourth Aliyah (1924–1929) which saw a 
large increase in Jewish immigration, largely composed of small traders and 
middlemen driven out of Poland, especially from Warsaw and Łódż, by anti-Jewish 
legislation in the country.  Additionally, the numbers increased because the United 
States of America placed tight restrictions on those allowed entry on the basis of the 
country of origin.67   “Only about one-third of those who came in the middle of the 
1920s were halutzim who wanted to become manual labourers.”  In the eyes of 
sections of the Zionist labour movement they were regarded as “capitalists without 
capital”.  They settled in the towns and the capital they had, tended to be invested in 
“land speculation and building, and only to a small extent into factories and the 
expansion of agriculture”.68  Unemployment grew in the Yishuv and emigration began 
to increase as a consequence.  The crisis within the Yishuv resulted in 8,000 becoming 
unemployed and confidence in the Zionist project diminished inside Palestine. 
 
The exacerbations arising from the intensifying international economic crisis 
coupled with the problems developing within the Yishuv contributed to a sharpening 
political debate within the community.  Acute differences of perspective arose within 
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the Zionist political movement beginning from around 1925 onwards which ultimately 
led to the split in 1933 when Jabotinsky left to form a new organisation.  Those, like 
Ben Gurion, who built their political base in the more cohesive working class sectors 
of society were to succeed in winning the majority support in the Zionist Congress. 
The Histadrut acting as employer and provider of social support grew throughout the 
period developing their corporatist approach linking all strata of the Yishuv into a 
singular nationalist ideology. 
 
The period of relative quietude of course did not mean that the issues or 
concerns which the Arab Palestinian Congresses had given voice to ceased.  Land 
sales continued throughout the period with occasional fluctuations. The area sold in 
one year more than doubling a previous year’s transactions.69  The area of land 
purchased from the non-Palestinian big landowners in the years from 1920 to 1927 
constituted an average of 80% of all sales compared to 16% from big Arab Palestinian 
landowners and just under 3% from fellahin.  This pattern changed from 1928 onwards 
as sales by the last two groups increased.  Sales by big Arab Palestinian landowners 
doubled and those by fellahin increased six-fold.70  This pattern was a consequence of 
a combination of a severe fall in agricultural production due to a variety of plagues, 
the inability to compete with foreign imported crops and the growing indebtedness of 
the fellahin.71  
 
Those fellahin displaced by the sales of lands on the coastal plains, in the 
Jezreel Valley and elsewhere were forced to move to the urban areas in the search for 
work, which, when they found it, more often than not was casual in nature.  Whilst in 
certain areas of employment more directly under the control of the Mandate authority, 
like the Railways, Arab Palestinian workers could receive the same wages as their 
Jewish counterparts, in other areas where the employer was pro-Zionist pressures were 
brought to bear to discriminate in favour of Jewish workers.   
 
The accumulative impact on the economy of the Mandate Administration’s 
implementation of the Balfour Declaration which, initially, was more tangible in the 
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rural communities, was now being experienced with ever increasing severity in the 
urban sector.  The symbiotic relationship between the urban and the rural took on 
added significance in the social realm.  The relatively recent but accelerating 
displacement of fellahin forcing them into the towns and cities added another 
dimension to the dynamic of that relationship which was to surface in the political 
sphere as will be examined later.  Greater numbers of Jewish immigrants were also 
gravitating towards the towns which because of the segregationist employment 
policies coupled with a separationist practice in the sphere of workplace organisations 
created major obstacles in the way of developing a unified trade union movement. 
 
Farmers and fellahin were vulnerable to the swings in the prices of products on 
the world market as a result of which indebtedness became widespread.  In 1930 the 
“bulk of the wheat crop … was mortgaged for debt payment to moneylenders, many of 
whom were grain merchants”.72  In order to survive and prepare crops for the coming 
year they were forced into borrowing money, frequently from the large landowners 
who charged exorbitant interest on the money they lent.  In some cases money was 
loaned at 30% and above and selling land may have seemed the only resort.  Other 
Arab Palestinians acted as brokers facilitating the sale of lands.  Yehoshua Porath 
states in From Riots to Rebellion that amongst those who sold land or brokered sales 
were, “people from varying strata: opposition members of the SMC and of the AE, 
party leaders representatives to the National Congress and prominent members and 
activists of the MCA and other nationalist organisations, Mayors, notables and the 
common people”.73  Those close to the Nashashibi-led oppositionists were more 
involved though this activity was not exclusive to them. 
 
This fracture between the subaltern embourgeoisified landowners and their 
increasingly proletarianised former tenants contributed to making the creation of a 
united nationalist movement more difficult.  In an economic sense it could be said that 
both groups were placed in a position of precariousness. The a‘yan who dominated the 
political organisations which had developed in Palestine wished to end the sale of 
lands in order to preserve their privileges rather than to displace the economic and 
social relationships which had previously existed.  In the policies adopted by the 
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Congresses they failed to elaborate a programme for the land which might have 
contributed to the formation of a national movement which could mobilise all layers of 
society by at least guaranteeing security of tenancy for the fellahin.74 
 
Arab Palestinian political factionalism and Zionist sectarianism  
Although there were no Palestinian National Congresses between June 1923 
and June 1928 it would be an error to view this as a period of political inactivity.  
During this period political parties were formed which reflected different perspectives 
and components of society.  This change marked a further transition from the 
hereditary politics of the a‘yan to forms of organisation which reflected social interests 
albeit one which was in part abetted by the intervention of the British and the Zionists.   
The hierarchical social relations inherited from the Ottoman period and still to some 
extent preserved in Palestinian society were challenged by the changing nature of 
economic relations.  The interpersonal relationships in the old economic forms were 
broken by the newer alienating ones associated with commodity production and the 
marketisation of society.  In the absence of the Congresses, which was a consequence 
of an inability to reconcile the two dominant sections of the nationalist movement the 
Majleyisoun and the Mu‘arada, debates over strategy took place within these separate 
groups. Perhaps the most polarised positions in this debate were evident in the 
discussions within the Arab Executive itself, where the failure of the lobbying strategy 
which had been adopted to influence the British, was now being challenged.   
 
At the meeting on 26th October 1923, just a few months after the Sixth 
Congress, a debate took place in the Executive Committee on strategy and tactics.  
There was agreement to adopt a policy of non-cooperation with the Government and 
opposition to the proposal for the creation of an Arab Agency, however there was not 
agreement about what tactics should be adopted to resist the British.  Mohamed Ali 
Eltaher, secretary of the Palestine Committee in Egypt, favoured a revolt but in the 
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opinion of Musa Kazem at that time such a step would be counterproductive.75  
Perhaps because he was based in Cairo, Ali Eltaher’s opinions failed to carry the day 
but they were nevertheless indicative of developments which were to surface later. 
 
The Sixth Palestinian Congress was divided over a number of issues.  Just four 
months after it had taken place and one month after the Executive had debated the 
issue of intensifying the opposition to the British, those who supported the Nashashibi-
led current took steps to establish a political party.  In reality this was the culmination 
of a process which had been developing for a number of years.76  Al Hizb al-Watani al-
‘Arabi al-Filastini (Palestinian Arab National Party) held its first Conference on 9th 
and 10th November 1923 electing an eight member Executive Committee with Sheikh 
Sulayman al-Taji al-Faruqi as President and Fakhri Nashashibi, playing a leading 
organising role.  Fakhri, who was the nephew of Raghib, the Mayor of Jerusalem, 
sought financial backing from Zionists on the grounds that its platform would 
accommodate to the creation of a homeland for the Jews but he did not receive it.    
 
A few months later Hizb al-Zurra (Party of Farmers) which, quite frequently, 
aligned itself with Al-Hizb al-Watani al-‘Arabi al-Filastini, was established in 1924 
with the support of Zionist funding.  The Zionists supported such initiatives to 
encourage a more sympathetic approach by the Arab Palestinian leadership for the 
creation of a homeland for the Jews.  The party was formed in Nazareth, Nablus-Jenin 
and Hebron regions and was based on sheikhs who were influential in their villages.  
The problems which rural communities were facing were becoming more difficult 
through the 1920s as the report of Sir John Hope-Simpson in 1930 indicated.77  The 
issues of concern were not only those caused by the sale of lands to Zionist 
organisations but the difficulties Arab Palestinian farmers faced due to the punitive 
interest rates on loans to capitalise their farms and the fluctuations in the market price 
of their produce.78  The increase in sales of land by owner-occupiers in the early 1930s 
was an indication of this growing problem.   
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The seeming inability of the existing political leaderships to wring any 
significant concessions from the British led to the sharpening of divide between the 
two dominant trends within Palestinian nationalism and also to divisions within the 
majority current led by the Arab Executive.  It was perhaps in response to this 
situation that the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) began to appear as a political force, 
though by definition it could not represent the whole of Arab Palestinian opinion and it 
too was riven by the same political problems that beset the Congress. The situation 
was further exacerbated by the actions of Al-Jam‘iyyah al-Islamiyya al-Wataniyyah 
(National Muslim Association) which sought to discredit the Sixth Congress in its 
protest to the High Commissioner arguing that that it did not represent the Arab 
people.79  A confessional politics would not bring about a unified perspective since 
Christian Palestinians would inevitably be marginalised if not alienated.80    
 
Attempts were made to reconcile the two wings of the nationalist movement, 
including an attempt to convene a Seventh Palestinian Congress in 1924.  To prepare 
for the Congress a joint group made up of four members of the Arab Executive and 
four representatives of the opposition was set up.   One of the demands which proved 
the breaking point however was that the Nashashibi opposition dissolve its political 
party and unify with those who supported the Arab Executive.  Their allies in Hizb al-
Zurra however refused to endorse such a move and the proposal for the Congress was 
blocked. Notwithstanding these differences a unified display of opposition to British 
policies was possible as exemplified by the strike on 25th March 1925 in protest at the 
arrival of Balfour in Palestine.81  A further attempt to convene the Congress took place 
in 1926 and again in 1927.  Factional divisions within the opposition group provoked 
by an element of regionalism proved the major stumbling block as various individuals 
refused to collaborate in the venture.82 
 
When the Seventh Palestinian Congress was eventually convened in Jerusalem 
in June 1928 there was a notable shift in its composition from previous congresses.  
Those who supported the development of a more collaborative line towards the 
                                                
79 Ibid. 214.  
80 Kayyali, 137. Porath, Emergence, 216. 
81 Kayyali, 134. Porath, Emergence, 250. In an effort to display unity to the British the President of the 
National Party acted as the chief spokesperson of the delegation which met the Colonial Secretary, L. S. 
Amery in 1925. 
82 Porath, Emergence. 252. 
 237 
Mandate authorities were larger in number and Congress decisions, refraining from an 
explicit rejection of the Balfour Declaration, also reflected that view.  Those in the 
northern regions who were more supportive of the Nashashibis and some of the 
Christians who had been alienated by what they viewed as hostility from some 
Muslims came together to support the call for the establishment of a Legislative 
Council.  The Congress elected a new 48 member Executive Committee composed of 
two Muslim delegates from each of the sub-districts, one being from the camp of the 
SMC and one from their opponents.  In addition there would be twelve Christian 
representatives.83    
 
The positions adopted however did not meet with universal approval.  Inside 
the Congress a group of younger delegates led by Hamdi al-Husseini from Gaza 
demanded that the Congress call for self-determination in the context of a Pan-Arabist 
orientation.84  They took the view that the decisions of the Congress fell short of the 
goals that should be set and they were not alone in having this critical attitude.   A few 
years later the position they took was echoed by the fledgling Palestinian Communist 
Party which characterised the Arab Executive and the Seventh Congress as “having 
entered on the road of traitorous competition with the Zionists in bargaining for 
concessions from British imperialism”.85    
 
The British were aware of the sharpening orientation towards an explicitly 
anti-British stance by increasing sections of the Arab Palestinian community.  
Amongst some British politicians there was a recognition that this position resulted 
from their adherence to the Balfour Declaration.    In the memorandum “Palestine” 
mentioned above, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 
warned the Government that “Arab hostility today is not merely hostility to the Jews, 
but hostility towards the British Government as the authors of immigration”.86   It was 
clear to him that the majority of fellahin displaced by land purchases in fact finished 
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up unemployed and that this could not be resolved as long as all employment 
vacancies were only to be filled by new settler-colonists.  His view was that only by 
the Zionists abandoning their employment policy could a basis be found to resolve the 
opposition to Jewish immigration expressed by the Arab Palestinian population. 
 
The rise of Nazism and its impact on Palestine 
The demographics of Palestine were to change dramatically in the 1930s. The 
rise to power of the Nazis in Germany led to a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
Jews fleeing persecution, and the numbers of those seeking to emigrate to Palestine 
increased.  Once again, as in 1924, the United States of America and other Western 
European countries imposed quotas which had the affect of limiting the numbers of 
Jews they would permit entry to their respective countries.  Whilst the criteria used 
were not always explicitly anti-Jewish, nevertheless, the formulae used impacted 
disproportionately on Jews seeking refuge from the Nazis and anti-Semitism.   
Approximately 40,000 Jews fled Germany, between 1933 and 1935 and a further 
110,000 fled Poland and other central European countries increasing the size of the 
Yishuv to 443,000 or 30% of the total population of Palestine.87   
 
In the main the new immigrants settled in the urban areas increasing the size 
of cities like Tel Aviv. According to the official statistics, designating any Jewish 
immigrant with more than £1,000 as “capitalists”, those so labelled increased as a 
proportion of immigrants to Palestine.88  The amount of capital invested in Palestine 
almost tripled between 1930 and 1939 and the value of production increased nearly 
fourfold between 1930 and 1938.89  This strengthened the bourgeoisie within the 
Yishuv and with the increasingly tight application of the policy of avodha ivrit this led 
to a growth of the Jewish working class and a rise in unemployment amongst the 
Palestinian working class, many of whom had lost their lands as the increased inflow 
of capital also contributed in part, to an expansion in the purchase of land.90 Although 
initially the policy adopted by bodies like the Jewish National Fund and the Zionist 
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settlers had favoured the purchase of large tracts of lands this pattern began to change.  
Initial sales of lands, as we have noted above, were carried out by absentee landlords 
like the Sursuqs, but with the reduction of land available from this source, purchasers 
turned to buying smaller areas of land owned by Palestinian small farmers who had 
become increasingly indebted because of the fall in the price of their crops. 
 
This economic and social shift impacted on the Palestinians who became 
much more conscious of the changing demographics and the potential consequences 
for their political goal of achieving self-determination.  The changes inevitably 
encouraged the Zionists to put pressure on the British in pursuit of more favourable 
policies and for the establishment and recognition of proto-state institutions such as 
the Haganah.  These developments inevitably were to increase the anxiety of the 
Palestinians that their chance of achieving their goals were threatened and no doubt 
contributed significantly to the search for radical solutions to the problem.   
 
 
Palestine and the Imperialist Rivalry re-born 
Whilst the significance of inter-imperialist rivalry as a factor influencing 
British policy in the Near East fluctuated it did not recede entirely since some 
countries retained territorial ambitions which they did not feel had been resolved by 
the negotiating process.   Some of the victors were discontented with the outcome of 
the Paris Peace Conference and subsequent treaties because they felt that they had not 
benefitted to a level commensurate with their efforts in the war.  Of course in the years 
ahead those who were defeated, like Germany, came to take courses of action which 
were to impact greatly on the future of Palestine. 
 
British desire to maintain a hegemonic position in relation to Palestine 
remained as determined as ever.  Safe passage for British ships to India coupled with 
the growing importance of oil discovered in Iraq and elsewhere put pressure on the 
Whitehall Government to view Palestine as of continuing importance in their imperial 
plans. Italian ambitions to expand beyond Libya into Ethiopia and parts of Somaliland 
posed the kind of the threats which had in the past been forthcoming from the 
Ottoman-German alliance.  In the early 1930s Germany had not adopted an aggressive 
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attitude towards the British nor exhibited any expansionist ambitions towards the 
colonies of East Africa.  On the other hand the British were concerned about the plans 
of Italy in Africa.  
 
Oil remained a major factor governing British policies towards the Arab 
regions.  The British navy in 1930 demanded that, in order to service all vessels, a 
year’s supply of oil should be stockpiled.91  The discovery of reserves of oil in Iraq 
added importance to the building of the Baghdad–Haifa Railway which would 
facilitate the construction and military protection of a pipeline linked to the 
Mediterranean Sea.  Old rivalries were viewed as a possible challenge to the operation 
however with France suspected of harbouring ambitions towards Haifa if the pipeline 
were to be built.  The project was regarded as very important because it had the 
additional advantage that the costs of shipping incurred by travelling through the Suez 
Canal could be greatly reduced.92  
 
The British Government faced a number of challenges arising from events in 
the wider world.  The Italian fascist Government of Benito Mussolini had, by 1934, 
established itself in Libya and was in the process of expanding its colonisation, 
developing roads and rail links to the Egyptian border.93  Thousands of Italian settler 
colonists had moved into the country and, with subsidies from the state, begun to farm. 
Additionally, resurrecting late nineteenth century Italian policy, Mussolini had the 
ambition of gaining control over Ethiopia and Somalia.  The British made several 
attempts to negotiate an agreement between the Italian Government and Emperor 
Haile Selassie but these ended in failure and in late December 1935 the Italian army 
launched an invasion of Ethiopia.94  The British viewed this as a further threat to the 
safe passage of their vessels to India since shipping passing through the Red Sea might 
become vulnerable to interception by the Italian forces able to close off the seaway at 
its southern end.  Seen as a further provocation by the British the Italian government 
had been in some discussions with sections of the Zionists and printed anti-British 
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material which was widely distributed throughout Palestine.95  Mussolini and not 
Germany was seen as the threat to the British Empire at this time, since Hitler was for 
much of the 1930s seeking to establish an alliance with London.96 
 
In Egypt in November 1935, there was mounting pressure through mass 
demonstrations calling for independence which led to the election of the Wafd party. 
Any move by the Egyptians, agitating for independence from the British, towards 
linking up with the Italian regime in Libya would have been considered another 
critical threat to Britain’s access to and control over the Suez Canal.97  As a 
consequence the British were forced into a round of negotiations on the future of the 
country seeking to pacify Egyptian demands for greater independence.  In Syria the 
French were under pressure in January 1936 from a similar wave of militant 
demonstrations and a two month long general strike which obliged them to enter into 
negotiations with the rebels.  The situation had another dimension from a Palestinian 
perspective with the proposal from King Abdullah that he become King of a unified 
Syria and Transjordan.  The suggestion was modified to distinguish between French 
and British spheres of influence but nevertheless had the potential to destabilise the 
political situation in Mandate Palestine.98    
 
In addition to these concerns about the political problems of areas surrounding 
Palestine the British of course were still focussed on their wider imperial objectives in 
the economic sphere.  During World War One the British had been preoccupied by the 
thoughts of possible Russian ambitions towards Persia and Afghanistan and whilst that 
concern was altered by the advent of the 1917 Soviet Revolution it nevertheless 
remained a matter of importance to the British because of India.  In December 1934 
the British Cabinet considered a Memorandum from Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of 
State for India, outlining discussions which had taken place with the Government of 
                                                
95 Weinstock, Zionism: False Messiah, 150.  Weinstock points out that Mussolini met the Revisionist 
wing of Zionism and Chaim Weizmann who followed his September 1926 encounter with him by a 
series of further meetings. The first Revisionist Congress was held in Milan in 1932 with the approval 
of the fascist review Oriente Moderno. 
96 CAB 24/262.  See also: Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, 72 ff.  Hitler’s focus 
was on Europe and seeing the virtual failure of British attempts to restrain Mussolini in Ethiopia 
encouraged him to occupy the Saar.  His position replicated that adopted by the German Government 
during World War One and the Drang nach Osten policy.  
97 Yapp, The Near East since the First World War, 58.  Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 235. 
98 Porath, In Search of Arab Unity: 1930–1946. 
 242 
Afghanistan.  The document reassured the Cabinet that the Afghan Government were 
well-disposed towards the British and that there was “no present danger of their 
adopting a pro-Russian policy or entering into any unwise commitment to Russia as a 
result either of Soviet threats or cajolery”.99 
 
British Commissions and Reports 
Following the events in 1929 the Government established a number of bodies 
to report on what had happened and to take a wider view of the situation.  Sir Walter 
Shaw was asked to report on what had happened and why, but alongside his 
Commission the Government agreed that a detailed report be made on the land 
situation and the likely impact of continued immigration.100  The report published in 
October 1930 was written by Sir John Hope Simpson and concluded that action had to 
be taken to address the problem of landless Arab families.  A survey of “104 
representative villages” concluded that 29.4% of the families having lost their lands, 
existed by working “in the village or outside or in other ways” and that if this 
percentage were extrapolated to the whole of the country it would be equivalent to 
around 25,572 families.101  “The condition of the Arab fellah is little if at all superior 
to what it was under the Turkish regime”.102  Hope Simpson’s report was referred to a 
sub-committee of the Cabinet, chaired by Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the newly formed National Government, which reviewed the costing of 
its proposals.  Snowden’s group, the Committee on Policy in Palestine, endorsed much 
of what Hope Simpson had highlighted and, in its second report, proposed that “the 
Palestine Administration should take immediate steps (a) to provide by means of 
legislation that during the next 5 years no further parcels of land shall be acquired by 
Jewish organisations, in order to give time for the assimilation of the landless Arabs 
under the policy which we recommend, and (b) to restrict the immigration of Jews to 
such numbers as can be settled on the reserve lands, or can confidently be expected to 
be absorbed into industrial occupation”.  The group warned that “If this is not done, 
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we fear that at the end of the five years the position will be no better, and possibly 
even worse, than it is at present”.103 
 
Lord Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, produced a White Paper at the same 
time as the Hope Simpson report but it was in many ways a reiteration of the 1922 
Churchill White Paper and the views expressed in the Haycraft Report.  On 31st March 
1930, a delegation led by Musa Kazem and including Hajj Amin and Ragheb 
Nashashibi had met with the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Lord Passfield.  
Passfield’s White Paper reflected the concerns that had been expressed there and was 
submitted to the Cabinet with the Hope Simpson report appended.  The White Paper 
echoed too the views of the Shaw Commission arguing that it was essential to look at 
“the three problems of development, immigration and unemployment”.104  He sought 
to put forward a scheme which he believed would demonstrate that the Government 
intended to treat both communities equally and this was coupled with a proposal for a 
Legislative Council.105 
 
The White Paper produced a strong reaction amongst Zionists with Chaim 
Weizmann, along with others, tendered their resignations from the Jewish Agency, on 
the grounds that Passfield was taking the view that the establishment of a homeland 
for the Jews was completed.106  In January 1931 however, his recommendations were 
effectively repudiated by the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in a letter to Chaim 
Weizmann. Even though the letter bore MacDonald’s name it was the product of 
discussions between civil servants and members of the Jewish Agency.107  MacDonald 
in what he asserted was “the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper”, pointed 
out that the Passfield White Paper was based on Churchill’s document of 1922 and 
that its commitment was to “the Jewish people and not only to the Jewish population 
of Palestine”.108  Between 1922 and 1931 Jewish immigration had increased by 110% 
and in the eyes of Arab Palestinians constituted a major threat to their national 
aspirations.  The letter refused to acknowledge the political rights of the Arab 
Palestinians and was read by them as a further encouragement to immigrants as it 
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specified that “the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close 
settlement by Jews on land remains a positive obligation of the mandate and it can be 
fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and positions of other sections of the 
population of Palestine”.109   MacDonald’s letter is effusive in its praise for the Jewish 
Agency but goes beyond that stating “His Majesty’s Government also recognizes the 
value of the services of labor and trade union organisations in Palestine, to which they 
desire to give every encouragement”.110  MacDonald emphasised his endorsement of 
the employment strategy adopted by the Jewish Agency stating that the “principle of 
preferential, and indeed exclusive, employment of Jewish labor by Jewish 
organizations is a principle which the Jewish Agency are entitled to affirm.” This 
constituted perhaps the most explicit declaration of support by any British 
Government for the policy of avoda ivrit and the discriminatory policies adopted by 
the Histadrut.  MacDonald’s letter became known by the Arab Palestinian community 
as the “Black Letter”.111 
 
The Shaw Report, the Hope Simpson Report and the Passfield White Paper had 
attempted to address the question of the economic problems of the Arab Palestinian 
population by proposing to restore some degree of compensation in respect to the rural 
population in particular.  The “disturbances of August 1929” had prompted the 
government to take a detailed look at the situation in Palestine.112  The White Paper 
identified “land, immigration and unemployment” as the three topics which were 
“interrelated, with political as well as economic aspects” and solving these questions 
was seen as the key to “peace and prosperity in Palestine”.113  The solutions offered by 
the British were continuously couched in terms of managing the flow of immigration 
and offering some degree of remedial action to improve the plight of landless fellahin 
and their families.  There was no recognition that these intractable problems were a 
consequence of the contradictory terms of the Balfour Declaration and the policies 
introduced by the British which were destroying the economic and social relations that 
had been present before their arrival.  The fundamental political question of what 
would be the post-Mandate form of government in an independent Palestine was 
                                                
109 Ibid., 39. 
110 Ibid., 38. 
111 Kayyali, 162.   
112 CAB 24/215 
113 Ibid. 
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seldom if ever addressed.  Unemployment was also widespread in the Arab Palestinian 
community.114  The reports to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates 
Commission echoed the position that there would be no change in respect of 
immigration which would continue to be governed by the 1922 White Paper’s formula 
of the “economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals”.115 
 
In subsequent years there were further Commissions and reports.  None of 
them succeeded in addressing the essential political issues nor resolving the economic 
ones.  The contradiction that was at the centre of the Balfour Declaration had practical 
repercussions on the policies adopted in the development of the Palestinian economy 
which as the White Paper had stated were interrelated and bore political effects too. 
The economic plight of the Arab Palestinian community worsened between 1929–
1931 as world commodity prices tumbled and farmers received less and less for their 
crops resulting in an increase in the numbers of landless labourers taking refuge in the 
towns and cities hoping to find work.  At the same time there was an expansion of the 
Jewish population, overtaking in some urban areas the numbers of Arab Palestinian 
inhabitants as increasing numbers of refugees fled the growing anti-Semitism in 
Germany and parts of Eastern Europe.  The apparent inability or reluctance of sections 
of the leadership of the Arab Palestinian society to challenge British policies 
contributed to the emergence and strengthening of currents which, having concluded 
that to achieve self-determination required a direct confrontation with the Mandate 
forces, adopted a much more explicitly anti-British stance. 
 
This accelerating radicalisation of opposition to the British administration was 
not confined to the existing traditional political formations.  As we have observed 
from the earliest period of the British occupation new social layers came into activity.  
In a repetition of patterns evident in the 1920s, women began to play an active role in 
the campaigning calling a conference in 1929 and in April 1933 a demonstration in 
protest at the visit of Lord Allenby.  Members of the Arab Women’s Association (later 
to be called the Arab Women’s Union) built new branches moving out from Jerusalem 
                                                
114 Exact statistics on unemployment for the Arab Palestinian community are not easily available but 
there are accounts in the Hope Simpson Report of 2,050 unemployed Arab Palestinian workers in Haifa 
alone and that there were large numbers of applicants for a job in Ramleh.   
115 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/AA1CA3C5176A0915052565D7005C1BC3 (accessed 1st 
October 2015) 
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to engage women in Nablus and elsewhere.116  They had connections with women’s 
movements in other parts of the world.  They were not immune however from the 
differences experienced in other organisations which saw the rift between the 
Majlesiyoun and the Mu‘arada.  
 
Youth organisations began to expand.  The first Congress of Arab Youth was 
held in Jaffa in January 1932 electing Issa al-Bandak as the President of its National 
Executive Committee.  Youth once again came to the fore in setting up of National 
Committees which sought to coordinate the resistance against the British forces. In the 
expansion of youth organisations new bodies were established, some of which like the 
Youth Troops were influenced by fascist youth groups.117  The Arab Young Men’s 
Association,  (Jam’iyyat al-Shubban al’Arab) was established in July 1931 at a 
congress in Nablus attended by over 300. Some advocated military training for the 
Boy Scout troops.118  A feature of the growth of these bodies and the emergence of 
more youthful activists was that they were frequently from cities other than 
Jerusalem.119 
 
The plight of landless fellahin and unemployed workers began to have greater 
significance in the development of the political discourse in Palestine.  This led to the 
increasing involvement of those who had come from the ranks of the landless fellahin 
and the unemployed workers in political activity alongside the developing new middle 
class social layers.120  It also manifested itself in the emergence of more socially 
conscious politics in some areas.  An example of the awareness of what was taking 
place in Palestinian society was reflected in the views expressed by at least one of the 
new political formations the Istiqlal (Independence) party which took an explicitly 
militant stance.  The new party considered the failure to date to be the product of the 
                                                
116 Fleischmann, The Nation and its “New” Women.  
117 This phenomenon of youth groups adopting some of the appearances of fascist youth organisations 
was replicated in the ranks of the Revisionist Zionists as well. 
118 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, 120. 
119 Kimmerling and Migdal, 89, 92. 
120 The composition of those who took part in the 1935 and 1936 armed revolts against the British 
included former railway workers, teachers, merchants, clerks at the Jerusalem Shar’i Court, labourers, 
porter in Haifa Harbour and members of urban notable families. (Porath, Riots to Rebellions, Appendix 
B.  Officers of the Revolt). 
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“egocentric and self-interested political notables who were subservient to the 
imperialist rulers”.121    
 
The economic situation and the lack of any significant political change on the 
part of the British led increasing numbers of Arab Palestinians towards a break with 
the political practices of the preceding decade.  It was this sharpening political and 
social differentiation which led to the 1936–1939 thawra (Arab Palestinian Revolt) 
and the subsequent repression unleashed by the British using the tactics of collective 
punishment, military repression, exile and intimidation to suppress a nationwide 
uprising expressing a desire for self-determination. The thawra went through stages 
but it was testimony to the depth of opposition to the Mandate that the British forces in 
Palestine were obliged to call on considerable reserves in order to thwart the ambitions 
of the Arab Palestinian people to assert their right to self-determination.  
 
Conclusion 
Undoubtedly certain dates stand out during the period of the British Mandate in 
Palestine as turning points in the development of the politics of the country.  It is a 
major contention of this thesis that although these events may be used to periodise the 
Mandate, they have to be recognised as essentially the products of processes which 
preceded the occupation as well as shaping and defining the rhythm of subsequent 
developments. 
 
The central problem confronting the Arab Palestinian community was that of 
seeking to assert its political right to self-determination against an imperialist power 
driven by its own priorities, and additionally, influenced by its alliance with an 
ideologically driven colonising movement.   The capacity of the Arab Palestinian 
community to challenge this alliance was undermined by the social disruption caused 
by the policies pursued by the occupying power which escalated that turmoil within 
the community.  In part the inability of the a‘yan to develop a political response to the 
challenges of landlessness and unemployment reflected a fundamental problem.  
Trapped in the discourse of an earlier epoch the recurrent demand was for the 
restoration of the status quo ante.  Their demand for the ending of the sales of land 
                                                
121 Kayyali, 167. 
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implied the maintenance of the pre-occupation forms of social relations consequent on 
the forms of land holding prevalent under the Ottoman rule.  Arguably the demand for 
an end to the sales by the fellahin originated from the more basic desire for the 
maintenance of their family’s livelihood.   
 
Calling on the traditional hereditary patterns of social and political relations 
which had existed during the Ottoman period reflected a failure to endorse or perhaps 
to recognise the significance of the profound economic, social and generational 
changes which were beginning to surface in Palestinian society.  As a consequence the 
move towards a more directly confrontational politics by the youth organisations 
frequently based outside of Jerusalem developed without the approval of the 
traditional leaderships and in some respects against their wishes. 
 
Schooled in a traditional relationship of accommodation with the ruling 
Ottoman Empire the a‘yan responded by seeking to recreate these political 
relationships with the British authorities.  The agenda of the British however was 
distinctly different from that of Constantinople and were determined first and foremost 
by their all-important imperial preoccupations.  Untroubled access to the Suez Canal 
and safe passageway to India was the on-going concern manifested in the British 
response to Mussolini’s ambitions in Ethiopia and Libya.   The importance of 
maintaining imperial interests was evident in their anxiety to ensure that the oil from 
Iraq was able to flow freely to Haifa to service the British fleet and stockpile supplies 
for the eventuality of war.  The repression meted out by the British in response to Arab 
Palestinian insurrectionary actions was substantially driven by its obsessive objective 
to maintain its presence in the region as much as by its commitment to the Balfour 
Declaration. 
 
The companies, factories and enterprises developed by the Zionist agencies 
and employers, committed to Zionism, constituted a form of industrial capitalism 
utilising investment from elsewhere which was able to develop and expand more 
rapidly than the predominantly mercantile capitalism of the Arab Palestinian 
bourgeoisie.  This process accelerated from 1933 onwards with the rise of Nazism in 
Germany.  Whilst the output of industries owned by pro-Zionist companies tended to 
be protected by the operation of Mandate enforced tariffs the crops and produce of 
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Arab Palestinian enterprises remained vulnerable to the changes in prices on the world 
markets and the importation of competing cheaper goods.  The displaced fellahin were 
denied entry to the labour market or exploited well beyond that of their Jewish 
counterparts.  The increased immigration from 1933 onwards saw a big increase in the 
working class component of the Yishuv and the corporatist alliances of the Histadrut 
with Zionist capital afforded a degree of protection for workers in the Yishuv though 
they too were vulnerable to the periodic crises in the world economy.  
 
The protectionism afforded to Zionist capital resulted in a burgeoning settler 
economy which displaced and disadvantaged the indigenous capitalist enterprises 
including the agricultural sector.  As a consequence a concomitant impoverishment 
afflicted the Arab Palestinian fellahin and the working class marginalised by the 
segregationist employment practices of Zionist enterprises and the militant 
corporatism of the Histadrut.  These economic and social developments contributed to 
the arrest of the development of a unifying programme which could address the 
specific challenges which different sectors of society faced.  These features arrested 
and distorted the development of social and political forces capable of developing a 
perspective which transcended these differences.
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Conclusions 
In the opening chapter I argued for the value of reconsidering the conceptual 
framework for analysing the nature of the British Mandate in Palestine.  Throughout 
the thesis the approach that I have adopted has sought to demonstrate the 
interconnectedness of the economic, social and political relations that impacted on the 
conduct of the Mandate administration and the responses of the Arab Palestinian 
community.  I have argued that an approach which analyses the specificity of British 
imperialism at the time of the occupation of Palestine and throughout the Mandate 
period benefits from a recognition of the interplay of the combination of factors 
influencing its development.  This approach is equally applied to the other principal 
agency, the Arab Palestinian people and to the initially less weighty agent, the Zionist 
settlers in this encounter.  The thesis has argued that whilst the encounter between 
these agencies is expressed principally in the form of political discourse the social and 
economic ingredients were critical to shaping the parameters within which this 
dialectic developed.  I argue that this synthesising approach has contributed to 
developing a fresh understanding of the British Mandate. 
 
Reflecting on the forms of imperialism which have developed over the 
centuries I argued that the nature of the new-imperialism which emerged at the end of 
the nineteenth century had features which distinguished it significantly from earlier 
forms of imperialism and had an effect on the way in which the British policies were 
implemented and developed.  In particular the territorialism and colonialism which 
had characterised the imperialism of the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were supplanted from the end of the nineteenth century onwards by a 
predominantly economic construct emanating from a globalised marketisation and 
commodification of products including the relatively new important raw materials of 
oil.  A characteristic and driving force of these changes was the emergence of 
powerful economic institutions produced through the fusion of the most aggressive 
and expansionist components of industrial and financial development.  The 
functioning of these institutions especially in the realm of overseas investments was 
buttressed by the mobilisation of their respective nation states to achieve or enforce 
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their goals.1  In some instances the establishment of clientelistic relationships with an 
indigenous ruling class obviated the need for a more direct intervention and 
colonisation.  
 
Under the terms of the Mandate the British government was supposed to 
ensure that bids to invest and create new industries were dealt with equitably.  The 
handling of the Rutenberg scheme epitomised the reality of the British partisanship in 
respect of projects for major capital investments which were in reality to create 
monopolistic companies.  Although the scheme for electrification had been promised 
prior to the war to a Greek entrepreneur M. Mavrommatis the British intervened to 
award the concession to Pinhus Rutenberg.  In the case of the Dead Sea concession for 
the development of its chemical resources the British backed the Palestine Potash 
Limited (PPL) company and found themselves in contest with the Syndicat Français 
des Potasses de la Mer Morte (SFPMM) which had the backing of the French 
government. Even though the British held the Mandate for Palestine they had to 
contend with on-going rivalry with their imperialist ally and the occasional 
intervention of foreign governments on behalf of citizens of their countries who 
argued that they had prior consideration in the awarding of contracts by dint of 
agreements that had been reached with the Ottoman rulers before the war.   
 
The inter-imperialist rivalry that erupted in World War One continued to be 
present even though the conflict did not manifest itself in physical confrontation.  The 
absence of any Arab Palestinian contender for the exploitation of the chemical rights 
of the Dead Sea was the consequence of their exclusion by the British.  Arab 
Palestinian entrepreneurs fully appreciated the potential of the Dead Sea chemical 
resources and regarded the transfer of the lands surrounding the area to companies 
which were owned by members of the Jewish community as both an economic blow to 
the development of Palestine and an assault on their national rights.  Arab Palestinian 
entrepreneurs were as prepared as their counterparts in the Yishuv and those sponsored 
by the Zionist movement, to identify for development those elements of the economy 
which would be strategic to the overall development of the country.    
 
                                                
1 Norris, Land of Progress, 184. See the detailed account of the British and French dispute over control 
of the chemical resources of the Dead Sea.  
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Previously in Britain, ideological rationalisations for imperial conquest based 
on the ideas of More, Grotius, Hobbes and Locke had been utilised to justify 
imperialist expansionism.  They were now being augmented by notions of racial and 
cultural superiority blended with quasi-scientific rationalisations mobilised in 
justification of colonial political practice.  The mission civilisatrice secularised the 
religious undertaking.  
 
The imperialist conquests did not go uncontested however.  In the second half 
of the nineteenth century new nation states were coming into being and yet more, in 
parts of the Ottoman Empire for example, sought to assert their right to independence 
from the imperial organism.  At the same time less dominant powers such as Italy and 
France sought to establish imperial interests through the colonisation of parts of the 
former Ottoman Empire in North Africa.  For a period both colonialism and 
colonisation existed side by side.  Out of this maelstrom of continuing colonisation 
and growing nationalism the Zionist response to the horrors of the pogroms rampant in 
Eastern Europe emerged arguing a nationalist revivalism in response to the 
persecution of Jews. The Zionist concept of “choseness” employed to argue the case 
for the establishment of a National homeland for the Jews in Palestine melded with the 
racial and cultural superiority views prevalent amongst many leading non-Jewish 
political figures in the imperial powers.  Non-Jewish adherents were won from the 
ranks of those who combined anti-Semitism with support for the Zionist cause in the 
hope that the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe would chose Palestine as an 
alternative to their own countries.  Their hierarchical ranking of peoples placed the 
Arab world of the Near East below that of Western Europe and the United States of 
America dismissing the entitlement of those who inhabited Palestine to the right to 
self-determination.  The imperial powers were to be the arbiters of fitness to merit the 
status of self-determination.  In the most grotesque manifestation of the use of such 
concepts European imperialist powers in Australia and South West Africa of course 
forced the transfer of peoples utilising genocidal practices which became synonymous 
with imperial expansion.  
 
I have used a conceptual framework outlined in Chapter One influenced by the 
writings of Karl Marx, Ellen Meiksins Wood, David Harvey, E. H. Carr and others to 
analyse afresh the way in which British policies were influenced by the characteristics 
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of this changing world.  This thesis has argued that the period within which the British 
government established the Mandate in Palestine constituted a moment in which the 
nature of imperialism was undergoing profound changes moving from a time in which 
it was typified by the use of colonisation as its defining characteristic to one in which 
the expansion of overseas investment was beginning to become the dominant form of 
its operation.  The last quarter of the nineteenth century had seen the rapid escalation 
of inter-imperialist rivalry resulting from the aggressive competition for dominance 
over increasingly important raw materials.  The attempts by the rival imperial powers 
through initiatives such as the Berlin Conference of 1884 to reach accommodations 
about existing points of contention and to anticipate future areas of disagreement 
failed to resolve the underlying problem at the centre of the changes taking place 
within the economies of the contestants. 
 
Chapter Two demonstrates how Britain and Germany, the two major 
contending imperial powers, sought to co-opt regional forces into their strategic 
perspectives. In both cases the interests of those with whom they sought to ally were in 
practice made subservient to the objectives of the imperial hegemon.  Both Britain and 
Germany were capable of deploying religious and secular apologetics to support their 
contentions in an effort to gain advantage.  The Germans and the British contested at 
different stages for the allegiance of both Muslims and Zionists presenting their 
motives in terms of the fulfilment of religious goals.   The political leadership in 
Germany sought to invoke the concept of jihad with the rulers of the Ottoman Empire 
in order to mobilise the peoples of countries with predominantly Muslim populations 
behind their war effort.  British politicians summoned up a Biblical narrative to justify 
their support for the Zionist project of creating a homeland for the Jews in Palestine.    
 
In analysing the different stages of imperialism I argued that the nature of the 
intervention by the imperial power was ultimately shaped by factors on the domestic 
front.  In Chapter Two I demonstrated how the capacity of the British to act on the 
international level was affected by the impact of the war on the home front and the 
challenge presented by the struggle for independence taking place in Ireland.  During 
the war Britain’s dependency on the USA for material and financial support to 
prosecute the conflict increased.  Whilst not deferring to USA views, the Cabinet 
discussions on the situation in Ireland reveal the extent of their influence on British 
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policies towards Ireland.  The 1916 Easter Rising, like the 1857 uprising in India, was 
a harbinger of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist challenge which followed the war 
as British governments faced tests of their rule in the Near East. The thesis establishes 
that connectedness between the domestic and the imperial policies and the Cabinet 
papers reveal how the discussions which were held by the political leadership in 
Britain over the years reflected the changing nature of the relationships between 
Britain and other imperial powers and between Britain and its Empire. 
    
As I have argued the new-imperialism which was rapidly emerging as a 
dominant international economic force was manifest in the changing priorities of 
British governments which viewed the acquisition of and jurisdiction over valuable 
raw materials as essential to their project.  Where those raw materials were located 
materially affected their strategic thinking.  I have demonstrated this through an 
examination of the Cabinet papers in which these questions were addressed.  In the 
thesis I have demonstrated how in the British Cabinet the debate over the approach to 
be adopted in respect of the Near East welded together economic, political and 
military considerations which shaped the evolution of policies.  Control over the Suez 
Canal constituted the epitome of these concerns.  The Canal was the principal route 
through which communications were maintained between London and the British 
Empire and especially with India which remained amongst its most lucrative 
possessions.  The importance of the Suez Canal was fully appreciated by German 
strategists and concerned British politicians.  Moreover British apprehensions about 
the potential vulnerability of India to Russian encroachment through Afghanistan or 
Persia made the Near East a particular strategic concern as maintaining the capacity to 
deliver reinforcements to the area by the swiftest means possible was crucial.  
Additionally large volumes of trade passed through the Canal on British ships which 
composed more than half of the world’s vessels.  It remained vital to the supply and 
maintenance of Britain’s capacity to defend its imperial territories both from external 
threats and from internal rebellion.   
 
Through the period of imperialist territorial expansion inter-imperialist 
rivalries manifested themselves in periodic military confrontations but the ascent of 
the new forms of economic development embodied in the establishment of a 
globalised market created new challenges.  Chapter Three demonstrated how the 
 255 
British imperialist concern to maintain their hegemonic position with regard to the 
Empire and especially India dictated their preoccupation with the Near East.  This 
resulted however in a clash between agencies with differing economic and political 
priorities.  Those predominantly pre-capitalist economies, like that of Ottoman 
Palestine, were confronted by an ever-increasingly aggressive capitalist expansion 
which distorted and disfigured their economic and social evolution and concomitantly 
their political development.  The finance capital backed enterprises that I have 
commented on above, like the Rutenberg scheme, had greater access to inward capital 
investment and grew more rapidly and became more profitable than the predominantly 
agriculturally oriented indigenous capitalist companies focussed on trade.  
  
President Woodrow Wilson, as I further explained in Chapter Three, applied 
the concept of self-determination differentially, passively endorsing British unilateral 
arbitration over the appropriateness of self-determination to Palestine.  Wilson’s own 
dubious credentials as an anti-colonialist were undermined by his own practices and 
willingness to employ imperial prerogatives in the case of the settlements emanating 
from the Paris Peace Conference.  The findings of the King–Crane Commission which 
conducted widespread consultations with people in the region came to conclusions 
which were clearly contrary to the intentions of the British government and indeed 
questioned the presumptions of the French.  The views which were expressed in their 
canvass of opinion were both informed and consistent in the responses which they 
gave indicating a clear wish to break with the proposed allocation of Mandates by the 
Supreme Council of the Allies at San Remo on 25th April 1920. 
 
The Arab Palestinian political leadership’s response to the British occupation 
and imposition of the Mandate was to seek to insert themselves in the same privileged 
position that they had been accustomed to in the Ottoman Empire.  The British 
continuously sought to coax the Arab Palestinians into formal or informal 
relationships with the Mandate Administration with the objective of reducing their 
opposition to the Zionist colonisation of Palestine and persuading them to become 
complicit in compromising their aspirations for self-determination.  I have argued in 
Chapter Four that the pattern of social and economic development had a distorting 
impact on the evolution of the Palestinian society and economy.  An economically less 
competitive capitalism disadvantaged the a‘yan capitalists and contributed to the 
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creation of a landless working class confronted by discriminatory employment 
practices enforced by Zionist corporatism.  This dislocation of a more organic 
evolution of Palestinian society in turn led to the social and economic differentiations 
being expressed in divergent political positions.  The a‘yan group themselves were 
obliged to come to terms with this process of change gradually dispensing with the 
traditionalist hereditary structures of alignment and gravitating towards the formation 
of political parties cohered by more explicitly programmatic expressions of view 
rather than kinship allegiances. 
 
Palestinian society, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was confronted 
by dramatic world changing events with social, economic and political consequences.  
In Chapter Five I have explained how the impact of these events shaped the political 
response to the British Mandate rapidly metamorphosing from a society dominated by 
pre-capitalist forms of social and economic relations into a society which was 
attempting to deal with the forcible imposition of norms dictated by a world power 
itself transitioning from colonialism into a new-imperialist power implementing a neo-
colonialist practice.  Palestinian society was in many respects unlike any other country 
which the British occupied and brought within their imperial domain because it was in 
the process of becoming a part of the wider world economy and had the capacity to 
continue to develop along that path.  Its economic, social and political progress was 
shaped by the constraints imposed upon it by British imperialism’s primary concern to 
secure its goal of preserving its own empire.  This centred around its preoccupation 
with the Near East and the Suez Canal.  This focus was evident before the adoption of 
the Balfour Declaration and was to re-surface during the 1930s as the inter-imperialist 
rivalry reappeared.  In the first instance the Zionist project was an adjunct to British 
imperialism’s main concerns, although this was never the view held by the Zionist 
movement. 
 
The thesis opened with an analysis of British imperialism and the context of 
the establishment of the Mandate.  Elements of the social, economic and political 
features which had shaped the process of the British occupation and the initiation of 
the Mandate remained operative throughout the period.  The wider world continued to 
impact on the development of Palestinian society as the fellahin suffered greater 
impoverishment with the devastation of their crops, the fierce competition of imported 
 257 
goods and the application of partisan economic measures by the British administration 
favouring Zionist run enterprises.  The Hope Simpson report recorded the 
impoverishment of the rural areas and the vulnerability of those who worked there 
alongside the precariousness faced by the landless workers who gravitated towards the 
larger towns for employment.  Arab Palestinian political response to their situation 
initially manifested itself through a focus on opposition to Jewish immigration and the 
sale of lands.  This was the basis of the inchoate politics which led to the periodic 
demonstrations and outbreaks of violence which led to the deaths and injuries of both 
Jews and Arab Palestinians.  The founding of the Istiqlal Party constituted a break 
with this politics and a refocus on the responsibility of the British as the principal 
authors of the situation. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have focused on analysing the positions of the British 
government through an examination of the discussions and decision-making process 
which took place within the respective Cabinets of the period.  I coupled this with an 
additional focus on the White papers that were produced and the various reports 
commissioned by governments into the major events of the Mandate period.  In so 
doing my intention was to demonstrate that within the British government it was 
clearly the case that they viewed the future of Palestine as a strategic question to the 
Empire as a whole.  Moreover there was an awareness of the contradictory 
implications of the Balfour Declaration and knowledge of the reactions of both the 
Arab Palestinian population and the Zionist settlers to the actions of the Mandate 
administration.  I have done so in order to challenge any notion that the British 
governments were unaware of the realities of the situation in Palestine or ignorant of 
the consequences of the policies they were promoting.       
 
At the centre of the aims of this thesis has been the argument that situating the 
Mandate within that wider context of global political and economic developments 
affords a new perspective on the political processes unfolding in Palestine during the 
period.  Choices by all parties did not take place in a vacuum but were influenced by a 
variety of factors, many though not all of which were beyond their control.  The thesis 
has aimed to reassert the value of taking a wider view on these developments in order 
to enhance reflection on the detail and to contribute to a re-examination of them which 
will contribute to the deepening of an understanding as to how and why events 
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developed in Palestine following this period.  The modest aim of this thesis is not to 
provide a comprehensive answer to the questions that arise surrounding the British 
Mandate in Palestine but to contribute to a fresh perspective on how that task might 
continue to be addressed. 
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